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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the reconstruction of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the 
aftermath of the Suez crisis during the period 1957-1961. The research starts by 
showing that this relationship was ruptured as a result of conflicts in the 
foreign policies of the two states. This rupture occurred during the period 
1954-1956 despite the fact that all problems in the bilateral field between the 
two countries were settled in 1953 and 1954. The sudden rupture in Anglo- 
Egyptian relations created several problems in the field of bilateral relations. 
These problems generated sufficient pressure on the governments of both 
countries to force them to meet, negotiate and make compromises on their 
initial positions in order to reach an agreement.
The research starts with an introductory chapter (Chapter One) which shows 
the development of Anglo-Egyptian relations up to 1957. The second chapter 
exposes the problems in bilateral relations between the two states as a result of 
the rupture in 1956, and their impact on both states. Chapter Three describes 
the start of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and how Egypt tried to reach an 
agreement with the United Kingdom in 1957. Chapter Four shows how an 
agreement was reached between the two states, the U.K.’s efforts to reach an 
agreement, and demonstrates the negligible impact of the conflicts in the 
foreign policies of the two states on the negotiations. The fifth and final 
chapter deals with the reconstruction of official relations and the impact of this 
on bilateral relations between Egypt and the U.K. and on the region as a 
whole.
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INTRODUCTION
This research aims to examine the restoration of diplomatic relations between a 
major power and its former client state after the severance of relations between 
them, as a result of clashes between the foreign policies of the two states in 
question. In such a case, conflict between the foreign policy goals and 
orientations of these two states obviously affects bilateral links and ties, 
leading ultimately to the severance of the diplomatic relations themselves.
The most important variables which are to be examined in this research are the 
relationships between the two states in the case study, both on the level of 
bilateral issues and in the realm of larger foreign policy issues. Bilateral issues 
mean all those problems or outstanding issues between the two states in the 
narrow area of bilateral relations, such as questions relating to the property and 
citizens of one state in the other, the level and the status of trade and 
commercial relations between the two states, as well as the state of official — 
i.e. diplomatic and consular — relations between the two states. At the same 
time, the degrees of congruency or conflict of their general foreign policies are 
also examined, since the rift which occurred between the two states was a 
result of foreign policy clashes. Such an examination should reveal the extent 
to which bilateral relations are affected by foreign policy clashes.
In order to conduct this research, it was essential to draw on the relevant 
approaches in international relations theory which help in explaining the 
factors which allow for the restoration of relations between a major power and
II
its former client state. The approaches utilised attempt to provide an 
understanding of the basic reasons for states’ actions. They also shed light on 
the constraints on states’ actions and the factors that influence the leadership 
of states in choosing a certain course of action at a given time. While each of 
these approaches is aimed separately at explaining the actions of states, in this 
research they are used to complement each other so as to qualify the limitations 
and shortcomings of each.
An important approach utilised is the realist approach, which is based on the 
postulate that states follow policies in the pursuit of their national interests. [1] 
The implication of such an assumption is that in order to understand the policy 
of any state, one has to identify which course of action will best serve that 
state’s national interest. National interest means, in this context, the pursuit of 
the objective of increasing the power of the state in question. Power, as the 
objective of the state’s actions, denotes political power — that is, the ability of 
a state to exert influence and affect the actions of other states. [2] Therefore, 
the perception of how best to increase the power of one’s state (to secure the 
national interest) is either by preserving the status quo, by increasing the 
power of the state or by gaining prestige through the exercise that power: 
“government policies can either be to keep power, to increase that power, or 
to demonstrate power”. [3]
However, such an approach (the classical realist approach as represented by 
Morgenthau) has several inherent limitations. It assumes the autonomy of the 
political sphere, meaning the separation of the domestic politics of the state 
from its foreign policy. This means that a state’s actions will be based purely on 
criteria of interest defined as power, where power (political power) is the ability
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of a state to influence the power of other states. It argues that the primary 
consideration for the decision-makers of any state is the effects of their foreign 
policy on the power of the state, rather than the legality of their policies, or the 
economic welfare of their society, or the interests of sectors of its economy. [4] 
Secondly, it assumes that political leaders will always “think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power”. [5] Thus it assumes that the leaders of states will 
always have an accurate perception of what is in their state’s national interest. 
It also assumes that those leaders will follow what it considers to be the 
“rational” course of action.
In order to make better use of the realist approach in understanding the actions 
of states, one has to bring out the limitations of realism; firstly, by 
understanding that although the power of a state may be demonstrated by its 
political influence and by its military strength and capability, nevertheless these 
are based on the economic means of that state. The history of the rise of major 
powers in world affairs illustrates that it was these factors which enabled these 
major powers to accumulate wealth which allowed them to increase their 
military capacities to become major powers. [6] The international system is 
characterised by a gradation of capabilities among the different states in the 
international community, and the rise and fall of powerful states is a main 
feature of the international system. [7] Indeed, “the relative strength of the 
leading nations in world affairs never remains constant, principally because of 
the uneven rate of growth among different societies and the different 
breakthroughs which bring a greater advantage to one society than to 
another”. [8] Therefore, the issue of trade, and the interests of certain segments 
of the economy which will be affected by the resumption or the severance of a 
state’s trading relations with another, will affect the way the decision-makers 
of that state view their foreign policy goals and orientations.
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Secondly, it is essential to acknowledge the influence of domestic politics on 
the foreign policy of states. It is indeed the case that “politics within a 
government influence decisions and actions ostensibly directed outward”. [9] 
Moreover, decisions within any government are influenced by the bargaining 
process which takes place within that system of government. The role of a 
certain part of a government in the decision-making process can sometimes be 
clearly visible. At the same time, the bargaining process is not just limited to the 
different branches of government but also includes the intervention of interest 
groups from outside government itself. These may include industrialists, 
businessmen, professional and voluntary associations, syndicates and so on. 
[10]
The classical realist approach, as represented by Morgenthau, is based on 
certain assumptions. It stresses that political relations are governed by 
objective rules, rooted in human nature, whereby decision-makers will make 
rational choices among certain options which are available to them. In this 
context, and as described above, statesmen will think and act in terms of 
interests defined as state power. By understanding which policy options serve 
these goals, one may understand and predict which course of action a state will 
follow. It is clear that this approach ignores, or at the very least underestimates 
the moral universe in which political leaders take decisions. More seriously, 
however, the most contentious assumption of this approach is that foreign 
policy decisions are in most important respects insulated from domestic or 
internal political considerations within the state. Such a classical realist 
approach tends to emphasise in a mechanical and undifferentiated way the 
modalities of states' actions. These problems with the realist approach lead to a
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focus on decision-making processes. This approach enables a better 
understanding of the influence of domestic politics on the foreign policy of 
states. It concentrates on how decisions are taken, particularly in the field of 
foreign policy. The decision-making process has received a great deal of 
attention throughout the development of the study of politics and 
international relations. Several supplementary theories have endeavoured to 
study and analyse the impact of the decision-makers on the foreign policy of a 
given state. The increased complexity of political systems has contributed to 
more elaborate theories and models which attempt to explain the ways in 
which decision-making processes operate, taking into account the character, 
background and ideology of the decision-makers themselves, as well as the 
input and constraints of the political system in which they operate. These 
theories start from basic models, which study the decision-making process in an 
authoritarian state, to the more complex models which describe the decision­
making process in a democracy.
Among such models, there is the Presidential Centre or Leader-Staff Group 
model, which usually results in personalised diplomacy. [11] This model 
assumes that the political structure in such a state is organised in a way which 
allows the ruler almost a free hand in the conduct of the foreign policy of the 
state in question. It assumes the absence — in that society —  of relatively 
independent political institutions able to contribute to the foreign policy of 
that state through the restraint they are capable of exercising on the 
government. Therefore, in such a model, the focus of the study concentrates on 
the decision-maker himself, in terms of his personality and background, in order 
to be able to understand past actions and future policy.
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These models become more complicated when attempting to analyse situations 
in democratic societies with a developed bureaucracy, where government 
decisions are subject to public scrutiny. Among such models are Allison’s three 
models: the Rational Actor Model, the Organisational Process Model and the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. The Rational Actor Model, assumes a setting for 
the decision-making process such that government decisions are based on a 
rational choice between certain policy options. In such a setting, the decision­
maker (or makers) make their choice purely on the basis of a rational analysis of 
the alternative ways of serving the states' interests. The Organisational Process 
Model conceives a decision process where the decision taken is the sum of the 
output of independent government organisations, each of which acts within its 
own sphere of influence. The third is the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This 
model assumes that the decision-making process is characterised by conscious 
decisions of the political leadership, choosing between policy options 
submitted by competing governmental organisations. The options given by 
these organisations are, in turn, influenced by the views of that particular part 
of the government bureaucracy — be it ministries of foreign affairs, defence or 
the economy —  of their indigenous concepts of national interests, as well as of 
the interests of that segment of the government bureaucracy and the personal 
interests of those in charge of it. [12]
These models have been developed and refined by others to make them more 
powerful and to rectify the shortcomings in their original designs [13] thereby 
making them more useful at explaining and predicting the behaviour of 
decision-makers within the internal political system in which they operate. For 
instance, there is the Cybernetic Theory of Decisions, which proposes a 
cybernetic paradigm for explaining the decision-making process. This suggests
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that the course of action adopted by the decision-maker in a given situation is 
more likely to be influenced by past experiences, rather than by a purely 
intellectual analysis of the problem at hand. This is in contrast to the analytical 
paradigm advocated by Allison and others, which assumes that decision­
makers will make their decisions after a rational analysis of the problem at hand 
and that they will adopt a course of action best suited to the national interest, 
after carefully considering the merits and disadvantages of all policy options.
However, the Cybernetic Theory provides a valuable contribution, mainly 
through the acknowledgement of the role of the cognitive process and the 
past experience of the decision-makers when taking their decisions. (14) This 
acknowledgement is essential in understanding decisions and actions which 
cannot logically be explained by an analytical paradigm. In addition, it 
provides a way of seeking to explain the influence of historical processes on 
political decisions.
Moreover, the acknowledgement of the importance of the perceptions and the 
cognitive processes of decision-makers rectifies a major drawback of the realist 
approach, namely the assumption that the leader (or the decision-maker) of the 
state will follow a “rational” course of action — in pursuit of power — to 
serve the national interest. It is extremely dangerous, whether for leaders or for 
analysts, to construct for others what is or is not a “rational” course of action, 
since it suggests processes of perception and calculation which may bear little 
relation to the situation of the decision maker. This rational course of action 
may indeed patently not be adopted by the leaders in question. Consequently, 
in order to be able to accurately analyse the foreign policy of the states in 
question, one should not only understand the internal political structure and
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how decisions are taken, but also acknowledge the fact that an understanding 
of the decision-maker’s perception of reality is essential in analysing and 
comprehending his decisions. Decisions-makers, like all individuals, tend to ’’fit 
incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they 
expect to be there“. [15] Therefore, the decision-maker’s perception of reality 
may be shaped by his situation, or by the context in which he receives the 
information appropriate to his decisions.
Moreover, one has to allow for the fact that decision-makers are also 
influenced by past experience and may have almost automatic reflex responses 
to problems or crisis. [16] Therefore, allowing for the influences of the decision­
maker’s cognitive process and perception of reality offers an explanation for 
why decision-makers take decisions which may be against the national interest 
(as perceived by others through a rational and detached analysis), or that defy 
logic or even common sense. In short, the contribution of the decision-making 
approach should be taken as complementary to the realist approach, so as to 
guard against the limitations of realism.
Nevertheless, one should also guard against the limitations of the decision­
making approach itself. Despite its contribution, it does not escape the problem 
of discovering where effective decision-making lies, a problem with which 
decision-making theorists have long sought to grapple. Secondly, it may lead 
to the assumption that one should concentrate one’s study on the pattern of 
behaviour and the past of the decision-makers, an approach that may lead the 
student of international relations away from the study of national interest, and 
the real issues of domestic and foreign policies, in order to draw conclusions 
derived from the past personal histories of the decision-makers.
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These are problems which the study of international relations seeks to 
understand, and through their resolution to discern the dynamics and patterns 
which characterize the policies of states. The challenge is to find regularities in 
the behaviour of states, in order to understand whether there are observable 
generic regularities between particular kinds of states and their relationships 
with each other. Without such an attempt at generalisation, one would be left 
with a particularistic view of the world, in which comparisons are difficult to 
make, patterns are difficult to see and generalisation becomes impossible. Yet 
political science, and thus international relations, are founded on the belief that 
a degree of comparison is not simply desirable, but also epistemologically 
necessary.
Realist approaches, and decision-making studies, are all, in some measure, 
seeking to throw light upon the way in which states behave. In order to gain a 
better understanding of how states act and to find generic underlying themes 
which motivate the policies of states, it is helpful to select and to study states 
which stand in particular kinds of relationship to each other — a relationship 
which may be unique in its detail and in its historical specificity, but which may 
nevertheless be taken as an example of a general type of relationship. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of these relationships and the degree to which they 
may qualify the assumptions on which general theories of international 
relations are based, will assist in assessing the validity of these theories.
It is for these reasons that the present research focuses on aspects of the 
sometimes troubled relations between two kinds of states: on the one hand, a 
state that formerly stood in a subordinate or client position toward an imperial 
or major power; on the other hand, the major power itself, in the process of
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losing its influence and, for a variety of reasons, unable to exert the kind of 
dominance or patronage it had once exercised over its former client. It is in this 
context that questions of the redefinition of the imperatives of national 
security, of the legacies of the previous relationship, of the search for new 
ways of establishing a relationship on a radically changed footing, as well as of 
the dynamics of this process, come to the fore.
Specifically, in the context of this research, the ways in which these questions 
arise at moments of crisis, caused in part by the factors which underpin them, 
throw into sharp relief the underlying patterns in this kind of relationship. In 
this context, the fact that both states — the major power and its former client 
state — will adopt policies which will serve their respective national interests, 
by seeking to restore official relations, may seem to validate the basic realist 
assumption that statesmen will seek to serve national interests, despite any 
negative feelings that they might have towards each other and without 
attempting to act on some high moral imperative. However, the realisation by 
the political leaders of both states that restoring diplomatic relations will serve 
national interests, is likely to have come about as a result of internal pressures, 
possibly stemming from the problems caused by the very rupture in bilateral 
relations. This qualifies the classical realist approach regarding the autonomy of 
the political sphere, since it emphasises the input of domestic political 
developments on foreign policy decisions.
Moreover, the fact that restoration of relations between the major power and 
its former client state occurred at a time of heightened regional conflict 
between the two states, shows that bilateral relations may take precedence 
over general foreign policy differences, as the former may generate sufficient
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domestic pressures inside each state to force the two states to restore relations. 
The thesis also validates one assumption of realism —  namely, that states tend 
to minimise threats against themselves, and that only after securing themselves 
will they seek the larger aim of increasing their power. The case study shows 
how a major power and its former client sought to restore official relations, 
despite a regional power struggle between them, because each realised that the 
other state was powerful enough to be able to inflict some damage on its 
interests in the area.
At the same time, the fact that colonial legacies of the past relationship 
between the two states resulted in negative perceptions which influenced the 
decision-makers’ view of the desirability of restoring relations, validates the 
importance attached by decision-making theorists to perceptions (or 
misperceptions) on the intended course of action adopted by the decision­
makers. Indeed, it demonstrates the centrality of the need to understand the 
framework within which decision-makers operate.
This also qualifies the realists' assumption that statesmen will follow a 
’’rational4* course of action in pursuit of their states’ national interest, as well 
as the Rational Actor Model, which makes similar assumptions. “Rationality”, 
insofar as it denotes means-ends calculations, can be seen to be subject to a 
multitude of influences which need in turn to be examined and explained with 
reference to the situation of the decision-makers. At the same time, the case 
study illustrates the Bureaucratic Politics Model of the decision-making focus, 
especially when reviewing how a decision within the government of a major 
power may be taken as a result of competition between different segments of 
the bureaucracy.
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This thesis about the restoration of relations between amajor power and its 
former client state, is a thesis on the foreign policy perceptions of the decision­
makers. The way in which bilateral and regional issues affect each other, will 
also affect national interests and the way which these are perceived. Moreover, 
the thesis illustrates Bull's analysis of the importance of diplomatic relations 
and how each state (the major power and its former client) may decide to 
resume relations to avoid the escalation of the conflict between them. Hedley 
Bull argues that the importance of diplomatic relations can be summarised as 
follows: they facilitate the negotiation of agreements; allow the gathering of 
information and intelligence; minimise the effects of tensions and symbolise the 
existence of normal relations between states. [17] Moreover, diplomatic 
relations provide the leadership of the two states with the opportunity to 
resolve misunderstandings through the exchange of confidential messages.
Although diplomatic relations are not a prerequisite for the exchange of 
messages between the heads of states, nevertheless, the absence of such 
relations can hinder the delivery of such messages. Furthermore, diplomatic 
relations facilitate the process of the negotiation of agreements to sort out 
bilateral differences between them. Moreover, contacts between diplomats and 
officials of both countries allow them the opportunity to minimise the effects of 
tensions, since they give both sides the chance to present the rationale behind 
their policies. Finally, diplomatic representation lends an air of co-existence 
and normality to bilateral relations. Despite the fact that diplomatic relations 
can never, by themselves, lead to better relations between states, nevertheless, 
they may contribute to improving the atmosphere of relations between them. 
(18)
22
To understand the reasons behind the restoration of relations between a major 
power and its former client state, it is best to utilise the above-mentioned 
approaches of international relations theory. To start with, one must 
acknowledge the basic premise of the realist approach, namely that states 
follow policies in pursuit of national interests. However, one has to be cautious 
in assuming that decision-makers will consistently follow a straightforwardly 
predictable course of action based on simple means-ends calculations in pursuit 
of their state's national interest. Several issues will affect the perception of the 
leaders or decision-makers of the national interest and the best course of action 
to serve that interest.
The legacy of the relationship which existed between the major power and its 
former client during the period of patronage will undoubtedly affect the 
perceptions of decision-makers of both states regarding each other. Moreover, 
in the case of the rupture or restoration of official relations, one must 
acknowledge that this legacy may lead to the rise of certain groups within 
each country which will actively lobby either for the restoration of relations or 
for a toughening of the terms that either state will accept for such a restoration. 
Such lobbies may include segments of the population which were harmed by 
the severance of the trade links between the two states, and who may try to 
influence their state’s policy for the restoration of official relations and the 
resumption of such trade links. The issue of trade may also serve the opposite 
effect, as other groups inside one state may lobby against the restoration of 
relations between the two states for fear of more competitive industries in the 
other state.
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Therefore, in order to understand the reasons for the restoration of a relations 
between a major power and its former client state, and while accepting that 
states' foreign policies seek to serve their national interests, one must allow for 
the influence of two factors: firstly, the effects of the legacy of the previous 
relationship on the perception of the decision-makers; secondly, the possible 
rise of interest groups from within either or both states which may pressure the 
decision-makers for or against the restoration of relations.
In addition, one may locate certain tangible issues, relevant to bilateral relations 
between the major power and the lesser power (its former client state) which 
lead to the restoration of official relations. Firstly, the fact that foreign policy 
clashes may be able to disrupt and sever bilateral links, despite the settlement 
of bilateral differences, suggests that after the end of the patron-client 
relationship, there may remain structural imbalances between the major power 
and its former client. This imbalance may lead to the souring of relations, even 
after the settlement of those problems which had previously existed in the 
bilateral field between the two states. Therefore, due to this structural 
imbalance in the relationship, problems leading to a crisis and the possible 
severance of the relationship are likely to surface. If the focus were not on 
bilateral issues, these structural imbalances might be expressed in other areas, 
such as in the realm of the two countries' respective general foreign policies.
Secondly, the abrupt severance of relations between the major power and its 
former protectorate, as a result of general foreign policy clashes, will cause the 
emergence of new problems in the field of bilateral relations between the two 
states. Such problems may convince the states in question of the importance of 
restoring official relations in order to serve their national interests. Some of
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these problems may arise from the severance of the trade links between the 
two states, leading to either state being denied the import of some strategic 
goods from the other, or the denial of a facility or a service to one state which it 
believes to be strategically important. These problems will create increasing 
internal pressures within each state, which force the governments of both 
states to address them. This internal pressure could emerge from the sectors of 
the population which were particularly affected by the severance of the 
relations, and it may force the governments of the two states to meet, and 
discuss ways of resolving their differences. Eventually, they may force both 
governments to make sufficient compromises to resolve these problems. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the desire for the resolution of these problems 
will convince both states of the need to ensure their successful resolution. 
Thus, although it may seem logical that problems in the bilateral field between 
states may sour their relations, nevertheless, it may indeed be these bilateral 
problems (resulting from the abrupt severance of relations) which will force the 
two states to meet, eventually contributing to the restoration of relations. This 
may occur even if the foreign policy clashes between the two states in 
question are not only maintained but intensify and develop in other areas.
Thirdly, although problems in bilateral relations may serve as the catalysts for 
the restoration of relations between the major power and the lesser power, they 
will work against a background of animosity between the two states, due to 
the problems of their past relations and particularly due to the abrupt manner 
of the severance of the relationship. This may lead to significant developments. 
The first is that the issue of restoration of official relations will involve more 
than the resolution of the outstanding problems between the two states. These 
issues include the perceptions of the leaders or decision-makers of both states
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of the policy of the other state, legacies of the colonial past with all the 
inherent value judgem ents of both states’ decision-makers and their 
perceptions of the effects of the restoration of official relations on the state’s 
prestige and power, especially in view of persisting competition in the field of 
both states’ foreign policies. The second issue is that, during the negotiations, 
the perception of each state of the relative strength or weakness of the other 
will affect its bargaining position. This means that if either state believes that 
the other is in a weak position and that it badly needs an agreement, this will 
lead to the softening of its negotiating position and increase its efforts to reach 
an agreement.
The case study through which these themes and processes will be examined in 
this research is the restoration of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the aftermath of 
the Suez War, a process (i.e. the restoration of official relations) which lasted 
from 1957 until the beginning of 1961 (when diplomatic relations were finally 
upgraded to ambassadorial level).
This case study is particularly relevant as it contains all the pertinent variables, 
in terms of the relations between the two states prior to and after the final 
break between them. The history of their relations prior to the break in 1956 
was that of a major power versus a lesser state which had been both a 
protectorate and a client. The problems between the two states following 
Egypt’s change of regime in 1952 soured the atmosphere of the relationship. 
However, these problems had been effectively dealt with by the Anglo- 
Egyptian settlement over the Sudan in 1953, and by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Agreement of 1954, allowing for British troops to withdraw from Egypt (the 
evacuation being completed in 1956). The relationship between the U.K. and
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Egypt during 1954-1956 illustrates that there were structural imbalances in the 
relations, imbalances that allowed factors relating to regional confrontations 
between the two states to spill over into the area of bilateral relations and to 
become the main reason for the break in bilateral ties between them. 
Furthermore, both states, respectively, fulfil the role of the previous patron and 
major power — the U.K. — and that of the lesser power and former client — 
Egypt.
As for the U.K., the economic power and thus capabilities of the British Empire 
had drastically declined, due to the second World War. Nevertheless, it still 
maintained a great part of its colonies, as well as the paternal, or patronising, 
attitude of some of its leaders and politicians. Unlike France, another major 
power which had been a leading colonial power before the war, the U.K. had 
never been humiliated by defeat in war by the Germans, and it depended on its 
partnership with the United States to restore its full economic potential, despite 
the problems faced by the British economy. Egypt, on the other hand, 
represented the lesser powers of that period anxious to prove their 
independence. In pursuance of its national interests, its government had 
embarked on an active foreign policy, designed to aid the independence of 
Arab states and to establish Egyptian influence and presence in the Arab world 
(possibly at the expense of the U.K., the predominant power in that region at 
the time). This was directly manifested by an active Arab policy that put Egypt 
on a direct collision course with the United Kingdom. This structural imbalance 
in the Anglo-Egyptian relationship found expression in the clashes in the 
foreign policies of both states, which eventually developed into a regional 
conflict over mastery in the Middle East and led to the destruction of bilateral 
ties.
This case study is illuminating precisely because the rupture which occurred
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between the two states happened after they had settled the problems between 
them in the bilateral field.
The main thesis of this study is to argue that the problems between the two 
states which developed as a result of the 1956 severance of relations, were 
themselves the main reason which forced the two states to meet and discuss 
ways of restoring their relationship. It is assumed that problems in bilateral 
relations between states will lead to the disruption of relations. However, 
contrary to this assumption, it was exactly these problems in the bilateral field 
between the U.K. and Egypt which acted as the catalyst that forced the 
resumption of the relations between them.
Bilateral relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom were slowly 
reconstructed over a period of more than two years. This process occurred at 
the time when the regional competition — or rather confrontation — between 
the two states had reached its zenith. There are several reasons which 
accounted for the need to resume negotiations between the two states and 
which led in effect to bilateral issues taking precedence over the regional 
conflict. The most important was the fact that the sudden and abrupt rupture of 
the bilateral relationship created major problems for both countries (the United 
Kingdom and Egypt). Secondly, these problems generated a momentum of 
their own, and sufficient internal pressure to force the British and Egyptian 
governments to meet and try to solve them. Indeed, that internal pressure was 
responsible for the fact that both states had to accept compromises on these 
issues, in contrast with the initial stances which they had adopted.
These problems, or outstanding issues, which had resulted from the break in
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relations between the two states, were firstly, the passage of British ships 
through the Suez Canal; secondly, the freezing of Egyptian assets in the 
United Kingdom valued at around £70 million [19] after Egypt nationalised the 
Suez Canal Company; and thirdly, the sequestration of British property in 
Egypt after the Suez War. There were other problems outstanding in the field 
of bilateral relations. The most obvious, naturally, was the severance of 
diplomatic relations between the two states. In addition, Presidential 
Proclamation Number 5 of November 1956 restricted the right of British 
citizens to own property or to conduct business in Egypt. Another 
outstanding issue between the two states resulted from the arrest and 
conviction of two British citizens on charges of espionage. This arrest had 
occurred in the late summer of 1956 and preceded the outbreak of the Suez 
War.
This research aims to establish that these outstanding bilateral issues and 
problems between the two states were the main reasons for bringing the two 
states to the negotiating table. They were thus responsible for the 
reconstruction of the bilateral relations between the U.K. and Egypt. This 
occurred despite the fact that the period during which reconstruction took 
place witnessed the heightening of conflicts of interest between the two states 
in the region. Indeed such a regional conflict of interests could be said to have 
caused the initial break between them. This sequence of events tends to prove 
that the outstanding issues in bilateral relations enhanced and fostered bilateral 
contacts aimed at solving them. This, in turn, highlighted the need to 
reconstruct the relationship between the two antagonistic states despite other 
regional differences in their foreign policies.
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This research starts by tracing the reasons for the restoration of relations 
between the United Kingdom and Egypt, and examining the way this was 
achieved. The thesis starts with a brief chapter which attempts to set the scene 
for the situation between the two states after the break in 1956.
The history of the relationship is briefly explored, with particular emphasis on: 
the pattern of the relationship between Egypt and the United Kingdom prior to 
the 1952 coup d’etat; the disruption of this pattern and the resolution of the 
bilateral differences in the period 1952-1954; and the reasons for the rupture in 
the relationship between the two states, showing that there remained a 
structural imbalance in relations that persisted even after the settlement of 
Anglo-Egyptian differences. While touching briefly on the emergence of the 
new superpowers which were interested in Egypt and the effect that this had 
on Anglo-Egyptian relations, particular attention is paid to explaining the main 
reasons for the severance of the relationship; namely that the clashes in foreign 
policy in the region led to the rupture in the relations in 1956.
The second chapter starts by identifying the main problems or outstanding 
issues which were created between the two states as a result of the abrupt 
severance of their relationship in 1956. And as this study involves the 
reconstruction of relations between the two states, the course of the research 
will try to identify the reasons and methods of the reconstruction of that 
relationship. The chapters are divided thematically and chronologically by 
identifying at each period which country sought to reconstruct the 
relationship, showing that this decision was made because the government of 
the state in question believed that this reconstruction was in its national 
interest. During the course of the exposition, it will be explained how the
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perceptions of that national interest by the decision-makers influenced the 
decision of both states about reconstructing the relationship. It will also 
expose the efforts of each of the two states in reaching an agreement, and the 
reaction of the other state towards such an overture (or overtures).
Accordingly, the second chapter will identify the major problems in the field of 
bilateral relations between the two states and the pressures that they began to 
exert on their governments. The most important of these problems was the 
continued closure of the Suez Canal to British ships, a issue which was of 
major concern to the British government at the time. The study will expose 
that, just as the Suez Canal was the reason — or rather the catalyst — for the 
outbreak of the conflict between the two states, it was also the catalyst which 
forced the governments of the two countries to meet in order to discuss ways 
of bridging that issue. Indeed, because of the pressures of this problem, the 
British government initiated the talks between the two governments, in order 
to resolve it. There were also the problems of the British property sequestrated 
in Egypt and the British refugees from Egypt.
The third chapter will seek to explain why, from May 1957, the Egyptian 
government sought actively to reach a reconciliation with the U.K. This was 
despite continuing foreign policy clashes and the feelings of bitterness 
prevalent in Egypt towards the U.K. because of the Suez War, the “Tripartite 
Aggression” . Special emphasis will be placed on the reasons behind the 
Egyptian position, mainly the economic difficulties Egypt was facing as a result 
of the economic sanctions imposed on Egypt after it nationalised the Suez 
Canal. These were beginning to cause serious problems for the Egyptian 
economy. Consequently the Egyptian government wanted an agreement with
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the U.K. which would allow Egypt to regain its sterling balances in the United 
Kingdom.
The change in the position of both states regarding reconciliation at that stage 
centred on the attempt to reach a financial agreement, permitting the return of 
normal relations between the two states in areas such as commerce and trade 
and allowing for the eventual resumption of official relations. These 
endeavours will mark the beginning of the following part of the research 
(Chapter 4). The position of both states in the negotiations directed at settling 
the outstanding bilateral issues drastically changed. This change was 
manifested firstly by the hardening of the Egyptian position in the 
negotiations. Thus, instead of Egypt wishing to reach any agreement with the 
U.K., the Egyptian negotiators and policy makers were only willing to accept a 
clearly favourable agreement. As for the change in the British side, it was 
noticeable that after the reluctance of the British government to reach an 
agreement in 1957, the situation changed completely in 1958.
During the course of this chapter the developments in the negotiations 
between the two states will be discussed. The reasons for the changes in the 
positions of both states will be analysed, especially the reasons for the 
softening of the British position in the light of the internal and external 
pressures for an agreement on the British Cabinet. An attempt will also be 
made to justify and analyse the reasons for the rigidity of the Egyptian position 
at certain stages of the negotiations. This led to the Egyptian delegation, at the 
last minute, baulking at signing the financial agreement. The eventual signature 
of the bilateral treaty in 1959 will be explained, showing the U.K. efforts to 
reach a financial settlement with Egypt. In that context, the foreign policy
32
conflicts, which had intensified during that period, will be reviewed, and their 
effects explained, to establish the impact this conflict had on the area of 
bilateral relations. From the evidence, it appears that, regardless of the 
increasing conflict, the efforts aimed at reaching agreement between the two 
countries not only continued but actually intensified. The terms of the 
agreement will be reviewed in order to establish which side made greater 
compromises. This will be an indication of which of the two states was the 
more eager to reach an agreement.
The last and final chapter of this research (Chapter 5), will deal with the 
restoration of official relations. The efforts to establish diplomatic relations with 
Egypt will also be examined, starting from the point where the U.K. wanted to 
establish outright diplomatic relations upon the signing of an agreement. The 
U.K. initially wanted to make the release of the blocked Egyptian assets in the 
U.K. conditional on the resumption of full diplomatic relations. Later, the U.K. 
was prepared to settle for the establishment of a U.K. diplomatic mission in 
Cairo, but had to allow the release of Egyptian balances in the U.K. before 
achieving even this, its minimum demand. The issue of the restoration of 
diplomatic relations will be examined, showing the difficulties that such a 
restoration entailed because of the generic difference between a financial 
settlement and the restoration of diplomatic relations. Due to these differences, 
restoration of full diplomatic relations was much delayed because it was 
influenced by domestic factors in each state, by the perceptions of the leaders 
and by the colonial legacy, as well as by foreign policy conflicts. In that 
context, the issues of bilateral relations between the two states will be 
examined, showing the difficulties which existed between the two states in the 
bilateral field. Also the problems of each country opening up consular and
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diplomatic missions in the lands — and spheres of influence — of the other 
country will also be examined. The significance of the last point is two-fold. 
Firstly, it took on such importance that it was the issue responsible for the 
delay in the appointment of ambassadors of the two states. Secondly, the 
conflict and competition between the two states, which was at first focused on 
the Middle East, later developed to other parts of the Third World. The 
permission given by one state for the opening up of diplomatic missions in the 
spheres of influence of the other had several implications. On one hand, it was 
a sign of the maturity of the relationship between the states, for it implied the 
acceptance of both governments that they had to live with the competition 
between their foreign policies, without sacrificing their bilateral relations 
because of that factor. Indeed, the restoration of diplomatic relations allowed 
both counties to co-operate in Kuwait in 1961, to prevent Iraq’s occupation of 
that country and to decrease the tensions in the area.
For the purpose of this study, a wide range of sources has been used. The most 
important were, of course, primary sources. British primary sources were 
essential for this study and I have relied extensively on the archives in the 
Public Records Office at Kew. These include Cabinet Papers, Foreign Office 
Files, Treasury Files and records of the Ministry of Defence. In addition some 
papers in the private papers collection at the Middle East Centre of St. 
Antony’s College (Oxford) were used. The debates in both Houses of 
Parliament were also consulted through H ansard, especially those in the 
period following Suez. Furthermore, the published memoirs of British 
politicians and diplomats were also consulted in order to obtain a clear picture 
of the global problems which faced the politicians and civil servants of that 
time, and thus to see how the decision-makers perceived the Anglo-Egyptian
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relationship, and how their perception was affected by other factors at the 
time. For that process as well, and since the issue of bilateral relations was an 
issue where British public opinion was involved, with its consequent 
importance for British decision-makers at the time, the British newspapers of 
the period were also consulted.
Secondary sources were also used. They include the body of literature which 
has been written on the Anglo-Egyptian relationship, or on British policy in 
the Middle East, and the international situation from the end of the Second 
World War until the early sixties, as well as the politics and foreign policies of 
both the U.K. and Egypt.
Officially, access to the Egyptian archives is impossible, since all documents of 
that period remain closed under the Fifty Year Rule in Egypt. However, 
interviews were conducted with some prominent Egyptian figures involved in 
the politics of that time who had first-hand information regarding Egyptian 
policy towards the U.K. These interviews, together with the Egyptian position 
as reported in the British archives, gave a better understanding of the Egyptian 
position. The British archives, in particular, gave a great deal of information 
about Egyptian policy at that time and the implications for the U.K. The 
writings of Egyptian politicians (including Nasser) of the time and their 
memoirs, were also used, together with the speeches Nasser made. To complete 
the picture, a review of the Egyptian press of that time was also important, 
especially in the light of the growing restrictions imposed by the Egyptian 
government on the Egyptian newspapers. Furthermore, the American National 
Archives, State and Defence Departments files have been used as well as the 
publications of the “Foreign Policy of the United States” from the period from 
1949 until 1956-1957.
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CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE SCENE 
I INTRODUCTION
By 1957, relations between the United Kingdom and Egypt had passed 
through a drastic transformation, especially in the decade previous to that date. 
For though Egypt was never a colony of Great Britain, the latter nevertheless 
had exercised almost absolute power over its internal as well as its external 
political and economic life since occupying it in 1882.
This created a structural imbalance which plagued Anglo-Egyptian relations 
after the end of the British occupation of Egypt and affected the restoration of 
official relations after the Suez War. The legal status of the British presence in 
Egypt, and its pattern of rule, had indeed ensured that structural imbalance in 
relations and led eventually to the destruction of that relationship.
At the same time, a major factor which had allowed the U.K. to maintain its 
position in Egypt, namely the fact that it enjoyed no competition from other 
major countries over its position in Egypt, was also threatened. This was due to 
the emergence of new superpowers in the post World War II era, superpowers 
which eventually began actively to compete with each other as well as with 
the U.K. for influence in and control of Egypt.
The combination of the above-mentioned factors, namely the decline of the
39
U.K. power, the effect of the exercise of that power on the Egyptian political 
system —  which led to the fall of that system in 1952, as well as the rise of new 
superpowers, all led to the decline of the U.K. hold over Egypt. There were 
two main problems which had soured the atmosphere of the relationship 
between the two states at that time and up to 1954. The first and most 
important was the Egyptian request for the U.K. to withdraw its forces from 
Egypt; the second was the question of the Sudan. The Egyptian monarch, as 
well as the rest of the Egyptian polity, tended to consider the Sudan an integral 
part of Egypt, while the U.K. was committed to giving the Sudan, eventually, 
the right of self-determination independent of Egypt.
i
However, the change in the Egyptian political system, as well as the pressure 
and mediation of the U.K.'s war-time ally and the new superpower of that era, 
the United States, had eventually led to the breaking of the stalemate which 
had plagued the relationship between the two states. The problems between 
the two states in the field of bilateral relations were eventually sorted out with 
the signing of the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the Sudan, and the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, which allowed for the withdrawal of the 
U.K. troops from Egypt.
Nevertheless after the problems between Egypt and the United Kingdom in the 
bilateral field were cleared up, leading to the hope that a new era of actual co­
operation would finally ensue between the two states, their relationship began 
to deteriorate. The active involvement of Egypt in the Arab world after the 
1952 coup d'etat was the main reason for this deterioration. As a result, a direct 
clash in the foreign policy of Egypt and the U.K. in the region occurred, since
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the Egyptian policy of attacking imperialism meant an attack on the power and 
influence of the U.K. in the Middle East, generally, and in the Arab states in 
particular. The result of this conflict in the foreign policies of the two states in 
the region was effectively perceived as the start of a regional conflict between 
them. This conflict resulted in a series of major incidents —  such as the Czech 
arms deal and the sudden removal of General Glubb from the leadership of the 
Jordanian army, the Arab Legion — which convinced the U.K. policy makers 
that there was no possibility of dealing with Nasser's Egypt. This led, in turn, to 
the sudden withdrawal of the High Dam financing offer, a move that had led 
Egypt to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and the Suez War which 
ensued in October 1956.
H LEGALITY AND PATTERN OF THE BRITISH 
RULE OF EGYPT UP TO 1952
The Anglo-Egyptian relationship had been described by one of the Egyptian 
supporters of the U.K. presence in Egypt as “a Catholic marriage which 
cannot be broken” . [1] The fate of the man who made that statement in 1942 
—  Amin Osman — was to mirror that of the marriage between the U.K. and 
Egypt. To understand why the Anglo-Egyptian relationship was ultimately 
destroyed, one has to mention the legality of the British presence in Egypt, as 
well as the pattern of the British rule in Egypt, which led to the creation of a 
structural imbalance in that relationship and the collapse of the pre-1952 
political regime in Egypt — all factors which contributed to the loss of British 
control over Egypt.
Firstly, when the British forces occupied Egypt in 1882, the legal pretext was 
Khedive Tawfik's (then the ruler of Egypt) invitation to put down the Urabi
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uprising and to protect foreign lives and property. After the occupation of 
Egypt, the British presence in Egypt lacked any legal foundation despite the 
fact that the actual ruler of Egypt became not the Khedive but the British 
Agent and Consul General. The first to occupy that post was Mr. E. Malet 
(who was the British Agent in Egypt based in Alexandria prior to the British 
occupation of Egypt).
In 1883, he was replaced by the most famous of the British envoys to Egypt, 
Sir Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer. The British envoys maintained that they 
“would not interfere with the liberty of action of the Khedivial Government, 
but in practice he would insist on the Khedive and the Egyptian Ministers 
conforming to his views.” [2]. A vivid illustration of the British domination of 
Egypt was Egypt's official non-alignment during the Ottoman-Italian war of 
1911-1912 (in Libya on Egypt's western borders) although Egypt was a part of 
the Ottoman Empire. This position prevented Egypt from allowing Ottoman 
troops to cross Egypt to Libya, while at the same time allowing Italian troops 
to pass through the Suez Canal from Ethiopia to Libya. [3]
After the beginning of the First World War, it was implausible to maintain the 
facade that British-ruled Egypt remained part of the Ottoman Empire while the 
two countries were at war. Therefore, Egypt was declared a British 
protectorate in 1914. Once done, the title of Khedive, the official ruler of Egypt, 
was changed to Sultan. The ruling Khedive, who was in Turkey at the 
outbreak of the war, and thought to be loyal to the Ottomans, was summarily 
sacked. At the same time, the title of the British envoy was changed from 
Consul General to High Commissioner. This meant that the British were free to
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exercise more open and direct rule over Egypt. After the end of of the First 
World War, and because of the massive public resistance which occurred in 
Egypt calling for independence, the British government issued a unilateral 
declaration of independence stating that Egypt was an independent 
monarchy. However, the British declaration qualified that independence by 
stating that there were still reserved points which remained to be negotiated 
with Egypt over a) the security of the Suez Canal and the imperial 
communications, b) the status of the Sudan, c) the protection of foreign 
nationals and finally d) the defence of Egypt. The fact that the 1922 
Declaration of Independence was qualified, as well as unilateral, meant the task 
of almost every government which reached power in Egypt was to negotiate 
an agreement with the U.K. over the reserved points in the declaration. In 1936 
the U.K.'s increasing concern regarding security in the Mediterranean was an 
added impetus for seeking an agreement between the two countries, especially 
as the United Kingdom wanted to secure the use of Egypt's resources and 
facilities during any future European war. However that treaty was less a 
confirmation of Egypt's independence than a way of legalising the U.K. 
presence there. This was demonstrated by the actions of the British senior 
envoy to Egypt in times of crisis.
Just as the 1922 declaration did not stop Lord Allenby from using gunboat 
diplomacy to force the resignation of Saad Zaghloul from power in 1924 after 
the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Lord Killeam (then Sir Miles Lampson) was 
not inhibited by the 1936 treaty from taking similar if not more drastic action. 
Thus when the King refused to appoint a Wafd government to power in Egypt, 
at a time when the defence of Egypt was seriously threatened from the attacks 
of Field Marshal Rommel on the western front, Lord Killearn did not hesitate to
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give an ultimatum to King Farouk either to appoint the Wafd government or to 
abdicate his throne. At the same time, he made sure that the King would oblige 
by surrounding Abdeen Palace, the King's official residence, with British tanks. 
The actions of the U.K. high commissioners — or ambassadors — in Egypt, 
regardless of the 1922 declaration and the 1936 treaty, meant that despite the 
fact that Egypt was never a colony of the U.K. it was still subordinated to the 
priorities of British governments.
Secondly, during the period from the British occupation of Egypt up to the 
1952 coup d'etat, the U.K. developed a pattern of how to manage Egypt and 
deal with whatever crisis which seemed to threaten it in Egypt: an efficient 
mixture of divide and rule tactics and gunboat diplomacy. The divide and rule 
tactics were effective by virtue of the singular role of the British in the triangle 
of power — between the British, the Palace and the Wafd — of Egyptian 
politics which existed before the army took over in 1952.
As for gunboat diplomacy, it meant in effect the threat of the use of force either 
by the movement of one or two of H.M.'s battleships to an Egyptian port, or 
the threat to use force yet more openly, as in 1942. In several cases the 
showing of British force — whether by military vessels in Egyptian ports or 
troops in population centres — was combined with an ultimatum, such as in 
1924 and 1942, which indicated in no uncertain terms that the U.K. was 
committed to achieving its demands by using force if necessary. A threat 
against either Egyptian side in the triangle of power —  whether the King or 
the Wafd — meant an immediate gain to the other side in the triangle of power 
when they capitulated to the U.K.'s demands. Therefore, over the years of 
British occupation of Egypt, the pattern of ruling Egypt became crystallised
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and fine-tuned by the British representatives in Egypt. First of all, the political 
system which had ruled Egypt, before the 1952 coup, rested on the existence 
of a constitutional monarch and a parliamentary system in which the Wafd 
Party enjoyed massive public support. The British representatives in Egypt 
played on the differences between the desire of the King to exercise absolute 
control and the Wafd's desire to hold power after winning almost every free 
election which took place from 1922 until 1952, aiding either side if that policy 
furthered its own interests. At the same time, and as mentioned earlier, there 
was always the veiled threat to use force against either (or both) sides if British 
wishes were not obeyed.
The legality, or rather the illegality, of the British presence in Egypt meant that 
though Egypt was nominally independent, the final say in running the affairs 
of Egypt lay with the British government rather than with Egyptian officials. 
Thus the independence which Egypt enjoyed was “the independence of the 
Egyptians to do right but not to do wrong in situations where the sole arbiter 
of right and wrong was Great Britain”. [4] The United Kingdom relied on the 
Egyptians to run their own affairs, subject to course of action adopted fitting in 
with the wishes of the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom wanted to 
exercise power over Egypt without responsibility, and because of that, 
Egyptian officials became used to blaming their failures on the existence of the 
British occupation as the classic scapegoat. [5] This dominant position of the 
British created a “parentalism” [6] mentality for British officials when dealing 
with the Egyptians. They became accustomed to enforcing their priorities on 
Egyptian policies whether they had a legal claim over Egypt or not. At the 
same time, the Egyptians also became frustrated because, despite a former 
declaration of independence (1922) and a treaty confirming it (1936), they still
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found that their “independence” was being violated by the British. British 
rule over the years of the occupation created for the Egyptians a mentality 
which urged them to prove their actual independence from the U.K. Indeed, 
the legacy of British rule over Egypt not only plagued Anglo-Egyptian 
relations up to 1952, but endured after the occupation was formally ended and 
the problems in the bilateral field resolved in 1954, contributing to the break 
which occurred in 1956 and, even worse, adversely affecting the prospects of 
the restoration of relations from 1959 onwards.
Indeed, some British diplomats have expressed the view that it would have 
been better if Egypt had been declared an outright British colony, clearly 
drawing the lines of authority [7] and where responsibility lay. [8] For the 
Egyptians became obsessed with trying to prove their independence from 
British rule and rejected even a British diplomatic presence in Egypt (after 
1956) as it reminded them of the years of British rule. Certainly, this structural 
imbalance in the Anglo-Egyptian relationship existed because the British had 
become used to exercising power over the affairs of Egypt; thus when Egypt 
refused to enter into a U.K.-sponsored defence arrangement (after 1954) and 
embarked on an active Arab policy which was opposed to the U.K. hold on 
the Middle East there occurred a case of “frustrated parentalism” [10] in the 
minds of British officials which led them to over-react (as will be seen later in 
the chapter) to the extent that they allowed differences in the field of foreign 
policy to destroy the bilateral links between the two states.
Thirdly, this structural imbalance contributed to the loss of British control over 
Egypt. There are two set of factors which were responsible for the collapse of
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the U.K. mastery over Egypt. The first set had to do with the effect of the 
triangle of power on the Egyptian political scene. The second was related to 
the changing fortunes of the U.K. in the world order which was created after 
the end of the war, namely the emergence of new superpowers in the post- 
World War II era, as well as to the decline in the power of the U.K. itself.
As for the first set of factors, the triangle of power which had allowed the U.K. 
to dominate the Egyptian political scene had eventually led that system to 
collapse — in 1952 — thus denying the U.K. the main method by which it had 
controlled Egyptian public and political life up to that point, as well as 
destroying a political system in which the U.K. had cultivated a long-lasting 
relationship with all its main participants. The way the triangle of power had 
been manipulated over the years had alienated the main actors in the system, 
including the U.K. Each of the three players was concerned with tactics and 
immediate gains rather than long-term strategy. The Kang and the Wafd had 
become more concerned with their standing versus each other, forfeiting their 
credibility within their constituencies to the extent that they had eventually 
lost the loyalty of the supporters as well as their constituencies.
The second factor was related to the effect of the Second World War on the 
power of the U.K. itself, and the rise of new powers interested in the Middle 
East. Up to that point, one of the reasons which had allowed the U.K. to 
manage Egypt was the absence of competition from any of the major powers 
of the time, since the “entente cordiale” of 1904 between the U.K. and France. 
The absence of competition had allowed the U.K. in a sense to have a free 
hand in its dealings with the Egyptians. Therefore the U.K. senior envoy to 
Egypt could —  when the need arose — deliver ultimatums and threaten the
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use of force if British demands were not met, and the Egyptians had no foreign 
power which was competing with the U.K. to turn to. But the Second World 
War had not only exhausted the resources of the U.K. to such an extent that it 
had destroyed its ability to act as a superpower, and it had also led to the 
emergence of two new superpowers, namely the United States and the Soviet 
Union, which had their own designs on the Middle East.
The Second World War not only alerted all Egyptians to the might of other 
world powers and their challenge to the British Empire, but it also led to the 
emergence of a bipolar world whose two pillars, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., in 
their competition for power and influence had their own ideas and policies for 
the future of the Middle East. Therefore, the U.K. had lost the absolute power 
and freedom from foreign interference which it had exercised in the Middle 
East, especially Egypt.
The rise of these two new superpowers — at a time when the power of the 
U.K. was declining — presented the U.K. with different policy options and 
challenges from each. The easier to understand of these two challenges was 
that of the U.S.S.R., which the U.K. saw as an enemy which had to be repelled 
and contained. It had to counter a Soviet foreign policy drive, under 
Kruszchev, which aimed at trying to win the Third W orld states. [11] The 
Soviet drive on the Middle East threatened not only U.K. prestige and 
influence in the area but, more importantly, vital oil supplies. As the U.K. at that 
time depended —  together with most of Western Europe —  on Middle East oil 
supplies, the U.K. and the U.S. feared that the motive behind the Soviet drive 
on the Middle East was because it (the Middle East) was the “Achilles heel of 
oil poor Western Europe”. [12]
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As for the United States, it represented a different sort of challenge once there 
emerged differences between the two allies. Indeed once the United States 
began to adopt an interventionist posture in world affairs, after years of pre- 
War isolation, differences and frictions between the two allies were bound to 
occur. This was due mainly to the fact that the U.K., which had emerged from 
the Second World War as the weaker partner economically and militarily, and 
which depended on the economic assistance of the U.S. —  whether through 
the Anglo-American Loan or from the Marshal Plan — nevertheless retained its 
traditional influence world-wide. The U.S. however had to assert its own 
influence in most parts of the world which it considered strategically relevant. 
The U.S. found that it had to start that process, in some cases, from scratch and, 
more dangerously for U.S.-U.K. relations, at the expense of the U.K. The 
differences which had occurred between the two states in the field of foreign 
affairs were not limited to any particular region or area in the world. The 
policies of the two governments differed drastically on several major issues 
which faced them in the post-War era: including the Soviet Union, Korea, Iran, 
Cyprus, the administration of Japan — where General Mac Arthur ruled single- 
handed leaving almost no room for the Allied Commission for Japan — and 
which members should be elected to the U.N. Security Council. [13] The 
disagreements between the two states resulting from the new interventionist 
policy of the United States not only alarmed British officials but also led the 
rise of anti-American feeling among the U.K. public — a feeling that was often 
fuelled by the media. [14]
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m  CONFIRMATION OF LOSS OF BRITISH CONTROL: 
THE 1952 COUP D'ETAT
The position of the U.K. in Egypt had deteriorated to the extent that when a 
small group of army officers took power on July 23rd 1952, the U.K. Embassy 
was completely in the dark as to that move or even the identity of those 
behind it. This illustrates the U.K.'s loss of control over Egypt, as only a few 
years back the approval, not to mention the knowledge, of the U.K. had been 
essential before any minor move to power could ever take place. Even worse, it 
has been suggested that while the U.K. Embassy in Cairo was in the dark, the 
United States was fully aware of what was going on —  if not actually 
involved. [15]
The reaction of the U.K. to the coup d'etat was extremely cautious. 
Immediately after the coup, the U.K. Cabinet decided to limit the movement of 
U.K. troops in Egypt; they should be as “unobtrusive as possible” . [16] 
Furthermore, the U.K. government decided that it would only intervene 
militarily if the lives of U.K. nationals in Egypt were endangered. [17]
This reaction illustrated two important things. The first, was that the U.K. had 
finally realised it could not maintain its former dominant position in the political 
affairs of Egypt. Secondly, it meant that the U.K. preferred to reach an 
accommodation in Egypt no matter who was in power, to help maintain 
bilateral relations and preserve its interests in Egypt. The two remaining 
problems which continued to trouble relations between London and Cairo 
were the Sudan and the U.K. military presence in Egypt.
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In 1952, U.K. policy makers felt that Egypt was important for two main 
reasons. The first was the Suez Canal Base, both as an arms reservoir, where 
the U.K. stored vast amounts of military equipment which British forces could 
utilise if the need arose, and as a base which could be used for quick 
intervention in any crisis or war in the Middle East. The second reason was the 
Suez Canal. The U.K. was concerned over the negative effects on the United 
Kingdom and Western Europe of a stoppage of free trade through the Canal . 
U.K. shipping would be especially hurt by any disruption to the flow of 
shipping through the Suez Canal, since British shipping amounted to a third of 
the annual tonnage passing through it. A temporary reversion to the Cape of 
Good Hope route would have meant damaging costs for U.K. shippers, as well 
as similar effects due to the disruption of the pattern of trade. Moreover, the 
area of most concern in the event of any disruption to the Suez Canal traffic 
was oil.
The new U.K. oil refineries, which had recently been built at a cost of over 
£165 million, relied on crude oil from the Persian Gulf. With the world tanker 
fleet fully occupied, a disruption of the Suez Canal traffic would have resulted 
in an immediate shortage of petroleum in England. Thus the U.K. knew that an 
ill-disposed Egyptian government would not only be a setback for the U.K. on 
the strategic level, since it might deny the U.K. its base right in the Canal Zone, 
but worse still, that such a government would be able to cause immense 
damage to the U.K. economy. [18]
At the same time, the U.K. decided not to withdraw forces from Egypt before 
negotiations had started and were progressing favourably. The U.K. 
government knew that by not reaching an agreement they were losing more
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than they could afford. The U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Anthony Eden, was convinced that the U.K. — by not reaching an agreement 
—  would be faced by one of two options: either the military occupation of 
Egypt, or complete evacuation, without having set up any defence 
arrangements in the area. It was further realised that the use of Egypt 
strategically would not be complete by simply relying on the U.K. troops in the 
Suez Canal Base. It would also require the use of Egyptian airfields and ports, 
especially those of Alexandria and Port Said. This meant the U.K. needed full 
co-operation from Egypt to utilise its assets satisfactorily —  if indeed at all. For 
if the U.K. were to over-stay its welcome in the Canal Zone and face a hostile 
Egyptian government, they would be in a position which they could neither 
defend at the United Nations, nor utilise strategically. [19]
Convinced of the need to sort out the two outstanding issues — the Sudan 
and the Suez Canal Base — the United Kingdom increased its efforts to reach 
an agreement with Egypt. The U.K. began to use a carrot and stick policy in its 
dealing with Egypt so as to coax the Egyptians into a new alliance with the 
U.K. and the West. It tried to reach an agreement with Egypt and the United 
States whereby Egypt would enter a defence arrangement with the U.K. and 
the U.S. in return for economic and military assistance. In an attempt to 
convince the new Egyptian leadership of the merits of their proposals on 
defence, and incidentally about a compromise regarding the Sudan, the U.K. 
utilised three main tactics.
The first was to convince the U.S. not to give in to Egyptian demands for 
assistance, economic or military, until Egypt softened its stance in the
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negotiations. Secondly, the U.K. delayed the delivery of agreed contracts to 
Egypt, depending on the Egyptian stance in the negotiations with the United 
Kingdom. [20] The third tactic, which was even more effective in trying to 
influence the Egyptian government, was the use of the question of Egypt's 
blocked sterling balances in the United Kingdom.
During the Second World War a huge trade imbalance in Egypt's favour had 
accumulated in the U.K. Treasury, with the result that Egypt's sterling holdings 
reached a peak of £470 million at the end of December 1946. [21] Most of the 
Egyptian sterling holdings (better known as the Egyptian sterling balances) 
were blocked, pending an agreement between the U.K. and Egypt over a way 
in which Egypt might gradually withdraw them without disrupting the U.K. 
economy. This agreement was reached by March 1951 and led to the scaling 
down of these balances to £230 million by March 1951. By the end of 1952, 
the value of the balances had fallen to £179 million. The U.K. Cabinet 
considered the annual release of £10 million in the light of the Egyptian stance 
in the negotiations with the U.K. [22]
In fact, the policy of using the card of the sterling balances of Egypt in the 
negotiations between the two countries was used throughout the period 
1950-1954, whenever the date of the release of Egypt's annual quota came — 
December of every year. The U.K. Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, regarded 
the matter from the standpoint of the progress of the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations. The attempt was to secure Egyptian submission, or at least 
increased co-operation with the U.K.'s demands, in exchange for the release of 
the agreed funds. This proved to be very successful in the short term. Egypt 
was forced to agree to the U.K.'s requests, or the United Kingdom would keep
53
—  albeit for a few more months — some badly needed cash. In the long term, 
however, it had a negative effect on bilateral relations, since it supplied the 
Egyptian leadership with yet another reason for mistrusting the U.K. It was 
hardly a very reassuring sign of the U.K.'s commitment to the treaties which it 
had already signed with Egypt. All the same, this stick and carrot policy 
worked both ways: it not only pressured the Egyptian government, it also 
rewarded it. In 1952, following the revolution, the U.K. released £5 million 
earlier than the due date because of the liquidity crisis Egypt was suffering 
from at the time. The hope was that this might influence the new Egyptian 
leadership towards better relations with the United Kingdom. [23]
The period following the revolution (1952) witnessed a slow but steady 
improvement in relations between the U.K. and Egypt, a trend which 
culminated in 1953 when the two countries finally reached and signed an 
agreement over the Sudan. However, the best prospect for better relations 
between the two states was finally reached when the two countries reached a 
defence agreement in 1954. The path to that treaty was by no means an easy 
one.
IV THE ROAD TO SUEZ
The signing of the two agreements of 1953 and 1954 — especially the latter, as 
it organised the end of the U.K. occupation of Egypt —  allowed for a fresh 
start in the bilateral relations between United Kingdom and Egypt. These two 
agreements settled once and for all the bilateral differences which had plagued 
relations. Egyptian officials, after witnessing the worst era for bilateral 
differences between the two states (the period 1950-1952), were relieved at
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the signing of the two agreements, especially that of 1954 which was called in 
Egypt Ittifaqiya al-G ala ' (The Evacuation Treaty), and hoped that it marked 
the start of a healthy relationship between the two countries, a relationship 
based on equality and mutual respect for each country's independence. [24]
This hope was not limited to Egypt. The U.K. Foreign Secretary, Anthony 
Eden, in his efforts to persuade the U.K. Cabinet to accept the treaty, argued 
that it meant the U.K. would “replace an expensive military presence in the 
Canal Zone with the lasting gratitude and friendship of the Egyptian 
government and people”. [25]
The optimistic expectations of both Egyptian and U.K. officials were indeed 
justified, for the Sudan agreement of 1953 paved the way for that of 1954 
which settled the last outstanding problem between the two countries, namely 
the evacuation of the remaining U.K. troops in Egypt. Once that treaty had 
been signed, the deck was cleared of problems in bilateral relations, according 
to the U.K. records as well as to Egyptian diplomats responsible for relations 
with the United Kingdom. [26]
The matters covered in these treaties were not issues in contention between 
the two states during the period from 1954-1956. It was not issues arising from 
bilateral relations between the two states which soured their relations and led 
to the Suez war in 1956. The evacuation of U.K. troops from Egypt was 
proceeding according to plan and the timetable was going even faster than 
stipulated. [27] In addition, new arrangements made in 1954 for the release of 
Egypt's blocked balances in the U.K. were adhered to. The U.K. even agreed 
to provide arms for Egypt — though on a limited scale. [28]
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Relations began to sour after 1954 for a completely different reason, namely 
the clashes in the foreign policies of the two states especially in the Middle 
East. This clash developed over a period of less than two years into a fully- 
fledged regional confrontation. The beginning of the problems between the 
two states began to appear when Egypt declined to join in with the U.K. 
strategic defence plans for the Middle East, in co-operation with the United 
States. U.K. policy makers were worried by the effective propaganda campaign 
being mounted by Egypt through Sawt al-Arab radio station. Directed at 
listeners in the Arab states, it concentrated its attacks on imperialism and those 
Arab allies of the U.K. which were joining the latter's defence arrangements or 
which were being pressured to join, namely Iraq and Jordan. The Egyptian 
propaganda machine also attacked the U.K.'s position in the Gulf (especially in 
Kuwait) thus endangering a vital source of oil. The refusal of Egypt to join the 
U.K. defence arrangement, called the Baghdad Pact, and its efforts to 
undermine the pact and encourage Arab states not to join were ill received by 
the U.K. policy makers. The anger the Egyptian position provoked was not 
only because it foiled U.K. strategic plans, but because the U.K. expected some 
gratitude from the Egyptian government in return for its withdrawal from the 
Sudan and the Suez Canal Base and the sale of U.K. arms to Egypt. U.K. 
politicians remarked that ’’not withstanding all the benefits which we had 
unilaterally conferred upon Egypt we had won no gratitude” . [29]
There remained an imperialist trend in the U.K. Cabinet which still viewed the 
world from the standpoint of the U.K. as a great power of the pre-War era. 
They considered the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations since Nasser came to 
power in Egypt as one of “Unilateral and unrequited gestures” . [30] This 
imperial trend is well exposed by Macmillan in his diaries. [31] The British
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conviction of the ingratitude of some nations which were actively seeking 
independence (whether Egypt or other countries) was more profoundly 
revealed when Macmillan wrote after the independence of the Sudan in 1956: 
“U.K. blood, U.K. money and devoted U.K. administrators had raised this 
people out of the state of savagery and slavery and set them on the path to 
civilisation.” [32]
U.K. irritation at Nasser intensified in 1955 when it became apparent that 
Egypt was not only refusing to enter the Baghdad Pact but was actively trying 
to undermine it. The Egyptian revolutionary regime took a vehement stand 
against the Pact, and fought tooth and nail to prevent Arab states from joining 
it, especially Jordan. Egypt used several methods to pressurise Jordan to refuse 
to join the Baghdad Pact. These entailed using the Egyptian propaganda 
machine to entice nationalists in Jordan to actively oppose the Pact, [33] using 
money from Saudi Arabia to convince the Jordanians not to join it and sending 
a member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council to the Egyptian 
Embassy in Amman to organise the opposition in Jordan against entering the 
Pact. [34] When Jordan finally refused to join, it was considered as a major 
rebuff for the U.K. and a victory for Egypt, a fact which was stressed by 
Egyptian propaganda at the time. [35]
The U.K. was shocked when Egypt, frustrated at being denied its requests for 
arms from the West, made the famous Czech arms deal which was announced 
in 1955. This arms deal was a double blow for the U.K. government. It meant 
that Egypt had given the Soviet Union a foothold in the Middle East, and it 
also provided a precedent for other Arab states: if they were denied arms by 
the West, then they could buy them from the Soviet Union, a willing and
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efficient arms supplier. The Czech arms deal meant an effective death sentence 
to the tripartite declaration of 1950 whereby the United States, France and the 
United Kingdom attempted to establish a security system in the Middle East by 
limiting arms supply to the region. [36]
The foreign policy of the Egyptian government, of opposing the Baghdad Pact 
and making the Czech arms deal, caused the U.K. Prime Minister, Anthony 
Eden, severe embarrassment and agitation especially as he had fought single- 
handedly in 1954 to convince a reluctant Cabinet and Prime Minister 
(Churchill) to agree to the 1954 agreement. [37] He had later managed to 
convince a reluctant American administration to propose the Aswan High Dam 
offer. [38] When General Glubb, the head of the Arab Legion (the Jordanian 
Army), was dismissed by King Hussein, Anthony Eden came to the conclusion 
that Nasser had to be destroyed. He became almost irrational as far the subject 
of Nasser was concerned, informing his subordinates in government that 
Nasser had to go. [39]
U.K. animosity to Nasser was by no means limited to Eden, for even the 
Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, changed his views on the Egyptian leader, 
and became convinced that he was behind Glubb's dismissal. [40] Officials in 
the Foreign Office became convinced they had to get rid of Nasser (as did the 
Americans) and at that point (March 8, 1956) they began to look for the means 
to destroy him. [41]
From this point onwards, the British government under Eden, was waiting for a 
chance or even a causus belli to deal with the Egyptian leader directly.
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Eden's animosity surfaced again when he sent a message to the American 
president, Eisenhower, arguing that immediate action was required in Egypt to 
topple Nasser. Eden's message stated that Nasser was an all-out Soviet 
conspirator and that his intentions were to demolish Western interests in the 
Middle East by dismantling the existing Arab regimes and setting up a United 
Arab States, made up of republican Arab states loyal to Nasser. Eden believed 
that Egypt had already installed its agents in the Arab states under the pretext 
that they were teachers. [42]
U.K. fears about the rising number of Egyptian teachers and what they were 
up to were not new. The U.K. government and U.K. diplomats in the Gulf had 
been questioning their presence for some time.
V COMPETITION IN THE ARAB WORLD
Egypt's increasing influence in the Arab world and particularly in the Gulf was 
being closely monitored by the U.K., with rising concern. As early as 1955, 
Egyptian influence in the Arabian Gulf had grown significantly, to the alarm of 
U.K. officials. The thousands of Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf — 
especially teachers — were a potent weapon in Egypt's propaganda arsenal. 
Egyptians were never appointed to head departments of education or allowed 
to determine education policies; these jobs were reserved for Palestinians or the 
natives themselves (with the exception of Doha where the Inspector of the 
Education Department was an Egyptian), [44] but the presence of so many 
Egyptian teachers worried the U.K. The number and involvement of Egyptian 
teachers was not uniform among the Gulf states — it varied from country to 
country with the level of development and the specific attitude of Arab leaders 
to Egyptians. In Kuwait for example, in 1955, several thousand Egyptian
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teachers were employed, while in Bahrain, as a matter of policy, teachers were 
hired from all over the Arab world. [45] The penetration of Egyptian influence 
in the Gulf through the increasing number of Egyptian teachers, just when 
Egypt was actively trying to undermine the position of the U.K. in the Arab 
world, presented the U.K. with a difficult problem. On the one hand, there was 
a desperate need in these emerging states for teachers and instructors to assist 
development plans, and no cheap alternative to teacher recruitment from 
Egypt. To deny or curb the supply of teachers would have meant a scaling 
down in the development of the region. Since the United Kingdom was not 
able to substitute for the massive numbers of Egyptian teachers it would have 
had great difficulty in convincing the Gulf rulers of the need to stop employing 
Egyptians. [46]
\
The U.K. monitored the number of Egyptian teachers seconded abroad — 
especially to the Arab states — and was disturbed at the results. The number of 
teachers had risen from 1400 in the academic year 1955/56 to 2472 in 1957 
and the Egyptian authorities estimated the number would reach 4000 by 1959. 
The U.K. Foreign Office viewed the spread of Egyptian teachers seconded 
abroad as a dangerous threat: the “Egyptian cultural penetration of the Arab 
and African World is proceeding apace”, and it feared that “for the next few 
years the cultural dependence of Egypt's neighbours upon her is unlikely to 
lessen but may well increase.” [47]
Egyptian penetration of the Gulf was not limited to teachers. Egyptian medical 
staff, including doctors, as well as experts in other fields like construction and 
engineering seconded by Cairo, poured into the Gulf. U.K. envoys in the Gulf
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noted how some Egyptian personnel's interest in politics exceeded their 
interest in their jobs.
The presence of white collar Egyptian workers in Arab states was a major 
concern for the U.K., which was by now irritated by the success and mass 
popularity of the "Voice Of The Arabs" radio broadcast covering all of the 
Middle East. Readers in Arab countries often found Egyptian newspapers 
much more interesting to read than their local national daily Arabic papers, 
according to the U.K. Resident in Bahrain who, while acknowledging the 
respect which the BBC Radio and the U.K. Arab-speaking radio station 
Sharq al-Adna enjoyed both for technical skills as well as for reliability of 
information, observed that a “kind of Gresham's law of some ideas seems to 
operate in the Arab mind by which bad news drives out good and falsehood 
drive out truth”. [48]
The U.K. observed how its influence was being eroded and attacked on 
different fronts. The first was the Palestinian problem where Egypt, through its 
defiance of the West as well as its confrontation with Israel, was the only state 
in the Arab world actively defending Palestine as an Arab cause. The U.K. 
position was further undermined by the continuous denunciation (by the 
Egyptian media) of the Balfour declaration as the main cause of the Palestinian 
problem.
The second was Nasser's propaganda machine as it exploited both the 
Czechoslovakian arms deal and Egypt's role in founding a new focus for Arab 
unity through the Arab League. Nasser's attacks threatened the U.K. as they 
alerted other Arab states to the possibility of dispensing with the U.K. in its 
role as arms supplier and patron.
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The third front was Egyptian efforts to destabilise the main U.K. allies in the 
Arab states of the Gulf. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 set an example to 
many in the Gulf that an unjust, inefficient and undemocratic regime could be 
toppled. In Bahrain, for example, some groups calling for political reforms 
identified with the Egyptian revolution as a model (in aims and not necessarily 
with the Egyptian method i.e. the army). Even more importantly this group — 
represented by “The High Executive Committee” — had direct links with and 
were aided by Egypt. The committee's views were distinctively pro-Egyptian 
and anti-U.K. and they were propagating Egyptian interests in Bahrain and 
advertising Egyptian scholarships for Bahraini students. [49]
Egypt's active policy at the time of sending thousands of Egyptian teachers 
and other professionals to the Gulf States, together with its refusal to join in 
any defence arrangements with the U.K., led the U.K. to become concerned 
since it saw its own standing in the Middle East threatened by Nasser's 
growing influence. It saw the expansion of Egyptian influence as a zero sum 
game, in which gains by Egypt were interpreted as losses to the United 
Kingdom and its allies in the region.
The U.K. observed with dismay the new realignment between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia and Syria, which was opposed to the Baghdad pact and Iraq and was 
trying to woo Jordan to their camp. The U.K. was also concerned that Saudi 
Arabia, which was agitated at the U.K. for siding with Oman in the Buraimi 
dispute, relied on U.S. backing in their oil production to use the oil revenues to 
support Egypt in inflicting maximum damage to the U.K. [50]
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The U.K. cited evidence that Egypt was succeeding in breaking the U.K.'s 
influence over the Middle East. Jordan's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact and 
then later the abrupt dismissal of General Glubb from the Arab Legion without 
the U.K. having been consulted or even informed in advance, were clear 
manifestation of the decline of the U.K. position. Furthermore, the Czech arms 
deal was in effect a deathblow to the arms control regime which the U.K., 
together with her war allies, the U.S. and France, had established in the Middle 
East in 1950. In addition, that deal realised the U.K.'s worst nightmare; it gave 
the Soviets a foothold in the Middle East. To counter such a threat, the U.K. 
became anxious to erect a defence arrangement in the Middle East. It is fair to 
conclude that overestimating the dangers might have made the U.K. anger at 
Egypt somewhat irrational, which in turn influenced Anthony Eden's judgment 
at the time.
YI THE FINAL STRAW
Thus when the Egyptian government decided, in May 1956, to recognise 
Communist China, American public opinion was inflamed and the United 
States was outraged, especially when Nasser announced he was to visit China 
later that year. The U.K. saw the development as an opportunity to settle 
scores with Nasser. The U.K. joined U.S. efforts to exert pressure on Egypt by 
the denial of the World Bank loan which Egypt sought for the construction of 
the Aswan High Dam. The importance of the High Dam project to Nasser was 
such that if the project failed he would suffer tremendous loss of face. [51] The 
withdrawal of the High Dam offer, as well as the way it was announced, put 
Nasser into a position where he had to retaliate to save his own position 
internally, as well as his image abroad. His response to the West was to 
nationalise the Suez Canal Company.
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Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal unleashed a wave of anger in the 
United Kingdom against Egypt and was the last straw as far as Eden was 
concerned. He was now adamant that Nasser should go, even by military 
means. Eden believed that to ensure the interests of the United Kingdom, as 
well as his own career, he had to to get rid of Nasser, He once remarked to a 
Foreign Office official that “it is either him (Nasser) or us, don't forget that". 
[52] Thus, he gave immediate instructions to his military advisors to prepare for 
military operations. [53] However, it would be a mistake to assume that this 
anger was limited to the Conservative government led by Eden. Hugh 
Gaitskell was vociferous in his attack on Nasser after the latter nationalised the 
Canal. [54] Indeed, the equation of Nasser to Hitler, which the British 
government leaders made much use of throughout the Suez crisis was first 
used by Gaitskell. [55] Eden, on the other hand, with what some in the Foreign 
Office described as his “feminine flair”, described Nasser as a second 
Mussolini. [56]
However, it should be noted that the anger of the British government towards 
Egypt because of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was not 
simply due to the importance of that company to the British government. The 
Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal was always considered by the 
U.K. to be a French company rather than an international company as its name 
suggested. [57] This company was established in 1858 as a French managed 
company which owned most of its sole capital assets. At the beginning the 
U.K. refused to participate in it and it was only in 1875 that the U.K. purchased 
any shares in the company. Indeed it was the fact that an opportunity had 
arisen for the U.K. to purchase 44% of the shares of the company held by
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Egypt at the attractive price of £4 million which made the British Prime 
Minister Disraeli buy these shares, with a loan from the Rothschilds. Moreover, 
there were only three British directors (on a board of 32 directors) until 1883, 
when British shipowners received seven more seats after a threat that British 
ships would boycott the Canal. [58] Indeed, the British government 
consistently treated the company as a French company which had to be 
guarded against. The stance of the British government during the negotiations 
for the 1888 Convention which governed the Canal only illustrates that point 
and shows how the British government guarded its control of Egypt from the 
French.[59]
There were also other factors which influenced the U.K. government's reaction 
at the time. During the period leading to the Suez War in October 1956, the 
Conservative government was experiencing several problems internally, as 
well as externally in other parts of the British Empire. The economy was in a 
sorry state, thanks to the electoral budget of the previous year which had 
fuelled inflation and consequently had led to increased pressure on the value 
of sterling. The Opposition utilised that opportunity, as well as that of the 
security problems which the government was experiencing at the time, when a 
Russian agent defected to Australia and revealed that there was yet another 
spy in the U.K. Foreign Office. This led to the defection of both Burgess and 
Maclean. Externally there was the problem in Cyprus, after the London 
Conference failed to reach a peaceful solution. The U.K. ordered the arrest of 
Archbishop Makarios and declared a state of emergency in Cyprus. This 
opportunity was also seized upon by the Labour opposition. Such problems 
made Eden's government less prone to accept another foreign policy setback 
—  in Egypt — without attempting to assert the power of the Empire to
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prevent further disintegration of its colonies and power base and ward off 
other new players in the international arena whether friend (the United States) 
or foe (the Soviet Union). Furthermore, it needed for internal political reasons 
some achievement or startling success in foreign affairs to ward off criticism at 
home, whether from the Labour opposition or from right-wing colonial 
elements inside the Conservative Party itself.
These factors contributed to Anthony Eden's obsession with the idea of 
punishing Nasser. From the nationalisation of the Canal in July until October 
1956, Eden kept trying to convince the Americans to find some causus belli 
for a military strike against Egypt. [60] For three months there were diplomatic 
moves to try and make Nasser disgorge the Canal, with two London 
conferences, the formation of the Suez Canal Users' Association and numerous 
meetings at the United Nations. Meanwhile the U.K. was eager to find a 
causus belli for war against Egypt in an attempt to destroy Nasser and by the 
end of October the U.K., with France and Israel, had devised a plan to do so. 
Thus Israel attacked Egypt on October 29 and advanced on the Suez Canal. 
The next day the U.K. and France gave an ultimatum to both countries to 
withdraw 10 kilometers from each side of the Suez Canal. After Egypt's refusal 
to accept the ultimatum, the U.K. and France attacked Egypt. However, the 
position of the United States at the United Nations, and, more importantly, its 
refusal to help sterling in the run on the pound which ensued on the 
international money markets, as well as its refusal to furnish the U.K. with oil 
after the closure of the Suez Canal and the destruction of the TAP. line in Syria, 
obliged the three states — the U.K., France and Israel, to accept a cease-fire 
and later to withdraw from Egypt. [61]
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VII AFTER THE WAR
The Suez War had a disastrous and very negative effect on the United 
Kingdom. These negative effects transcended the difficulties in relations 
between the United Kingdom and its main ally — the United States — despite 
the importance of that relationship. It went much further, causing internal 
friction in the United Kingdom polity and society, as well as the weakening of 
the U.K.'s influence abroad.
Suez created great internal conflict and controversy in the United Kingdom. 
Perhaps one of the best descriptions of the effects of Suez can be found in 
Macmillan's memoirs, where he described the turmoil resulting from Suez as ”so 
fundamental and involving such deep feelings as to cause temporary and even 
permanent, rifts between friends, division in families, heavy stresses on Party 
organisations and implicating not merely those normally affected by political 
controversy but the whole mass of the population. Such emotions were caused 
by Munich and nearly twenty years later by Suez.” [62] The effects of Suez 
were even more dramatic as the prevailing “rancour spread to even private 
homes and continued long after the end of the immediate crisis”. [63]
At the same time, the effect on the United Kingdom's influence and position in 
the Middle East and especially the Gulf — the main reason behind the initial 
hostility to Nasser — was devastating. Although U.K. animosity towards 
Nasser was due to competition and conflict between the two states, its venture 
to safeguard its interests and position in the Middle East brought about 
consequences exactly the opposite of its aims. The effect of the joint Anglo- 
French ultimatum of November 4, 1956 was ruinous for the status of the U.K.
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and its supporters in the Arab world. The rulers of the Persian Gulf states 
maintained their persistent support for the U.K. mainly because they owed 
their continued existence to the U.K., but the prolongation of the Israel 
occupation of Sinai, as well as the Suez War, jeopardised their support as this 
would increase the local opposition to the United Kingdom in the Gulf. [64] 
The U.K. Political Residents and Political Agents in the Gulf were worried not 
just because of the immediate security problem, but because of the long-term 
effects the U.K. action against Egypt and in favour of Israel would have on the 
interests of the U.K. in the Middle East.
“Our continued attack on Egypt, while doing nothing against Israel, is the one 
thing that might make Kuwait and perhaps Qatar change their relationship 
with us. Since the important object of our ME policy is to preserve our position 
here...Immediate action by U.S. against Israel or to oblige Israel's forces to 
withdraw would do the U.S. more good than anything else both in the 
immediate...and in the long term future.” [65] In fact, the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh 
Ahmed, while maintaining his commitment to safeguard the property of 
foreigners, sharply condemned the U.K. actions against Egypt to the British 
Political Agent in Qatar, asking him to convey his feelings to the British 
Foreign Office. He also expressed his strong feelings in favour of Arab unity 
and solidarity with Egypt, as well as his hatred for Israel, pointing to the 
collusion between the Israel and the U.K. whose action was contrary to 
“international conventions”. [66]
Meanwhile in the Trucial States, where support for the U.K. was relatively 
better and more stable than in the rest of the Gulf, the rulers came under local 
pressure from pro-Nasser and anti-UK demonstrations, due to actions by
68
Egyptian and Jordanian teachers. However, the U.K. maintained the situation 
by denying the collusion between Israel, France and the U.K., something 
which became increasingly difficult. By 7 November 1956, the British Political 
Resident in Kuwait Mr. Bell, observed the increased local pressure on the 
Kuwaiti ruler to cancel contracts with British firms and dispense with British 
technicians, as strong feelings grew among the local population, many of 
whom were Palestinians who had relatives in Gaza. [67]
The U.S. observed the erosion of British influence in the area, noting the rising 
support for Nasser against a background of a rise in anti-British feeling even in 
countries whose rulers were traditionally loyal to the U.K. and some of whom 
were opposed to Nasser. The feeling in the U.S. was that the erosion in both 
British and French influence was not limited only to the Middle East, The 
director of the C.I.A. in a briefing concluded that “In the rest of Africa and 
Asia there is unanimous revulsion at the U.K. and France. W hatever the 
outcome, the influence of the U.K. and France throughout the area will be at a 
low ebb for a long time to come.” [68]
Saudi Arabia, however, was a different story altogether. Unlike the rest of the 
other Gulf states it was no longer in the British orbit. In fact, it was not only 
closer to the US, but was intended to become one of the main pillars of the U.S. 
policy in the Middle East. [69] Indeed, almost a year before the Suez crisis 
there were some —  in the F.C.O. — who perceived the real cause of the 
difficulties facing the U.K. in the Middle East to be Saudi Arabia, with its vast 
financial resources and American help. This, in turn, led to the feeling that it 
might be necessary to make some bargain with the U.S. administration 
whereby the U.K. “will not press some objective dear to our heart in some
69
other part of the world provided they agree to put the screw on the Saudis”. 
[70]
Saudi Arabia publicly blamed the U.K. for instigating Israel's attack on Egypt. 
The Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister Yussef Yassin gave this official 
view to — of all newspapers — The Times on November 6, 1956. He pledged 
Saudi assistance and support to Egypt and further, after the blocking of 
Egyptian financial assets in the West, declared that Egyptian pounds would be 
backed by Saudi dollar reserves. The Times commented that the Saudi 
Arabian official view was widely shared in the Arab world. [71] That same day, 
November 6, Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with both France and 
the U.K. Even worse, it placed an embargo on supplying U.K. and French ships 
as well as other ships going to these countries with Saudi Arabian oil. These 
measures were declared by the Saudi Arabian permanent representative to the 
United Nations. [72] And on November 6, 1956, King Saud ordered the 
stoppage of the flow of the Saudi oil pipeline to Bahrain. This was congruent 
with Saudi Arabia's decision to stop the supply of its oil to either the U.K. or 
France. As an immediate effect, employment in that sector of the economy in 
Bahrain dropped from seven thousand to a few hundred. Such a dramatic rise 
in unemployment had a significant impact on stability in Bahrain and on the 
U.K.'s standing there, since the U.K. was blamed for this action. [73] The U.K. 
action in Suez, instead of safeguarding the Middle East, resulted in the extreme 
opposite, in Saudi Arabia in particular. British prestige became “non-existent” 
and anti-British feelings were stronger than ever. Instead of isolating Nasser 
and the U.S.S.R., sympathy for Egypt was widespread and (according to the 
assessment of the British Ambassador in Jedda) there was — within the highest
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circles — appreciation of the role of the Soviet Union in aiding Egypt. [74]
Although Iraq did not join Saudi Arabia in its solidarity with Egypt, the 
government of Nuri al-Said was under increasing internal pressure because of 
the situation in Suez. Nuri al-Said asked the British government to help release 
Egypt's prisoners held in Israel to placate Arab opinion on that matter. [75] 
Indeed, after the British intervention with France at Suez, not only was the 
British oil supply interrupted from some parts of the Gulf, but British goods in 
other parts were boycotted. By December 10, 1956 the Political Resident in 
Kuwait hoped that the withdrawal of the British troops from Port Said would 
lead to the collapse of this boycott. [76] This boycott had been implemented 
despite the favourable attitude of the ruler and the influential Kuwaiti families 
towards the U.K. throughout the Suez crisis (for the Kuwaiti ruler not only 
committed himself verbally to the British government to stand by them if things 
became critical, but lived up to that commitment). [77] The implementation of 
this boycott, despite the attitude of the elite in Kuwait, proved to the U.K. not 
only the weakness of its own position, but even more dangerously the power 
and influence of Nasser's Egypt.
vm CONCLUSION
The Suez affair brought the relationship between the U.K. and Egypt to its 
lowest level since the landing of British troops in Egypt in 1882. Ironically, this 
deterioration came in the wake of the mood of optimism which had prevailed 
when the two sides managed to settle their bilateral differences in the two 
agreements of 1953 and 1954. The prime reason for this negative development 
was that the regional conflict between the two countries had taken
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precedence over bilateral issues. The fact that differences in the foreign policies 
of the two states managed to sour relations between the United Kingdom and 
Egypt suggests a deep and significant pattern underlying the relations 
between the two states up to that point (1956). For there were indeed 
structural imbalances in the relationship of the two states which had to find 
expression in various ways, either in bilateral issues or in regional ones. 
Although these causes were different on the surface, the underlying issues 
were similar and arose from the fact that Egypt, though never a U.K. colony, 
had nevertheless always been treated like one by the British. As shown earlier, 
some British politicians and officials considered the history of Anglo-Egyptian 
relations as one of “Unilateral and unrequited gestures” and felt appreciation 
was due them for all the benefits they had bestowed on Egypt. They expected 
Egypt to show gratitude to them for “granting Egypt independence”, by 
supporting U.K. policies in the Middle East. They were surprised to find Egypt 
not only opposing these policies but, even worse, damaging British interests. 
British leaders, over a period of about 74 years, had become used to exercising 
power and control over the fate and policies of Egypt. At the same time, 
Egypt's new leaders, having been subjected to what they considered British 
domination for such a long period, were anxious to prove their independence. 
The young leaders of the post-1952 regime were even more anxious to prove 
their autonomy from the United Kingdom to their own constituency. The 
differences in the mentality of the leadership of both states and the way they 
regarded the Anglo-Egyptian relationship could not be solved simply by a 
treaty. Perhaps a drastic action, such as the Suez War, was necessary to shatter 
that unbalanced relationship so that a new one might take its place.
The United Kingdom's attempt to maintain its regional influence in October
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1956 by occupying the Suez Canal doubled its losses. Not only did it damage 
its influence in the region, but it also forfeited vital British interests in Egypt. 
The Canal was blocked, British properties in Egypt were either sequestrated or 
nationalised while the U.K.'s trade with Egypt suffered considerable losses. 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom had suffered serious diplomatic losses by the 
end of the crisis. These losses manifested themselves in the isolation of the U.K. 
in the international community, especially at the United Nations, together with 
a rupture in the pattern of its external relations. This was especially the case 
with its most important ally and partner, the United States, where the 
relationship was badly affected and reached its lowest ebb for years. 
Meanwhile the state of the U.K.'s internal political and economic scene was no 
better than the state of its foreign relations.
Egypt, on the other hand, emerged from the crisis politically victorious. Its 
President was credited in Third World states with “cutting the Lion's tail” and 
the state's image had been transformed overnight; from being seen as a poor 
developing country, it acquired a leading position in the Third World. 
However, despite the changes which had occurred in the fortunes of each 
state, two other factors must be considered.
First was the fact that the structure of government in both countries, as well as 
the individuals in power (meaning not just the President and Prime Minister, 
but also ministers and senior officials) who were responsible for the collision 
between the two states, survived the crisis. The exception was the downfall of 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. Although Eden was the chief architect 
of the British Suez policy he was not its sole author. His collaborators and 
supporters in that policy remained in their respective positions in government; 
some were even promoted.
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Secondly, part of the legacy of the Suez crisis was that there now existed some 
serious problems in the field of bilateral relations which had to be addressed by 
both countries. As might have been expected, both the United Kingdom and 
Egypt had a mutual interest in returning relations to a “pre-Suez status-quo”. 
Gamal Abdul Nasser stated publicly that Egypt sought a reconciliation with 
the U.K. [78]
Having felt the pinch of several months of economic sanctions imposed by the 
U.K.'s Western allies, Egypt saw some merit in restoring relations with the U.K., 
at the very least to free its sterling balances in the U.K., which had been 
immediately frozen after the nationalisation of the Canal. Having maximised his 
gains from the confrontation with the U.K. — in the eyes of the Arab masses 
he became the hero who had successfully defended Arab independence 
against imperial aggression — Nasser realised that it was in his interest to 
resume ties. Another gain for Egypt in improving relations with the West 
(including the U.K.) was to block Soviet penetration.
There was a desire to restore relations for the U.K. too. For the same reason 
which took it to war, namely the Suez Canal, the United Kingdom needed to 
reach some kind of accommodation with Egypt now that it had lost physical 
control over the Canal. Since British shipping and oil supplies were heavily 
dependent on the use of the Suez Canal, some arrangement had to be made 
with Egypt regarding these British interests when it was reopened for 
navigation. There was also the question of the sequestered British property to 
be resolved. Thirdly, the U.K. Cabinet was forced to address the problems of 
the thousands of British citizens who were now de facto refugees in the U.K.
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after the Egyptian government suddenly expropriated their property. These 
were but some of the problems left by the Suez Crisis. It was inevitable that 
such a legacy would sooner or later force the two governments to work 
together to find some solution.
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CHAPTER TWO
FACTORS AFFECTING ANGLO-EGYPTIAN  
RELATIONS AFTER SUEZ
Following the Suez War and its immediate consequences, the nature and 
structure of the relationship between the U.K. and Egypt changed drastically. 
Relations between these two states were at the time (1957) at their lowest ebb. 
It is important to note the changing fortunes of the two states and the effects 
such changes had on each state's desire to improve relations with the other.
The political defeat of the U.K. and France during the Suez War caused them 
great humiliation and loss of face in the world at large, especially in the 
Middle East. The influence and prestige of the United Kingdom dwindled, and 
this was further complicated by the strain in relations between the U.K. and 
the U.S. In essence this meant that the U.K could not rely completely on the 
U.S. for support in restoring its fortunes in the Middle East. Furthermore, anti- 
British feeling in the Arab world was at its highest, with diplomatic and 
official relations severed between the U.K. on the one hand and the largest oil- 
producing state (Saudi Arabia) as well as with the most heavily populated 
(Egypt) on the other.
The Egyptian government was in a different situation. It had managed to 
portray its military defeat in the war as a political victory not merely against 
Israel, but, more significantly, against the two colonial powers, the U.K. and
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France. President Nasser consolidated his newly-found position as one of the 
leaders of the developing world. To the British government's horror, Nasser 
was not only established firmly amongst the masses in Egypt, but in the Arab 
world at large. Nasser's Egypt became a force to be reckoned with, a regional 
power which had managed to win its first major battle with the two former 
colonial powers. Hence 1957 witnessed a victorious Egypt which had already 
not merely proved its ability to control the use of its prime asset, the Suez 
Canal, but had also established its credentials as a credible regional power. This 
meant that Egypt not only had interests outside its immediate borders, but more 
importantly had gathered sufficient influence to be able to advance them. The 
fact that the U.K., thanks to the state of its relations with Egypt, neither had 
access to Saudi oil nor was able to repair the Syrian oil pipeline (which the 
Syrian army had damaged during the Suez War, and whose rupture was 
contributing to the U.K.'s oil shortage) was sufficient proof of the damage 
Egypt could continue to cause to the United Kingdom's interests in the Middle 
East. The change in the pattern of the relationship between the two states was 
highlighted further by the fact that it was Egypt which had severed diplomatic 
relations with the U.K. following the Suez War. [1] Again it was Egypt which, 
in January 1957, unilaterally abrogated the main treaty governing its relations 
with the U.K. (the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954). Indeed, this was the 
second time that an Egyptian government had abrogated such a treaty with 
the United Kingdom. The first occasion had occurred less than seven years 
previously, when Egypt abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1951. 
However, the difference between these two instances, from a purely legal point 
of view, was that the U.K. could not dispute the validity of Egypt's action in 
abrogating the 1954 treaty, since its own military action against Egypt three 
months previously had not been consistent with the terms of that treaty. [2]
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The British government had to come to terms with the importance of Egypt for 
the U.K. In the first place, the U.K. needed to secure an agreement over the 
passage of British ships through the Suez Canal. Once the U.K. was able to 
achieve this, another factor which influenced the desire of the British 
government to reach an agreement with Egypt was its calculation of the 
chances of Nasser's regime staying in power in Egypt, despite the economic 
pressures that the U.K. and the West were exerting on him. It is perhaps 
noteworthy that, at the time that the British government thought that 
economic pressures could cause a crack in Nasser's regime, [3] the British 
stance in the negotiations with Egypt was rigid and uncompromising. Indeed, 
during the summer of 1957 the U.K. did not even want to reach a settlement 
with Egypt. [4] (Selwyn Lloyd, prior to the start of the talks, made a point of 
emphasising the exploratory nature of these talks and insisted that he had not 
even considered such questions as restoring diplomatic relations. [5] The 
British position began to change and became more favourable towards the 
idea of reaching a settlement when the U.K. realised that there was little 
possibility that the Egyptian government could be overthrown by economic 
pressure. [6]
I FACTORS AFFECTING THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE U.K.
After Suez, relations between the two countries were determined by two sets 
of considerations. These were related to: (a) The respective power of the U.K. 
and Egypt abroad, and the power of their two governments at home; and (b) 
the immediate problems and issues resulting from the drastic break between the
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two states after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and its consequences, 
including, naturally, the Suez War itself.
The first set of considerations (a), the power of each government at home and 
its influence abroad, meant that both the U.K. and Egypt addressed the issue of 
bilateral relations with the other from the point of view of the foreign policy 
clashes which had led to the initial break in their relations. Therefore the 
priority issue from this point of view remained the foreign policy conflicts, 
rather than bilateral relations. As for the second set of considerations (b), they 
were concerned with the problems — in the field of bilateral relations —  that 
had resulted from the drastic rupture in the bilateral relations. These problems 
were indeed responsible for the fact that each state had to ignore its animosity 
towards the other (or for the leadership of the other), in order to sort them out. 
These problems or issues created sufficient internal momentum to force the two 
states to overcome their animosity, negotiate and finally to make the necessary 
compromises to reach an agreement.
A Factors Related to the Respective Power 
of the U.K. and Egypt
The Suez War had dramatic ramifications for both the U.K. and Egypt, since it 
had affected their internal political situations, their economies, and their 
standing in the world at large and particularly in the Middle East. When 
addressing the effects of the war on Egypt, the aspects which will be analysed 
are: the internal effects of the war on the Egyptian political system, its effects 
on the economic development and external relations of Egypt, and the way 
that Egypt regarded the U.K. after the war. As for the U.K., particular emphasis
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will be placed on the effect of the internal changes in the U.K. government on 
relations with Egypt, and on the extent to which there remained animosity in 
the U.K. towards Egypt and its leader.
1 — Egypt
A: Effects of the Suez Crisis on Egypt's Political System. The nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal and the result of the Suez War in 1956, instead of destroying 
Nasser, as Eden had intended, helped to make him the undisputed leader of 
Egypt, with claims to be the most charismatic leader of the Arab world in 
modern history. After the war, and due to the fact that he was able to transform 
Egypt's military defeat into a spectacular political victory (albeit thanks to the 
position of the United States and perhaps the Soviet Union), Nasser's standing 
and position in Egypt became unrivalled. His decision to nationalise the Suez 
Canal and the events and aftermath of the war had given him the opportunity 
and the exposure he needed to secure his position. These events made him 
stand out from the group of army officers which was responsible for the 1952 
coup d'etat and enabled him to become recognised by the Egyptians as their 
undisputed leader. [7] He now had the personal authority to rule Egypt in his 
own right as Nasser, rather than as a member of the group of army officers 
which had made the 1952 coup. [8]
Prior to the Suez affair, Nasser's claim to rule, his authority, rested on the 1952 
military coup. However, in that political action four years earlier, he had had to 
share credit with the 10 other officers who had formed the Revolutionary 
Command Council which effectively ruled Egypt [9] until Nasser, in 1956, 
introduced the new constitution and returned the army to barracks — at least 
in theory. The Suez victory, however, was credited solely to him. It displayed 
him as successfully achieving two feats that no other leader in Egypt's modern
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history had been able even to come close to accomplishing: namely the 
acquisition of the Suez Canal, and the defeat of the U.K., the colonial power 
that had occupied Egypt for 75 years.
Nasser was credited by the Arabs in general, and the Egyptians in particular, as 
the sole slayer of the dragon (the dragon meaning the British Empire and 
Anthony Eden), the saviour of the nation from the evil designs and actions of 
imperialism. The fact that the Suez War was a military defeat for Egypt was not 
even acknowledged in Egypt, as the propaganda machine was able to 
concentrate the attention of the populace on the political victory and on the 
heroism of the Egyptian army and its leader in that episode. The fact that it was 
the role of the United States which was the key to the defeat of the Suez 
campaign was not even acknowledged by Nasser or the regime and was 
consequently ignored by the masses. In a play published in Egypt in 1969, 
after the 1967 defeat, Nasser's taking credit for the Suez victory was compared 
to Oedipus's taking the credit for slaying the sphinx and was thus alleged to be 
the cause of the nation's ills. [10] (The implication of that play was that Nasser 
was able to take complete control of Egypt's destiny, without any worthwhile 
resistance internally, due to the myth that the victory he claimed at Suez was 
his alone, and thus he was responsible for the catastrophe that occurred to 
Egypt in 1967.)
Indeed Nasser, after Suez, gained absolute power over the affairs of Egypt, 
since there was nobody able to challenge him internally after that war. He 
obtained this control mainly because he was regarded internally as the Za'im 
(leader) and not just as al-Rayyis (the President). He was seen as the saviour 
of the nation, the fulfilment of its aspirations. [11] In that capacity he was not 
be challenged, and he obtained a degree of authority which had never been
89
achieved by any Egyptian leader in modern history. [12] The limitations on his 
power came not from any internal opposition, competitors for power, or 
institutionalised system of checks and balances, but rather from his perception 
of the internal ramifications of his decisions.
Thus Nasser was able to create yet another political institution, the National 
Union. It was established in May 1957, and from its ranks the People's 
Assembly (the Egyptian Parliament) was elected in July of that year. That 
parliament, during its term of existence, from July 1957 until March 1958, 
proved to be the norm for the conduct of Egyptian parliaments under Nasser: it 
was an audience for speeches, or at most a rubber stamp for legalising the 
measures that Nasser wanted passed. [13]
The regime in Egypt centred around Nasser, who became the final arbiter of 
any major decision — or even minor ones. [14] The political actors in that 
personalised and authoritarian system of government fell into two categories. 
The first category in term of rank and authority was called Ahl al-Thiqa (The 
People of Trust). These were the people the new regime mostly chose to be in 
command in key posts of government. Their selection did not depend on their 
respective abilities; rather, the main criterion was their unquestioning loyalty to 
the new regime. The second category was called Ahl al-Khihra (The People 
of Expertise). The criterion for their selection was their expertise, as the name 
implies, and they were subservient — in most cases — to the former category. 
[15]
From 1957, Nasser ruled by depending on a mixture of these two categories. It 
was his decision to employ whichever he saw fit. Whomever he placed in the
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key posts was responsible to him. The power base of most of these new 
appointees was simply the continuing trust and goodwill of Nasser, and 
naturally their future employment and political careers depended on that 
factor.
The Suez War gave Nasser sufficient popularity and political weight inside 
Egypt and the Arab world to rule Egypt almost single-handed. The decision­
making process in Egypt became closest in nature to that of a Presidential 
Centre or Leader-Staff Group. [16] Decisions on all major matters in Egypt 
became Nasser's domain, among them the issue of relations between Egypt and 
the U.K. Nasser was able to act alone with few constraints from either his 
people or the state institutions. In addition, the only people he even consulted 
was a small group of subordinate advisors appointed by him.
As a result, the U.K. had lost all its influence in dealing with Egypt, and was 
forced to deal with Nasser or his advisors without any of the useful contacts 
and intermediaries whom it used to have in the pre-1952 political system. In the 
period from 1957 until official relations were restored — and even after — the 
U.K. government found that it had to deal with and try to gain access to 
individuals whose main claim to fame was their closeness to President Nasser. 
In some cases, these people were better able to deliver whichever commitment 
the U.K. needed than the relevant Egyptian officials. The prime example to 
prove that point was Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, then editor of Al-Ahram, 
and one of Nasser's closest friends and advisors. Colin Crowe, the first British 
Charge d'Affaires in Egypt after the restoration of relations, was told by Heikal 
himself that Nasser sometimes used him as a “second Foreign Office”, [17] and 
indeed the way that relations were restored between the United Kingdom and 
Egypt later (in 1959) only validates that statement.
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Therefore, the Suez War led to the exact opposite of what the British 
government had planned. Instead of breaking Nasser, it led to the 
strengthening of his hold over the Egyptian political system. Moreover, the 
Tripartite Aggression, as it was called in Egypt, led to the elimination of 
whatever influence the U.K. had in Egypt. The remnants of the pre-1952 
regime were wiped out from the Egyptian political scene and after Suez the 
U.K. realised that, despite years of controlling Egypt, it retained no power base 
or even influence in that country. The net result was that the future of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations could only be negotiated with a stronger and more 
influential Nasser.
B: Developments in the Egyptian Economy After Suez. The political 
strength of Nasser after 1956 and his increased influence and success in the 
field of foreign relations were not matched by similar achievements in the 
economic field. The policy of the post-1952 revolutionary regime in Egypt was 
set down in the Six Principles drawn up by Egypt's new leaders. Most of these 
principles aimed at increasing the standard of living and quality of life for the 
majority of Egyptians. The revolutionary leaders also aimed at increasing the 
output of the country, so as to cope with the increasing population, as well as 
to raise the share of the industrial sector in the economy and boost the 
contribution of the industrial sector to the GNP. The government aimed at the 
latter objective through establishing some large industrial projects in the 
country. The most substantial of these projects was the High Dam, which was 
intended not only to achieve goals related to the agricultural expansion, but 
also to provide for the augmentation of Egypt's energy resources through its 
planned hydraulic generators. Nasser continually stated that his immediate aim,
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as well as the most pressing need, was to build the Egyptian domestic economy 
and raise the standard of living in Egypt. [18]
The Egyptian government, by 1956, had already announced its plans to build 
several industrial projects, including a paper mill, a caustic soda plant, and 
several others. The government financed these projects mainly through internal 
borrowing from the public. By the middle of 1956, the government had already 
borrowed over $142 million from the public to finance these development 
projects. In its drive for industrial expansion, Egypt used these funds to finance 
a large program of capital goods imports that accounted for most of Egypt's 
increased balance of payment deficit of around $100 million. [19] In order to 
finance these projects Egypt also relied on the proceeds of the nascent 
nationalisation measures on the internal scene, as well as the aid and grants it 
received from foreign governments. Indeed, the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal which started the Suez crisis was in response to the American 
withdrawal of the loan to the High Dam project. Nasser, when nationalising the 
Suez Canal, declared that its revenues (which he estimated at $100 million p.a.) 
would enable Egypt to meet the cost of the High Dam project. [20] Another 
important avenue utilised by Egypt to finance its capital goods imports from 
the West was its sizeable foreign reserves abroad which were — relative to the 
Egyptian economy as a whole — quite substantial. Most of these reserves 
were held in the United Kingdom and by 1957 they exceeded £70 million. [21]
However, the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal did not create the 
economic prosperity which the Egyptian government desired. Immediately 
after Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the U.K., France and the 
United States froze Egyptian assets in their countries, thus preventing Egypt
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from using the funds it owned abroad. Moreover, prior to the attack on Suez in 
late October, only 40% of the Suez Canal dues were actually being paid to 
Egypt, since British, French and many other ships continued to pay their dues 
to the Suez Canal Company in London or in Paris. As Egypt did not want to 
escalate the dispute over its right to control the Suez Canal, it decided to 
continue to allow these ships passage. This meant that Egypt was receiving 
only part of the Suez Canal dues, while it had to continue to pay the entire 
cost of operating the Canal. After the Canal was blocked during the hostilities 
in November 1956, all Suez Canal revenues were discontinued, while most of 
the overheads that Egypt had to endure remained. [22] Egypt's foreign 
exchange problem was underscored by a sharp decrease in, if not virtual 
disappearance of, its income from tourism. Egypt's total foreign exchange 
holdings declined by over 20% between 1954 and 1957. Of the $600 million 
of foreign exchange balances available for Egypt in 1956 almost half were 
blocked in London. [23]
There is no agreement over the exact amount of the Egyptian blocked 
balances in the West after Suez. Perhaps the best estimate for the total amount 
of sterling blocked balances at the time of the nationalisation of the Canal in 
July, 1956 is around £110 million, [24] In addition, the blocked Egyptian 
balances in the United States amounted to about $27.3 million. [25] As of 
August 1956, the total free foreign exchange available for Egypt was merely 
$244 million, of which $174 million was in gold and served as a cover for the 
Egyptian currency. By December 1957, Egypt's free holding of foreign 
exchange (exclusive of gold] did not exceed $50 million. [26]
The problems of the Egyptian economy in the aftermath of the Suez crisis were
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not limited to the area of foreign exchange. The Egyptian government had 
seized the opportunity to speed the processes of nationalisation and 
Egyptianisation of its own economy. The sequestration of foreign (British and 
French) and Jewish firms created a large vacuum in the Egyptian economy. 
The companies that were sequestrated or Egyptianised had played a large role 
in the Egyptian market economy. Among the sequestrated companies were 17 
insurance companies and seven banks which were an important factor in the 
domestic commercial banking sector. [27] The sequestration, as well as the 
dismissal of foreign nationals from these firms (and several others), negatively 
influenced the running of the market economy in Egypt at the time, especially 
since these measures in effect led to a complete halt to Western foreign 
investment in Egypt. The Egyptian government, when it seized these 
companies, sometimes collected not an asset, but a liability. This was the case 
with the Egyptianisation of Barclays Bank in Egypt. When the Egyptian 
government took over the bank, it realised that Barclays held its pension fund 
(worth £8 million) in London, making it inaccessible to them. This meant that in 
acquiring the bank Egypt also acquired a debt of £8 million. [28] The Egyptian 
government was faced not only with the vacuum that the sequestration 
created, but also with having to bear the running losses of some of these 
companies.
These losses added to the fiscal problems of the government, accentuated by 
the Suez crisis, which had resulted in an increase in government expenditures, 
accompanied by a drastic fall in its revenues. Allocation for the military sector 
in the general budget of 1956-1957 amounted to $215 million, an increase of 
more than 25% over the previous year. This allocation was naturally increased 
due to the outbreak of the hostilities and the later need to replace the weapons
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lost in that war. [29] The cost of replacing damaged equipment was not limited 
to the military sector, since several civilian establishments were damaged in the 
course of the war, including, for example, the radio station. [30] The Egyptian 
government was faced with an additional problem which was also related to 
the Suez crisis, namely the decline in its revenues. At that time, one third of the 
government's revenues came from customs receipts. Since the nationalisation 
of the Suez Canal customs revenues had registered a significant decline. After 
the outbreak of hostilities in October, these revenues fell by around $10 million 
a month. In addition, since the government had an acute foreign exchange 
problem, it had to curb imports. This meant an additional reduction in customs 
receipts. [31]
Another consequence of the Suez crisis was the disruption it caused in the 
pattern of Egypt's external trade. Prior to 1956, most of Egypt's external trade 
was with the West, payment for most imported goods (with the exception of 
imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries] being made in 
sterling. Most of the Egyptian commercial banks had sterling deposits in 
London in order to complete such transactions. The sanctions imposed on 
Egypt after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal made the existing 
arrangements for financing Egypt's imports obsolete. Egypt managed to devise 
new ways to finance its imports, such as barter deals, or payment through the 
use of other currencies, such as the German mark or Swiss franc. [32] These 
methods were partially successful, but nevertheless they led to shortages in 
some basic goods as well as in industrial spare parts. The freezing of the 
Egyptian balances in the U.K. and the United States, as well as in France, 
naturally contributed to these shortages. [32] Indeed, the denial of Western 
goods, especially British goods, to the Egyptian markets had begun, by 1957,
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to cause serious dislocation to the Egyptian economy. Just before the Suez 
crisis there had been a large volume of trade between the two countries, 
totalling £38.8 million in 1955, with U.K. exports to Egypt reaching about 
£19.4 million. There was every evidence of an increase in this trade, since trade 
between the two states had totalled £30.1 in the first half of 1956, up to the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal, with British exports to Egypt in that period 
of around £22.8 million. [33] The effect of the sanctions on bilateral trade with 
Egypt was drastic: in 1957 the total amount of trade slumped to £3 million. [34]
As a result of these economic dislocations, the Egyptian government 
introduced rationing for kerosene in January 1957, and all government 
departments were ordered to cut spending by 10%. The following month, the 
Egyptian Health Ministry, as a result of the shortages in medicines and 
pharmaceuticals, published a list of substitutes for 15,000 brands of 
pharmaceutical product which were no longer available in Egypt. [35] 
However, these measures were not sufficient and in March 1957 the 
government drastically cut imports of luxury items and government 
departments were instructed to cancel all but extremely vital imports, in order 
to conserve badly needed foreign exchange. [36] Later, the foreign exchange 
crisis forced the Egyptian government to cut spending even more drastically 
and in April 1957 further cuts in imports were introduced and holidays abroad 
were forbidden. The result of this was a rise in the cost of living, as well as the 
creation of long queues to obtain whatever goods were available. [37]
Thus, although Nasser's political power in Egypt in the aftermath of the Suez 
crisis was assured, these economic pressures had an adverse effect on the 
position of the government. The shortage of goods and austerity measures
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adopted by the government were bound to lead to increasing popular 
disaffection. The combined effects of the economic problems that faced Egypt 
could not go unnoticed by Egypt's political leaders. This disaffection was 
bound to erode the popularity of Nasser and the regime as the people 
continued to face economic hardship. These economic problems served, in turn, 
to enhance the realisation of Egypt's political leaders of the importance of 
reaching an agreement with the U.K., at the very least in order to regain the 
blocked Egyptian financial assets.
C: Developments in Egypt's External Relationships. The economy was not 
the only problem that Egypt faced after Suez. The initial success which 
Egyptian foreign policy achieved during the Suez crisis and its aftermath 
began to wear extremely thin. After Suez, Nasser achieved cult status, not just 
within Egypt's borders but in the Arab world at large, allowing him to become 
a spokesman for the developing world in Asia and Africa. [38] Nasser managed 
to claim victory over the two colonialist powers of the past, the United 
Kingdom and France. The creation of the new “Arab Solidarity Agreement” 
between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, and the meeting of its heads of 
state twice in Cairo in January and February 1957, added to Nasser's increasing 
standing and influence in the Arab world. Egypt gained a great deal of prestige 
not just because of the fact of that meeting, or because of its venue, but more 
importantly because of its results. The creation of the Arab Solidarity 
Agreement so soon after the end of the Suez crisis meant, in effect, the 
consolidation by Egypt of the political victory and the new leadership status it 
had achieved through the Suez War. However the Arab Solidarity Union 
proved, as early as 1957, to be riddled with differences among its members, and 
relations soured between Egypt and both Jordan and Saudi Arabia before the
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year was through. The popularity and influence that Nasser acquired after and 
because of the Suez affair gave him tremendous influence among the Arab 
masses, whether in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan. However, this very same 
factor sowed the seeds of the destruction of the relationship between Nasser 
and the regimes in these states.
Egypt's main regional alliances prior to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
were with Saudi Arabia and Syria. The alliance with Saudi Arabia meant that 
Egypt received financial backing for executing its foreign policy ventures in 
combating the influence of the U.K. and its allies. This was a common goal of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and the power 
that Nasser acquired during that crisis, made King Saud wary of his increasing 
influence, especially in Saudi Arabia. King Saud was concerned at that 
influence as early as August 1956. When Nasser visited the kingdom for talks 
in August of that year, King Saud chose the eastern province of Saudi Arabia 
as the venue to avoid a show of Nasser's popularity among the masses in the 
urban centres of Hijaz or Najd. Even so, on Nasser's arrival in Al-Dammam he 
was welcomed by a demonstration so enthusiastic that the barricades were 
swept away and King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal had to try to shield 
Nasser from thousands of greeters and well-wishers who wanted to touch him. 
King Saud's jealousy and concern for his own position inside his kingdom was 
vividly demonstrated when he started hitting the crowds with his stick and 
cursing them in front of Nasser and his entourage. [40] The nationalisation of 
the Suez Canal itself alarmed the Saudi monarch, who claimed he was not 
informed about it in advance, and the events surrounding the nationalisation 
(and the war) affected Saudi oil revenues negatively. Moreover, Egypt had 
brought the whole matter of the concessions the West enjoyed in the Arab 
world out into the open. This was embarrassing for Saudi Arabia especially,
99
since they included not only oil concessions but the American use of Al- 
Dahran air base in Saudi Arabia. This point is worth mentioning because in 
1956, after Nasser's visit to Saudi Arabia, King Saud complained to Nasser that 
Egyptian teachers in Saudi Arabia and some of the army officers at the 
Egyptian military mission in Riyadh were repeating negative remarks about 
him, especially in connection with the Dahran air base. [41]
At the same time, the social principles Egypt was advocating alarmed King 
Saud and made him apprehensive of their implications for Saudi Arabia and the 
position of the Saudi ruling family. Equally damaging were the propaganda 
attacks that Egypt was directing at the ruling families in Jordan, Iraq and the 
Gulf States, because most of the charges that Egypt levelled against these 
states fitted the Saud family as well — a fact which did not go unnoticed by 
the Saudi monarch. Moreover, the power of Nasser in the streets of the Arab 
world made him so sure of his influence in these states that he began to 
overrule their governments and rulers, in case of differences, and appeal — 
through ardent speeches — directly to the masses. This technique worked 
almost every time in forcing these rulers to take the direction that Nasser 
desired or even threatened the position of Arab governments if they tried to 
resist. Nasser was able to create a sufficient pressure of public opinion that the 
Arab rulers (including King Saud) became very wary of his influence inside 
their own countries. [42] Thus, despite the success that this policy of Nasser's 
had achieved in the short term in making the Arab states follow Egypt's lead, it 
managed to destroy the relationships between Egypt and these Arab states in 
the long term.
The events of the Suez War represented the pinnacle of the Saudi-Egyptian 
alliance. After that relations began to cool and had worsened considerably by
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the middle of 1957. Breaking point was almost reached in 1958, when Nasser 
believed that King Saud was involved in a plot against his life and regime. [43] 
Relations with the third partner in the initial Egyptian-Arab alliance, Syria, 
began to run into trouble in the first half of 1957 because of Syria's serious 
internal problems: the intensification of the struggle between the Soviet Union 
and communist elements in Syria on the one hand and the West, namely the 
United States and its allies in Syria, on the other. [44]
Indeed the problems in Egypt’s main alliance in 1957 were not just due to the 
disruption in the alliance between Egypt and Saudi Arabia alone. More 
importantly, Saudi Arabia had changed its position from actively supporting 
Egyptian foreign policy to making every effort clandestinely to undermine 
Egyptian influence abroad and especially to undermine the Egyptian-Syrian 
relationship. [45] The Saudi-Egyptian rift went beyond the realm of bilateral 
relations between the two states to develop by 1958 into active clandestine 
regional confrontation between the two states. This coincided with a 
rapprochement between King Saud and Iraq (which Egypt believed to be 
engineered with the help of the United States) [46] and meant that the 
Egyptian alliance of 1956 against the U.K. and its allies in the Middle East was 
wrecked with the ascendancy of the rival camp, led by Iraq. Moreover, Egypt 
in 1957 had lost the pillar of support that had allowed it to achieve political 
victory against the U.K., France and Israel in 1956, namely the United States. In 
1957 the U.S. had finally crystallised its policy vis-a-vis the Middle East when 
it adopted the Eisenhower Doctrine.
The Eisenhower Doctrine viewed the threat to the Middle East as emanating 
from international communism and the Soviet Union. The method of combating
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it was through military aid to the moderate countries in the region to enable 
them to fight it. This was combined with the use of American military forces to 
safeguard the sovereignty of nations threatened by communist (or communist- 
controlled) countries. [47] Described simply, it was a carrot (military and 
financial aid) and stick (military intervention) policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine 
came into existence officially on January 5, 1957, when President Eisenhower 
asked the United States Congress to approve a new policy in the Middle East. 
This new policy allowed the President to use the U.S. armed forces to secure 
and protect (from overt aggression from other nations controlled by 
international communism) the territorial integrity and political independence of 
any Middle East nation that requested such aid. The second part of this policy 
was the appropriation of the sum of $200 million to aid countries threatened 
by such danger. This policy was endorsed by the U.S. Congress in March 
1957.
The interpretation and implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine meant, in 
effect, a crystallisation of the American policy towards Egypt. However, before 
explaining the change in the United States policy towards Egypt after the 
Suez War, it is important not to ignore the fact that this policy preceded the 
latter's nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez crisis itself. In the period 
up to 1956, the American government looked to Egypt under Nasser to take 
the lead in meetings with the U.S. to discuss the major problems of the Middle 
East and to achieve the objectives of United States policy in the Middle East. 
The American government of the time perceived and identified its primary 
objectives in the Middle East as “the development of friendly relations with 
the Middle Eastern governments which are willing to resist the extension of 
Soviet influence and which are willing to co-operate with the United States
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and other Western governments”. Another objective was the reduction of the 
tension of the Arab-Israeli conflict through the conclusion of a settlement 
between the Arab states and Israel. The U.S. was disappointed by the fact that 
Nasser was not co-operative and failed to reach agreement over these 
problems. American officials noted that Nasser refused to move on toward a 
settlement with Israel; he stalled in taking the initiative regarding the 
“Johnston Plan” . Nasser also objected to fundamental parts of the proposed 
agreement over the Aswan Dam. The Czechoslovakian arms agreement, as well 
as Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact — to the extent that he concluded 
bilateral agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia to counter the Pact — made 
U.S. officials wary of Egyptian influence in the area. They came to believe that 
Egypt was actually aiming at undermining the interests of the U.S and that all 
their objectives had “been adversely affected in one way or another by the 
present attitude and actions of Egypt under Nasser”. Furthermore, the U.S. 
considered that ”the attitude of the other Arab States and of Israel toward the 
United States is in fact being undermined to a serious degree by Egyptian 
actions.” [48]
As far as the U.S, was concerned, the Egyptian actions not only failed to help 
the conclusion of a settlement between the Arabs and Israel, but, even more 
importantly, began to open the door for Soviet influence in the Middle East 
and Africa. [49] Even worse was the fact that Egyptian propaganda directly 
attacked some Western countries, especially the U.K. and France and even the 
United States itself. In the aftermath of the Suez War, U.S. policy toward Egypt 
and the Arab world was based on an attempt to assist and encourage the pro- 
Western Arab states to stand against Nasser's attempts to dominate them, but
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without making it appear that the US was trying to isolate him. This assistance 
included granting U.S. aid to the propaganda machinery of these states, 
especially to their radio broadcasting capabilities, in order to counter Egypt's 
“Voice Of The Arabs” radio station. [50]
The Suez War in 1956 not only dramatically harmed the U.K.'s standing and 
influence in the Middle East, but also harmed U.S.-Egyptian relations. There 
were several reasons for this. After the way in which it stood by the rights of 
Egypt to the detriment of the interests of its ally the U.K., the U.S. might have 
expected some gratitude and appreciation from Egypt. It certainly did not 
expect that the Egyptian leadership would credit the U.S.S.R. for the defeat of 
the Tripartite Aggression, whilst almost ignoring the more serious and crucial 
role of the U.S. The U.S. found that it had helped defeat its ally without 
gaining the U.K.'s predominant role in the region, since the credit was being 
given to its rival, the Soviet Union. This fact naturally made the U.S. policy­
makers feel that the result of their actions in the Suez crisis had not yielded 
sufficient rewards. It confirmed the American administration's extremely 
negative view of Nasser and changed the way in which the U.S. treated Egypt 
thereafter. The American President began to share and even acknowledge — 
although in private — the feelings of mistrust which both the British and the 
French leadership had for Nasser. In December 1956, Eisenhower told his 
Secretary of State, J.F. Dulles, that they generally shared the British and the 
French opinion of Gamal Abdul Nasser. In fact, a very interesting feature of 
that conversation was that Eisenhower stated that the main difference the U.S. 
had with the French and U.K. actions against Nasser in October 1956 was over 
the opportunity that both countries utilised as well as the timing of their 
actions, rather than with the principle of cutting Nasser down to size. [51]
104
The United States's adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine had several effects 
on Egyptian foreign policy. The first direct result was that Nasser could no 
longer rely on the support of the U.S. in boosting his leadership qualities in the 
Arab world, a policy that the U.S, had adopted in the early 1950s to enable 
Nasser to reach a peace agreement with Israel. By the early months of 1956, 
after the Czech arms deal to Egypt, the failure of the Anderson mission and the 
American attempts at a peace agreement between the Arabs, represented by 
Nasser, and Israel (and months later the Egyptian recognition of Communist 
China), the United States began to contemplate ways and means of limiting 
Nasser's influence and exerting pressure on his regime. The obvious example of 
that policy was the withdrawal of the American offer to finance the High Dam 
project.
The second result was a radical shift in the policy of the United States in the 
region. After the U.S. had led the international efforts at the United Nations in 
1956, it intensified another concerted effort to try wean Egypt's allies, 
especially Saudi Arabia and its monarch King Saud, away from Egypt. [52] The 
final outcome of that policy was that the Egyptian-Saudi alliance of 1955- 
1956, which had contributed to Egypt's successful campaign against the U.K. 
in 1956, was wrecked and replaced by the above-mentioned hostility between 
King Saud and President Nasser, The U.S. efforts at combating Nasser's 
influence in the Middle East were not limited to Saudi Arabia, but included 
Syria, the third party to the Arab alliance Egypt had forged in 1956. The 
American efforts further included Jordan and Lebanon and also involved 
strengthening the resolve of Iraq. [53]
The above-mentioned variables, regarding the Egyptian domestic political
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scene, its economy and its external relations had several implications for the 
predicament of Nasser's Egypt post-Suez. On the one hand, Nasser emerged 
from the Suez War as the undisputed leader of Egypt. His political victory in 
that war allowed him the opportunity to eradicate the influence and position of 
the U.K. and the pre-1952 regime in Egypt. On the other hand, the Egyptian 
economy was severely shaken as a result of the Suez War and the sanctions 
that were imposed by the West and which were still being maintained in 1957. 
Moreover, the external political clout that Nasser had achieved in 1956 was 
being severely eroded as his relationship with his allies in the Arab world 
began to sour and after the United States adopted the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
and began actively to work to undermine Nasser's position in the Arab world.
2 — The United Kingdom
A: Effects of the Internal Changes in the U.K. on Relations with Egypt. The
political defeat the U.K. suffered at Suez (as mentioned in the previous 
chapter) led to its greatest post-War humiliation and had major implications for 
the political actors concerned. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, who 
had been groomed by Winston Churchill himself for that public office, and 
who was known as the most experienced leader in the field of foreign affairs 
and diplomacy, had to pay for this disaster with his own political career. The 
resignation of Eden and the accession of Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister 
on January 9, 1957 led to the rise of a certain assumption which, despite the 
fact that it has some merit as well as elements of truth, is nevertheless 
misleading. This attempts to explain the resumption of the relations between 
Egypt and the U.K. as the result of a defeat, exemplified by Eden's downfall, of 
the imperialist (or colonialist) elements in the British government which 
devised and helped execute the Suez affair. The assumption goes on to
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conclude that with the downfall of the “imperialist elements” from power, the 
British government was able to resume normal and indeed diplomatic relations 
with the Egyptian government under President Nasser. Suez indeed managed 
to demolish the imperial legacy not only in the Middle East but more 
importantly in the British mind as well. But there are fallacies in this theory. 
The first is that although the Suez affair led to the downfall of the Prime 
Minister, the others who left the government as a result of this affair were by 
no means collaborators in it. It was those who objected to the Suez policy, not 
the advocates of that policy, who resigned from office (which led to the end of 
their government careers), and those resignations were not caused by Eden’s 
downfall but took place much before it.
These people included Sir Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Edward Boyle, Economic Secretary to the Treasury and even William 
Clarke, Sir Anthony Eden's Downing Street Press Secretary. This group 
included another member, the Minister of Defence, the First Viscount 
Monckton of Brenchley (then Mr. Walter Turner Monckton), who resigned as 
Defence Minister just before the outbreak of hostilities because he did not 
agree with that policy. [54] (Apparently Mr. Monckton did not feel unduly 
strongly about the Suez operation, since he accepted to stay in the Cabinet as 
Paymaster General.) As for those who actually helped advocate the Suez 
policy, their fortunes in its aftermath either flourished, or at least were not 
damaged by its consequences.
Harold Macmillan was, in fact, the first in the Cabinet (since August 1956] to 
advocate the collusion between France and Israel to instigate the attack on
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Egypt in 1956. [55] The downfall of Eden led eventually to Macmillan 
becoming the Prime Minister who succeeded him, although before the crisis it 
was Rab Butler, who in 1956 was Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of 
Commons, who was tipped as Eden's successor. In fact, it was Butler's defence 
of the British withdrawal from Suez in Parliament and among the Conservative 
Party which led to him being labelled as “first in, first out” and contributed to 
the loss of his credibility as leader, although Butler was not responsible for, or 
even an advocate of, the policy the U.K. government adopted in October 
1956. [56] Butler's loss of credibility ultimately contributed to the choice of 
Macmillan as Prime Minister.
The effects which the Suez War had on the personnel responsible for its 
execution inside the Foreign Office also illustrate the same result: that the 
events of the Suez War did not harm their careers. The prime example was the 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, who remained in office with the added 
benefit that a Prime Minister who had constantly interfered (Eden) was out of 
the way. The senior Foreign Office official who went to Sevres at the end of 
October to finalise the agreement between the U.K., France and Israel over 
Suez, Sir Patrick Henry Dean, remained as Deputy Under-Secretary of the 
Foreign Office until 1960, when he became the U.K. Permanent Representative 
at the United Nations and later became British Ambassador to the U.S., the 
U.K.'s top ambassadorial post.
Furthermore, it is not the case that the resumption and improvement of relations 
between Egypt and U.K. occurred because those who were opposed to Nasser 
had lost their influence because of the Suez affair. Two of the most adamant 
opponents of Nasser in the 1956 Cabinet, Macmillan and Lloyd, were in
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control of British foreign policy in 1959 when relations between the two 
countries were resumed. Macmillan, who succeeded Eden as Prime Minister, 
was clearly against Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis and his account of that 
period in his memoirs clearly demonstrates that he had not changed his initial 
negative view of Nasser. Macmillan believed that Nasser's policies toward the 
West were designed merely to engage the Western nations in bidding against 
the Soviet Union to obtain the maximum price for Egypt. [57] He believed that 
“dangerous dreams of Arab imperialism” were behind Nasser's Arab policy, 
and that by 1956 Nasser had fallen under the influence of the Russians. [58] 
Macmillan's negative perception of the Egyptian President led him to believe 
that the decision of Dulles to withdraw the offer to finance the High Dam 
project — as well as the way that the Dulles decision was delivered — was 
completely justified on account of Egypt's difficult stance in the financial 
negotiations with the World Bank over the loan. The fact that the U.S. 
decision to withdraw that offer was mainly to humiliate Nasser is not even 
considered by Macmillan when he concludes that “both British and American 
Governments used all their efforts to conclude their agreement on reasonable 
and even generous terms”. [59]
This clearly shows that the resumption of the relations between the U.K. and 
Egypt did not take place merely as a result of the fall of Eden from power. 
More importantly it illustrates that the British government which negotiated 
with Egypt over the settlement of the problems between them in the bilateral 
field, and which actively sought the resumption of official relations with Egypt, 
shared Eden's animosity towards Nasser as well as having supported Eden's 
Suez policy in 1956.
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B: The Change in the U.K. Position on the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The British 
government was faced in 1957 with the necessity of “coming to terms with 
Egypt”. This does not in any way mean that the British government at the time 
actually wanted to improve relations with Egypt, or to have a better 
relationship with President Nasser. On the contrary, all the signs indicate the 
continuing animosity of the British government towards Nasser's Egypt. Up 
until July 1957, the British government considered Nasser as the prime threat in 
the Middle East. During a dinner at 10 Downing Street, the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, in response to a question by the 
United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, about British policy 
towards Nasser, stated that “we still regard him (Nasser) as public enemy No. 1 
in the Middle East.” Macmillan agreed with Dulles that Nasser must be taught 
that his “misdemeanours did not pay” and added that Nasser was “more 
dangerous than any possible successor because of his greater ability”. [60]
Among the signs of the increasing animosity to Egypt in the United Kingdom 
government was the new enthusiastic sympathy towards Israel. Before its 
relations with Egypt had begun to sour and prior to the Suez War, the U.K. 
had not been pursuing a policy that was hostile to Israel. Nevertheless, there 
was a strong Arabist trend in the British government (especially at the Foreign 
Office) at the beginning of the 1950s which was understanding of the rights of 
the Arab countries and Egypt's legitimate rights regarding its self-defence. An 
example of this position was U.K. officials' attitude towards Egypt's refusal to 
allow Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal. Indeed, that was the 
position taken by Eden before relations with Egypt deteriorated. [61] After the 
crisis, the British government began to adopt the view that the refusal of Egypt 
to allow Israeli ships passage through the Canal was in breach of the 1888
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convention. [62] This stance was not sufficiently substantiated, since Israel 
was not a party to the 1888 Constantinople Convention and since Egypt was 
exercising its rights of legitimate self-defence, since it prevented the ships of a 
belligerent state not merely from using the Canal, but more importantly, from 
entering its territorial waters. The British government, post-Suez, was almost 
obsessed with the rights of Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal and with the 
safety of Israel and the legitimacy of its position vis-a-vis the Arab countries. It 
took the view that Israel was justified in refusing to withdraw completely from 
the Sinai Peninsula (basically Gaza and Sharm al-Shaikh) without some 
“equivalent guarantees” regarding Israeli security. [63] The degree of this 
change of heart on the part of the British government towards Israel was 
further demonstrated by the refusal of the U.K. to accept the United States' 
readiness to use sanctions against Israel to force the latter to withdraw from 
Sharm al-Shaikh and Gaza. This was the reason that the United Kingdom 
engaged Canada's mediation in the U.N., which proposed a United Nations 
peacekeeping force so as to convince Israel to accept a ceasefire and 
withdrawal from Sinai without having the U.S. force the issue by submitting a 
resolution to the Security Council calling for sanctions against Israel. The only 
consideration that prevented the British government from siding completely 
with Israel — to the extent that it might have vetoed (or at least abstained on) 
a United States4 resolution calling for sanctions against Israel if it did not 
withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza, was the fear of antagonising its Arab allies 
in the area. [64]
The pro-Israel feelings in 1957 in the U.K. were not restricted to the 
government, but also commanded a substantial following in the Press as well as
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a strong following in the House of Commons. During the course of 1957, the 
British government was forced to to notice “the strength of parliamentary 
feeling in favour of Israel” when it considered the supply of arms to Arab 
states, even to the prime allies which the U.K. was bound by treaty to defend, 
such as Jordan. British ministers acknowledged, when they authorised the 
supply of even a small number of Centurion tanks to Jordan, that such a 
transaction might lead Israel to renew her request for a further supply of 
Centurion tanks and that, in view of the degree of support for Israel in 
Parliament, the government might not be able to refuse such a request. [65]
C: The Effect of Suez on the U.K.'s Foreign Relations. The Suez War had 
grave effects on the standing and influence of the U.K. in the Middle East (as 
explained in full in the previous chapter). However, there is an added 
dimension that should be explored at this juncture and which is directly 
relevant to the Anglo-Egyptian relationship: namely the position of the United 
States. There were two aspects of the U.S. position which were particularly 
relevant to the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. The first was the crystallisation of 
the United States policy in opposing Nasser's influence in the Middle East 
(which was discussed earlier). The first effect of this was that Egypt lost the 
winning card which enabled it to snatch political victory from the jaws of 
military defeat at Suez. For it was the United States that had led a concerted 
effort to rally international public opinion against the U.K. in the United 
Nations, and it was the United States that had refused to support sterling. In 
addition, it had refused to allow the U.K. to draw on U.S. oil supplies, and 
continued its pressure on the U.K. until the latter agreed to withdraw from 
Suez after the war. Thus the U.S Middle East policy and U.S. relations with 
both the U.K. and Egypt were an important element in the calculations of these
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two states, thus giving the U.S. extra leverage against both.
The ingratitude that Egypt had shown the United States contributed to the 
possible regret felt by American policy-makers regarding the way in which the 
U.S. had treated the U.K. in that crisis. Although there were many differences 
between the two countries, they did not permanently damage the alliance 
which had been forged during the Second World War. This was demonstrated 
by the personal letter by Churchill to Eisenhower — though the former was 
out of office and retired from politics — and Eisenhower's response. This letter 
reminded the American President of their alliance and the relations they 
enjoyed during the war and stressed the importance of that alliance to combat 
communism. [66] Such sentiments on the part of the American policy-makers 
were strengthened by the ingratitude that Egypt had shown towards them and 
their perception of an increased Soviet presence and influence in the Middle 
East, coinciding with or resulting from an even stronger Soviet-Egyptian 
relationship.
The fact that the United States had finally decided on and declared a clear 
policy of opposing Nasser (the Eisenhower Doctrine) meant that Egypt lost its 
trump card against the U.K. It also meant that the U.K. was at last able to rely 
on a United States commitment in the struggle against the spread of Nasserite 
influence in the Middle East. The U.K. welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
though it felt that it was too late. Nevertheless, “this gallant effort to shut the 
stable door after the horse has bolted was welcome to us” . [67] It was in its 
way another lesson which the U.K. was to learn, regarding their own role in 
comparison to that of the U.S., in this “new tenet”. British politicians began to 
wonder why the British Empire should not be allowed to send its forces to the
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area to defend its own aims while, according to the Eisenhower Doctrine, the 
U.S. was perfectly free to do so — “it was only American troops, American 
power and nobody else”. [68]
However, the change in the U.S. policy towards Egypt after Suez became even 
more relevant in the light of yet another development, the rapprochement that 
took place early on (March 1957) between the United States and the U.K. This 
rapprochement took place in Bermuda at the Anglo-American Summit between 
the British Prime Minister, Macmillan, and the American President, Eisenhower. 
During these meetings, the special relationship between the United States and 
the U.K. was restored. In particular, the relationship between the leaders of the 
two states was restored to the excellent level that had existed between them 
during the Second World War, when they served together in Algeria. [69]
The Bermuda meeting — which came about through an American initiative
[70] — did more than reopen lines of communication between the two states, 
lines which had been strained during the early phases of the Suez crisis and 
were later almost blocked when the United Kingdom launched the Suez War.
[71] Though the American administration did not necessarily share the 
particular British hatred of Nasser, they nevertheless listened to British 
arguments. The British Prime Minister became convinced that this meeting had 
awakened the Americans to the fact that they should stand up to the Soviets in 
the Middle East. [72] Indeed, the American President was highly satisfied with 
the result of that conference and with the mending of fences with the U.K. He 
called the Bermuda conference “the most successful international conference 
that I have attended since the close of World War 2”. [73]
114
The Eisenhower Doctrine, and the fact that it meant the United States saw itself 
as having a singular role in defending the Middle East and Western interests 
without relying on either colonial power (the U.K. or France), affected Anglo- 
Egyptian relations in one important aspect. This was the view the United 
States took of the entire colonial legacy in the Middle East after Suez. The U.S. 
examined the influence and prestige of both the U.K. and France in the Middle 
East after the political defeat that the U.K. received in 1956 and began to 
regard Western interests in the Middle East as its own responsibility. This view 
was illustrated in the report to President Eisenhower by Richard Nixon, the 
U.S. Vice President, after the latter's extensive visit to North Africa (from 
February 28 until March 21, 1957). This report gives an indication of the way 
the U.S. regarded its new role as perhaps the “Guardian of the West” and 
Western interests.
The U.S. Vice President, while acknowledging the interests of the colonial 
powers, especially France (as the visit was mainly to a French sphere of 
influence), was highly critical of colonial practices in North Africa. He felt that 
these practices endangered the interests and the standing of the West, and 
observed the decline in French power and influence in the area. The 
recommended policies after the visit were two-fold: on the one hand, to try to 
show the French the peril of their repressive and excessively colonial policies, 
especially in Algeria, whilst reassuring France that the U.S. had no intention of 
supplanting France's influence in that area but would strengthen this by 
cementing U.S. relations with the area; on the other hand, it was recommended 
that the U.S. should move quickly to establish direct and independently strong 
relations with these countries and “avoid any identification with repressive 
features of French policy in Algeria and make as clear as necessary that we
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expect France to respect the sovereignty of Tunisia and Morocco.” It was 
further recommended that the U.S. conduct its separate aid policies to the 
relevant countries in the region independent of both ancient colonial powers. 
[74] The negative view of the United States about the influence of the former 
colonial powers was not limited to France. Indeed United States officials wrote 
to their government that in their view the influence of the U.K. in the Middle 
East was almost completely wiped out. [75] This meant that though the 
relations between the U.K. and the United States were finally restored, 
nevertheless, the U.K. could no longer hope to maintain the role that it 
exercised after the end of the Second World War as the guardian of Western 
interests in the Middle East. Therefore, though the U.K. once again began to 
receive the support of the United States, the U.S. remained wary of associating 
itself closely with the U.K.'s colonial legacy.
The above-mentioned variables clearly illustrate that both the U.K. and Egypt 
were severely weakened by the 1956 Suez War and its aftermath. As for 
Egypt, though Nasser's position in Egypt became more secure than ever before, 
nevertheless, the state's economy as well as its external trade and foreign 
relations were severely injured. As for the United Kingdom, the fall of Eden 
from power did not represent the fall of the “imperialist trend” which had 
decided and executed the policy of attacking Egypt in 1956. Indeed, this 
could have contributed to the change of heart that occurred in the U.K. 
position vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, a change that was obviously to 
Egypt's disadvantage. Furthermore, though the Anglo-American relationship 
was reconstructed, nevertheless the United States realistically estimated the 
damage that occurred to the position of the U.K. in the Middle East because of 
the Suez affair.
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B Factors Solely Related to Bilateral Issues
Between the U.K. and Egypt
The second set of factors were, as mentioned earlier, concerned with issues of a 
bilateral nature between the two states. They were for the most part a direct 
consequence of the break in relations between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom. They included the issues of the punitive measures taken by each 
state against the other, whether after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal or 
after the outbreak of hostilities. The existence of these punitive or retaliatory 
measures meant several things: firstly, resuming normal relations between these 
two states was heavily dependent on, or at least related to, dealing with those 
matters. Secondly, it meant that the issue of the relations between the two 
states had obtained a certain degree of urgency because of the problems that 
had arisen from the above-mentioned punitive measures. The internal pressures 
for both governments that these problems generated forced them to address 
them, and naturally this meant addressing the issue of bilateral relations. Each 
country had a different, but related, set of goals which obliged it to attempt to 
mend fences with the other. For the United Kingdom these goals included 
being able to use the Suez Canal, desequestration and the restitution of British 
property in Egypt, compensation for that property which had been 
nationalised and the lifting of restrictions facing British interests in matters of 
trade in Egypt. In addition there were other matters of less importance, such as 
securing the release of the two British nationals who were held in Egypt under 
espionage charges and were faced with the possibility of death sentences.
Egypt, on the other hand, was extremely anxious for the release of its sterling 
balances in the United Kingdom. These had been blocked after the
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nationalisation of the Suez Canal. Their release would also mean that the 
United States government would follow by releasing blocked Egyptian 
balances in the United States. Egypt also wanted to resume normal trade with 
the United Kingdom. Most of its imports, prior to 1956, had been from the U.K. 
and it was especially keen to acquire spare parts for the machinery it had 
already imported.
1 —  Importance of Egypt for the United Kingdom in 1957
The importance of Egypt to the U.K. after the end of the Suez affair was 
evident in the priority given to the issues that were related to Egypt by the 
new British Prime Minister and his Cabinet. As defined by Harold Macmillan 
the most important issues facing his Cabinet were questions of foreign affairs 
and were listed as follows: a) Israel-Egypt; b) Clearance of the Canal; c) Canal 
dues; d) Long-Term Canal Settlement; e) Syrian Pipelines. [76] Indeed — 
according to Macmillan — “The most urgent questions facing us (his 
government) were: the clearing of the Canal from physical obstruction; the 
terms on which it should be reopened, especially the terms that would be 
imposed on the British and French ships; the position and security of Israel; the 
opening of the Syrian oil pipelines.” [77] The significance of this was that all 
the above-mentioned policy goals of the U.K. were related directly to the Suez 
crisis, as well as being dependent on settling the immediate problems between 
Egypt and the United Kingdom. It was a situation where the U.K.'s immediate 
strategic interests perhaps lay in opposition to its classic colonial posture in the 
Middle East. There were several impending issues which obliged the United 
Kingdom to face the necessity of coming to some arrangement with Egypt. 
These issues were: the oil situation; the Suez Canal; and the property and 
assets o f B ritish  nationals and com panies w hich  had been
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nationalised/sequestrated by Egypt as a result of the joint British, French and 
Israeli action against Egypt in 1956.
A: The Suez Canal. One of the most important factors that made the U.K. 
willing to reach some form of agreement with Egypt was, of course, the Suez 
Canal. Harold Macmillan patronisingly used to call the Suez Canal the “Water 
Jump”. [78] Nevertheless, as has been noted, when he became Prime Minister 
in January 1957 he identified its clearance, as well as the terms on which it 
would be opened to British ships, as questions of vital urgency. [79]
The economic and strategic importance of the Suez Canal and the cost of its 
closure to the U.K. is clearly explained when analysing the cost and time 
difference between the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope routes. On 
February 13, 1957, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their decision on a 
memorandum by the Chief of Naval operations on “Major Factors Pertaining 
To The Suez Canal Problem (U]’\  established that a freighter journey from the 
United Kingdom to Bombay through the Suez Canal would cost around 
$40,480 and last 23 days. The same journey via the Cape of Good Hope route 
would cost around $70,400 and take 40 days. For the United States the Canal 
route saved $46,000, as well as 3,500 miles, for a trip from the eastern seaboard 
of America to the Persian Gulf. In fact, the J.C.S concluded that, with such a 
saving, a reasonable increase in the Suez Canal tolls by Egypt would be 
acceptable. [80]
Realising the importance of the Suez Canal, the U.K. was faced with two 
options. The first was to prevent Egypt from controlling the Canal. The second 
was to reach some form of accommodation with Egypt over it. The Suez War
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and its aftermath convinced the U.K. that the first option was not viable. It had 
become evident that the West could not wrench the operation of the Canal 
away from Egypt without the latter's consent, since the Canal would be 
inoperable without the Egyptian government's concurrence. Egypt could 
prevent ships carrying the U.K. flag and its allies outright from using the Canal, 
or could use operational tactics to hamper their passage, such as requiring 
lengthy notice from U.K. ships, delaying passage through the Canal by 
misapplying the World Health Sanitary Regulations, limiting the type of freight 
and cargo allowed through the Canal, or assigning unqualified or politically 
motivated pilots to U.K. ships. Moreover, if control of the administration of the 
Canal was wrested out of its hands, Egypt could resort to other tactics that 
would prevent the use of the Canal by all nations without discrimination, such 
as: blocking the Canal by sinking vessels and minor aircraft, mining the Canal 
passage, instigating strikes among the Egyptian work force, refusing entry 
visas to the pilots etc. [81] Therefore the U.K. had to resort to the second 
option, i.e. reaching some form of accommodation with Egypt which allowed 
U.K. ships to use the Suez Canal,
Nevertheless, in the period immediately subsequent to the Suez War, the 
second option was not viable either. After the Suez War, the U.K. had to rely 
on the U.S.A. in the negotiations over the Suez Canal, since Egypt refused 
direct negotiations with either the U.K., France or the Suez Canal Users 
Association. In fact the U.S. was the only Western party whose mediation 
Egypt accepted (in Cairo April 1957). The only other alternative open to the 
U.K. was the U.N. Security Council, where any decision forcing Egypt to 
comply would be blocked by a probable Soviet veto. Furthermore, a resort to
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the General Assembly to override any S.C. veto would be time-consuming; the 
U.K. knew that time was on Nasser's side because the U.K. could not long 
prevent shipowners from using the Canal. In fact, British shipowners were at a 
disadvantage already, since other shipowners were accepting cargoes destined 
to pass through the Suez Canal. In addition the British government knew that 
eventually it would have to accept that Suez Canal tolls would be paid to the 
Egyptian Suez Canal Authority (under protest and without prejudice to the 
existing legal rights or the terms of a future settlement). [82]
Egypt had a potent weapon in this dispute: the continued closure of the Canal. 
This weapon was so effective that the US anticipated that Egypt might try to 
utilise it not just for its demands vis-a-vis the Suez Canal Company, but for 
other aims as well, of itself, of other Arab states, and even perhaps of the Soviet 
Union. [83] The U.K. was keen to indicate to the U.S. its willingness to offer its 
salvage equipment and personnel to whatever U.N. agency undertook the job 
of clearing the Canal very soon after the end of hostilities in the Suez War (on 
November 12, 1956). The fact that it did so without waiting to see the result of 
the running dispute between Egypt and the Suez Canal Company; indeed, 
without knowing who might actually run the Canal, proves the importance of 
the Suez Canal for the U.K. [84] The U.K. participated fully in the salvage 
operations of the Suez Canal, so that by mid-January 1957, U.K. salvage ships 
were responsible for removing 10 out of a total of 21 wrecks at Port Said. [85]
The United Kingdom maintained its interest and enthusiasm in fully 
participating in the Canal clearance. At the beginning of 1957 the British 
government was alarmed at the limitation imposed on British participation in 
the clearing-up operations and felt that General Wheeler —  the United Nations
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officer in charge of the salvage operations — did not intend to fully depend on 
the ships in that operation. The British government at the time feared that any 
“additional delay in the clearance of the Canal would entail the risk of a 
serious setback for our industrial production”. As a result, the British Cabinet 
decided in its first meeting of 1957 to approach both the Secretary General of 
the United Nations and the American government to complain about the failure 
to utilise British salvage capabilities fully, fearing that this failure might result in 
delaying the clearance of the Suez Canal and consequently harm the U.K. 
economy. [86]
B: British Property in Egypt. There was another major factor which 
pressured the British government to reach some form of accommodation with 
Egypt. This concerned British property there. Following the Suez War, the 
Egyptian government had either sequestrated or nationalised the property and 
assets of British subjects and companies in Egypt. The resulting claims from 
British subjects and companies totalled around £119 million (sterling). [87] 
These claims were classified into three categories: private property, totalling 
£50 million; business property, (except Shell) amounting to £14 million; and 
finally the Shell Company claim which was the largest at £55 million. [88] 
Furthermore, the legal framework of that restriction was Proclamation No 5 of 
November 1956. This also restricted the freedom of British subjects, as well as 
companies, to the extent of preventing them from operating in Egypt. The 
plight of these British subjects and the interests of the U.K. companies were 
among the factors that pressured the U.K. to reach an agreement with Egypt. 
Certainly, the plight of almost 2,500 British nationals, who had either left 
Egypt voluntarily or been expelled by the Egyptian government, and were 
living in temporary accommodation in the United Kingdom, brought some
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pressure on the government through the mass media and in Parliament. The 
government was also pressed to reach an agreement by the fact that there were 
approximately 9000 U.K. nationals still in Egypt, where the government feared 
for their property, freedom, and indeed their continued existence in Egypt 
(5000 of this figure were Cypriots who had not yet been penalised). [89] The 
problem of the British refugees and their assets was of sufficient magnitude to 
convince the British government — as early as January 1957 — of the 
inadequacy of existing institutions, such as the Anglo-Egyptian Aid Society, to 
handle it. The view in the British Cabinet of the time was that the government 
had more than a general or humanitarian duty to help these British subjects 
“since their misfortunes were directly attributed to the action which the 
government felt obliged to take against Egypt”. [90] Therefore, the Cabinet 
decided in January 1957 to establish an “Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement 
Board...so as to administer assistance to British subjects evacuated from Egypt 
and to deal with the problems of their resettlement”. [91]
C: T rade with Egypt. Another point — perhaps of less importance — was 
that of trade. Throughout the years of British domination, with the exception 
of a brief interval during the Second World War, Egypt was a market that was 
more or less dominated by the U.K. This was perhaps demonstrated by the fact 
that the U.K. commanded a relatively high share of Egypt's foreign trade. Total 
trade with Egypt during the period from 1948-1951 ranged from £82.2 million 
in 1948 to £86.4 million in 1951. [92] The U.K. maintained a relatively large 
share of Egypt's foreign trade even after 1952 and even at times of soured 
relations between the two states, prior to the nationalisation of the Canal in 
July 1956. Although trade had declined between the two states to £37.2 
million in 1953, this was in line with the general decline of Egypt's total foreign
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trade, and it was clearly on the rise again, as it reached £38.8 million in 1955. In 
fact just prior to the Suez crisis trade between the two states was on the way 
to reach a figure similar to its all-time high in 1951. During the first half of 1956, 
trade reached around £30.1 million. [93] However, due to the trade embargo 
imposed on Egypt by the U.K., this upward trend was abruptly halted. The 
value of the total trade (£30.1 million) was considerable, especially since the 
total of Egyptian foreign trade in 1955 was around £300 million. [94] This 
illustrates how despite the deterioration in its relations with Egypt the U.K. 
managed to maintain, due to the regional competition, a substantial share of 
Egypt's foreign trade.
2 — Importance of the United Kingdom for Egypt:
Why Egypt Needed an Agreement
After the end of the Suez War, Egypt indeed appeared to emerge with a 
political victory from its war with the former colonial powers (the U.K. and 
France). The outcome of the Suez War, though it was a military defeat for 
Egypt, resulted not only in strengthening President Nasser in Egypt and in the 
Arab world but in increasing his international stature, making him a spokesman 
for Africa and Asia. [95] In addition, Egypt managed to secure its territorial 
integrity when Israel declared its intention (March 1, 1957) to withdraw its 
troops from Sinai behind the Egyptian-Israeli Demarcation Line. This 
commitment by Israel was obtained only after heavy American pressure. 
Among the catalysts of that pressure was Egypt's refusal to allow the opening 
of the Suez Canal for shipping until the final withdrawal of Israel from Egypt. 
Actually, Egypt only announced that the Suez Canal would be opened to 
ships of up to 500 tons as of April 8, 1957, the same day on which the United 
Nations Emergency Force occupied Sharm al-Shaikh. [96] The final withdrawal
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of Israeli forces from Egypt was not until March 16, 1957. [97] Egypt managed 
to increase its power as well as extend its influence in the Arab world 
immediately after the end of the Suez War. This was demonstrated by the 
meeting in Cairo between the heads of states of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan and the Syrian Prime Minister (January 19), and the establishment of the 
Arab Solidarity Agreement. This meeting, as well as that which took place in 
Cairo the following month (February 27), served to underline the position and 
prestige of Egypt in Arab politics. The Egyptian leadership was encouraged, as 
well as reinforced by the spoils of the Suez War, in terms of these political 
victories. It refused any form of users’ control over the Suez Canal and 
managed to convince even the U.K. and France to abandon any expectation 
of obtaining such a demand. [98] Furthermore, Egypt was able to proceed with 
its plan to exercise full control over its economy when laws were enacted in 
February 1957 providing for the Egyptianisation of foreign banks, insurance 
companies and commercial interests in Egypt. On 18 April 1957, the 
Sequestrator-General Egyptianised seven British and French banks as well as 
17 insurance companies. In addition, 20 schools belonging to these two 
countries were transferred to Egyptian hands and the scientific and cultural 
establishments of both the U.K. and France were taken over the following 
month. [99]
Although it had appeared that Egypt’s political victory at Suez had led to the 
destruction of the U.K. standing in the Middle East, [100] this rosy outlook for 
Egypt did not survive the first months of 1957. As mentioned earlier, 
developments in 1957 demonstrated that Egypt did not have the upper hand 
which, at first glance, it appeared to possess. The problems in the Egyptian
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economy, its relations with the United States and the policy of the U.S. 
contributed toward the deterioration in Egyptian relations with its Arab allies. 
The bright outlook that faced the Egyptian leadership in the first few months 
of 1957 was replaced later with a grimmer picture which forced the Egyptian 
government towards a more realistic policy aiming at improving its relations 
with the West, including the U.K.
The above-mentioned set of variables, related to the effects of the Suez War on 
the regional conflict between the two states, and the power and influence of 
both the Egyptian and the British governments, had mixed effects on the 
negotiating stance of both countries. On the Egyptian side, Nasser had 
emerged as Egypt’s unchallenged leader. His internal position became stronger 
than ever. At the same he obtained, thanks to his political victory in the Suez 
War and his defeat of the two colonial powers (the U.K. and France), a 
charismatic stature among the Arab masses. From relative obscurity at the 
beginning of his career in politics in 1952, the Suez War had raised Nasser to 
become the most influential and charismatic leader in the Arab world. However 
the events that followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal had caused 
severe disruption in the Egyptian economy. This was amplified by the 
economic sanctions applied by the West on Egypt after it nationalised the 
Suez Canal, which had began to take effect by 1957. Moreover, the policy of 
the United States, which contributed to the rift which occurred between Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, meant that Egypt was denied the possibility of financial 
assistance from Saudi Arabia.
Thus the Suez War had mixed effects on the Egyptian negotiating stance. On 
the one hand Nasser had gained a great amount of political strength internally,
126
as well as influence over the populations of other the Arab states, mainly due 
to his defeat of the U.K. and its allies in 1956. This led to his reluctance to 
reach an agreement with the U.K. for fear of jeopardising the achievements of 
Suez. But on the other hand, his economic difficulties at home, together with 
the diplomatic offensive that the United States began to wage with the 
onslaught of the Eisenhower Doctrine, began to cause him a temporary 
regional isolation in relation to a number of Arab regimes (such as Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan). Moreover, he began to feel the need to counter the Soviet 
influence in Egypt which made him, in a way, more accommodating towards 
reaching an agreement with the U.K. This was augmented by his desire to 
acquire the Egyptian sterling balances, valued at around £70 million, which 
were blocked in the U.K. and which he needed to alleviate his economic 
difficulties.
As for the United Kingdom, the outcome of the Suez War had mixed effects on 
its policy and negotiating stance vis-a-vis reaching an agreement with Egypt. 
On the one hand there were factors pulling the U.K. government away from 
any compromise with Nasser. There was the regional conflict between the two 
states prior to the Suez War, which had helped precipitate the crisis. There 
were U.K. fears that a reconciliation with a victorious Nasser would result in 
demolishing whatever standing or influence the United Kingdom still had in 
the Middle East after its political defeat. And there was a clear United States 
policy of trying to isolate Nasser, a policy that was actually succeeding in 
breaking Nasser's alliance with Saudi Arabia. Egypt's foreign relations setbacks 
by m id-1957, together with the problems of the Egyptian economy, led the 
U.K. (as shall be explained in the following chapter) to hope that some damage 
would occur to Nasser's regime. All these reasons pulled the U.K. away from 
reaching a compromise or reconciliation with Egypt.
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On the other hand, there were immediate problems resulting from Suez which 
forced the issue of relations with Egypt to the forefront of the U.K. 
government's attention. There was the strategic importance of the Canal and 
the question of the passage of U.K. ships through it, and the issues of British 
property in Egypt and trade. Together these issues gradually built up sufficient 
pressure to force the U.K. to move to address them via an agreement with 
Egypt.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE START OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS
AFTER SUEZ
I NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT 
AND THE U.K. AFTER SUEZ: 1957
The Suez crisis of 1956, as outlined in the previous chapters, not only caused 
the severance of Anglo-Egyptian relations but also led to a drastic change in 
the fortunes of both the U.K. and Egypt, which in turn led to the rise of several 
problems in the field of bilateral relations.
Firstly, the Suez War caused dramatic changes on the domestic political scenes 
and affected the pattern of external relations of each state. In Egypt, Nasser's 
power and control reached its zenith; he became the undisputed power and 
began to exercise absolute control. However, the Egyptian economy was 
severely weakened because of the sanctions imposed on it by the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom and their action in blocking Egypt's 
substantial and badly needed financial balances in those countries. At the same 
time, the political success of Egyptian foreign policy during the Suez crisis did 
not survive the year 1957, as the United States actively undermined Nasser's 
position in the Arab world.
In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, though the Suez crisis had led to 
the fall of Eden from public office this did not mean the fall from power of
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those who had supported the U.K. actions in Suez in 1956, such as especially 
the new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and the Foreign Secretary Selwyn 
Lloyd. Moreover, the economic crisis which hit the U.K. at the time of (and as a 
result of) the attack on Egypt, especially the fall of sterling and the shortage of 
oil supplies, was soon alleviated thanks to the Anglo-American rapprochement. 
Nevertheless, and despite the reconciliation between the United Kingdom and 
the United States, the position of the U.K. in the Middle East was severely 
shaken as a result of the collusion between the U.K., France and Israel in the 
Tripartite Aggression, as the Suez War was called in the Arab world.
Secondly, and despite the continued (if not increased) animosity between the 
two countries due to the Suez War and the intensification of their regional 
conflict, there emerged several problems in the bilateral field between the U.K. 
and Egypt which forced them to re-evaluate their policies towards each other, 
to meet and negotiate, and to make compromises for the sake of finally 
resolving them.
These bilateral problems led the governments of both states to overcome their 
mistrust of one another and calm their intensified clashes in the field of foreign 
policies in order to resolve their differences by agreement and to restore official 
relations. The main problem for Egypt at the time was the need to regain its 
blocked balances in the United Kingdom. Valued at £70 million, these balances 
were badly needed by Egypt in view of the economic hardship it was enduring 
and, particularly, its difficulty in fulfilling its need for foreign exchange. The 
U.K., on the other hand, needed to reach an agreement with Egypt to allow the 
passage of U.K. ships though the Suez Canal. It also had to resolve the
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problems of British property in Egypt, property which had been sequestrated 
by the Egyptian government in November 1956. The U.K. also wanted to 
resume trade with Egypt and to secure the release of two political prisoners 
who had been held in Egypt on charges of espionage since the summer of 
1956.
It was these problems which proved the main impetus for both countries to 
negotiate an agreement, and obliged them finally to settle their differences 
despite the continuing conflicts in their foreign policies. Negotiations between 
Egypt and the United Kingdom passed through four major phases in the 
aftermath of Suez until an agreement was finally reached in 1959 and 
diplomatic relations were established in the same year. These phases were 
defined basically by the conduct of these negotiations, which reflected which 
of the two countries was actually seeking an agreement with the other at the 
time. This was determined by the relative strength or weakness of each country 
during that particular stage of negotiations. The attitude of each state was 
determined by its own perception of strength or weakness vis-a-vis the other. 
For example, when one state believed its own fortunes to be on the ascendant, 
and that concluding the agreement at that stage would result in more benefit to 
the other country than it would receive itself, it tended to harden its 
negotiating posture and become more aggressive and less conciliatory.
This was the case in the First Phase of the negotiations, when the U.K. thought 
that Nasser could be brought down — due to internal, as well as external 
pressures — and that he was isolated in the Arab world. This was one of the 
reasons which made the U.K. government disinclined to reach an agreement 
with Egypt during 1957. At the same time, Nasser's economic situation, as well 
as the decline in his regional influence in the Arab World, led Egypt to make 
every effort to reach an agreement with the U.K.
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The Second Phase of the negotiations emerged towards the end of 1957, when 
the U.K. realised that Nasser was firmly in power and events proved to both 
states that Nasser's power and influence in the Arab world was in the 
ascendant. This made the U.K. more in favour of settling with Egypt, while 
Egypt became less inclined to settle than before and concentrated instead on 
getting the best terms it could.
The Third Phase was in 1959, when the U.K. was working hard not just on the 
financial agreement between the two countries, but also on the question of the 
resumption of diplomatic relations. Egypt, having achieved much better terms 
for the financial settlement, was not as anxious as the U.K. to resume 
diplomatic relations.
The Fourth Phase was, however, not concerned with bilateral relations 
between the two states and is not covered in the period of this research; it 
concentrated on settling the problems resulting from the clashes in the foreign 
policy of the two states, which led to a regional confrontation between them in 
the Middle East. This issue was not settled for years to come, with the demise 
of the dreams of both states for hegemony and control over the Middle East.
n  FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE U.K. AND EGYPT
A The First Round of Negotiations. May 5-9 1957
The first direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and Egypt started 
due to necessity, not design. The catalyst for the beginning of negotiations 
between the two countries was in fact the same catalyst which had caused the
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rift between the two states less than 10 months earlier: the Suez Canal.
Once the Canal had been cleared and become almost completely operational, 
the U.K. was forced to address the question of its use. There were two 
problems in that regard: whether Egypt would allow passage for U.K. ships; 
and how British ships were to pay the Canal dues, if they were allowed 
passage. The British government received some comfort when President Nasser 
declared on March 29, 1957 that Egypt would abide by the 1888 convention 
guaranteeing Freedom of Passage. This meant that both British and French 
ships would be allowed passage. However, as Egypt insisted that the Canal 
dues should be paid in full to the Egyptian authorities, this brought the second 
issue to the forefront, namely how the U.K. was to pay these. The British 
government did not want to pay the Canal dues to the Egyptian authorities as 
this would be interpreted as recognition of the nationalisation of the Suez 
Canal, which would cause a considerable and embarrassing loss of face for the 
U.K. in the Middle East. The U.K. would be perceived as giving in to Egyptian 
demands. Nevertheless, the U.K. realised that payment to an international 
institution such as the World Bank or even the United Nations would not be 
accepted by Egypt. Furthermore, the U.K. feared that Egypt would not accept 
transferable sterling as the currency for payment and would insist instead on 
either gold or dollars, something the U.K. found entirely unacceptable, not so 
much on firm legal grounds, but because this would have a deleterious effect 
on sterling, as well as on the U.K.'s foreign exchange reserves.
This was a growing problem that the British government could not ignore. It 
knew that it could not keep the major maritime powers from using the Canal. It
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was one thing to boycott the Canal while it was still being cleared, but it was 
another thing to continue to boycott it after it had become fully operational. 
By April 1957 it became obvious to the British government that the other 
major maritime powers would resume using the waterway after the completion 
of the clearing operations. Moreover, the government could not afford to bar 
its own ships from using the Canal, since this would undermine British 
competitiveness in the market and ultimately harm British commercial interests. 
[1] Indeed, with the passage of time, there were growing pressures on the 
United Kingdom government from British shipowners to define their position 
vis-a-vis the Suez Canal and to lift the ban on U.K. ships using it. Even worse, 
the British government observed that British ships were being registered under 
Liberian and other flags to overcome the commercial handicap they were 
forced to suffer due to their government's stance. [2]
The negotiations between the two countries were conducted in Basle, 
Switzerland, from 5-9 May 1957, and took place between representatives from 
the Bank of England and the Central Bank of Egypt, not between delegations 
from the foreign offices of the two state. The purpose of this round of 
negotiations — which was conducted at the request of the Bank of England 
[3] — was to find a method whereby U.K. ships could pay the Suez Canal 
dues to the Egyptian authorities. The most the U.K. hoped for was that Nasser 
would accept transferable sterling and not haggle or argue over the release of 
Egypt's Number One account, which the U.K. was determined not to release 
until the settlement of the British financial claims in Egypt. [4]
The Egyptian balances in the United Kingdom were confined to two accounts: 
an account from which Egypt could draw freely, for whatever reason, which
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was called the Number One account, as well as a Number Two account, the 
movement of funds from which was restricted, subject to the approval of the 
British government. The movement of the Egyptian balances in the U.K. was 
subject to a series of agreements reached between the U.K. and Egypt since 
the Second World War, when Egyptian balances in the U.K. had stood at over 
£300 million pounds sterling; they had even reached the sum of £470 million in 
1946. Under these agreements, the U.K. government agreed with Egypt over 
the timetable of Egyptian drawing from these funds. The final agreement, 
which governed the movements of funds from these accounts up to the middle 
of 1956, was signed on July 1, 1951. It allowed Egypt the right to draw a sum 
between £10 and £15 million a year up to 1960. [5] The result of this round of 
negotiations was that a special transferable sterling account, known as Number 
One Special account (otherwise called Number Three account) was opened for 
the payment of Canal dues and other expenditures in connection with British 
shipping. [6]
From the point of view of the United Kingdom, the Basle negotiations had not 
merely been satisfactory, but had “gone unexpectedly well” . [7] The British 
demands, as set out by the Cabinet on April 11 [8] and on May 6 1957, had 
almost all been achieved. [9] The U.K. had managed to reach an agreed minute 
with Egypt over establishing a new account, Number Three account, for the 
payment of the Suez Canal dues and disbursements by the ships of the United 
Kingdom. This account was to remain free from restrictions; U.K. fears that 
Egypt would make its establishment conditional on the release of the Number 
One account, or would refuse payment of transferable sterling, had proved 
unfounded. Moreover, the Central Bank of Egypt had formally requested 
discussions on the resumption of current trade with the U.K. In fact, the
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Central Bank of Egypt made it a condition for signing the Basle Agreement 
that such discussions should start immediately. [10]
As a result of this successful round of negotiations, the U.K. declared its 
intention to lift the bar on British ships using the Suez Canal, and on May 11, 
1957 informed the Commonwealth governments that the U.K. government was 
no longer preventing British, ships from using the Canal. The public 
proclamation of this change of policy was made by Macmillan on May 13, 
1957 in the House of Commons. [11] How urgent the U.K.'s need to use the 
Suez Canal had been was further confirmed by the large number of British 
ships which immediately passed through the Canal after May 13. (92 British 
ships crossed the Suez Canal from May 13 to May 31, 1957.) [12]
m  REACTION TO THE BASLE AGREEMENT IN THE U.K.
The Basle agreement did not mean that there was a change in U.K. views 
towards Egypt and relations with it. Indeed, an onslaught on the government 
for this agreement materialised in the House of Commons, in a two-day debate 
which was by all accounts very heated. [13] Even Macmillan, in anticipation of 
this hostility to the agreement, made a point of emphasising that this new 
special account, Number Three account (or, as it was sometimes called, Number 
One Special account) did not change the position of the Egyptian blocked 
balances in the United Kingdom. He even went on to stress that the accounts 
holding these balances in the U.K. would remain blocked until satisfactory 
arrangements for the British financial claims were made. [14]
All the Egyptian balances in the United Kingdom had been frozen on 27 July,
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1956, after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The area of contention 
remained the freeing of the Number One account, the free-drawing account 
under the terms of the 1951 agreement. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of 
opposition to the Basle agreement in the House of Commons, The Opposition 
had a field day during the first day of the debate on the issue, and Macmillan 
feared massive dissent in his party when it came to the vote. With a majority of 
just over 50, he feared that a change in the vote of 30, or even 20, 
Conservative back-benchers could have embarrassed the government. If they 
abstained or voted against the government, the Opposition motion censuring 
the government could succeed. Indeed it was a relief for the government when 
the Opposition motion was defeated by a majority of 49 with only 14 
Conservative abstentions. [15]
The Basle agreement also received a mixed reception from the British Press. 
Some papers seized the opportunity to attack the government for the treaty, 
others supported Harold Macmillan and his policy on the issue. The Times, as 
well as the traditional Conservative paper The Daily Telegraph, supported 
the government on the Canal issue. On the other hand, Lord Beaverbrook, 
through The Express, seized the opportunity offered by the Basle agreement 
to launch a vehement attack on the government and took the side of the Suez 
Group. The Manchester Guardian joined in the campaign, albeit for different 
reasons, and attacked the Conservative government record on its dealing with 
Egypt since even prior to the Suez Crisis. [16]
IV REACTION TO THE BASLE AGREEMENT IN EGYPT
In the U.K. there was a great deal of interest in when, or even whether, U.K.
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ships would be allowed to use the Canal. The case in Egypt was quite 
different. The issue of allowing British ships passage through the Canal did not 
appear to be a similarly urgent or vital matter to the general public in Egypt, 
and did not command the same degree of interest. The issue that dominated the 
attention of the Egyptian public, as far as the Suez Canal was concerned, 
centred on whether Egypt would be able to safeguard its right to the Canal 
and could continue to run it efficiently and independently from the U.K. and 
the West. In addition, it was not in the interest of the Egyptian government of 
the time to permit anything to blemish its anti-imperialist record. Thus it did not 
see any immediate need to advertise its decision to allow the passage of U.K. 
ships through the Canal. The difference between the systems of government in 
the two states also accounted for the difference in the reaction in Egypt. 
Perhaps the fact that Egypt at the time did not have the same degree of either 
press freedom or parliamentary democracy as the U.K. explains why the Basle 
agreement was hardly reported in the Egyptian Press. Two points should 
therefore be explained at this stage: the reasons why the Basle agreement was 
not mentioned in the Egyptian Press, and the impact of the difference in the 
systems of government in the U.K. and Egypt on the negotiating patterns of 
each of the two states.
As to why the Egyptian papers at the time did not report the Basle meetings, or 
indeed the agreement that had been signed with the U.K., this was due to the 
fact that Nasser and the Egyptian government felt that they should not appear 
to be giving in to the U.K. or the West, and should be seen to be maintaining a 
steadfast non-aligned posture in world affairs. At the same time, Egypt was 
conscious of the U.K. and Western attempts to show the Arab world that 
Egypt had given certain concessions in the aftermath of the Suez War, mainly
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in stressing that Egypt was allowing Israeli ships passage through the Gulf of 
Aqaba, and was also permitting the stationing of U.N. troops in Sharm al- 
Shaikh. [17] In view of the Western stress on these concessions, Nasser did not 
want it to appear that he was making a deal with the U.K. in return for keeping 
and exercising sovereignty over the Suez Canal. Moreover, the Basle 
agreement was not one of his proudest achievements, for he did not regain 
control over any of the blocked sterling balances in the U.K. in return for 
allowing the British ships passage through the Canal. Further, Nasser could not 
afford to bar British ships from the Suez Canal, as such a decision would have 
meant that Egypt would be breaking the Constantinople Convention of 1888. 
Even worse, Egypt could not publicise the Basle agreement as an 
acknowledgement by the U.K. of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal, 
because to do so would have jeopardised the impending Rome negotiations 
between the two states over the resumption of current trade.
On the second point, it is clear that the difference in the U.K. and Egyptian 
systems of government had a large and noticeable impact on the negotiating 
pattern of the two states throughout the period covered by this research. The 
fact that the U.K. was a parliamentary democracy, with an established system 
of government, meant that the chain of authority and the governmental 
departments responsible for relations with Egypt were clear. The Treasury 
Chambers (and departments under its authority such as the Bank of England) 
handled the financial aspects, especially the question of the value of the British 
assets in Egypt, the negotiations over the methods of payments of the Canal 
dues, and the control over the Egyptian blocked balances in the U.K. The 
Foreign Office handled the political aspects of the bilateral relations and the
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impact of Egypt's Arab policy. The final authority on relations with Egypt was 
the British Cabinet, where each department was represented by its head, 
namely the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary respectively. Where 
differences between the two departments arose, the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet view prevailed in reaching a decision on the matter at hand. The view 
of Parliament, which had to approve and ratify any agreement with Egypt, was 
an overriding concern because the political life of the government and its 
members depended on it. The view of the free Press was equally important 
because of the impact the Press had on public opinion in the U.K., an essential 
element considering the fact that the government had to be re-elected 
periodically.
Egypt was quite a different case. Nasser's system of government was quite 
new, with new governmental departments being created as the need arose, 
with no clear boundaries between them or agreement on their precise briefs. As 
mentioned earlier, Nasser's system of government resembled a Leader-Staff 
group, or Presidential-Centre type. Nasser was the ultimate authority, not just 
on what decision should be taken, but, even more significantly, on whom 
should be entrusted with carrying out the negotiations. The new National 
Union was an attempt to fill the political vacuum which existed after the 
political parties of the pre-1952 era had been abolished, rather than a vehicle 
for formulating policy and mobilising public support. What influenced Nasser's 
policies vis-a-vis the U.K. were his own beliefs as well as his perception of how 
the public in his constituency (Egypt and the rest of the Arab world) would 
react.
There were no rivals to or organised pressure groups acting on Nasser.
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However, what influenced Nasser's views were the long discussions he had 
with his advisors, in which each proponent of a certain view argued his case. 
Nasser would listen to the different views expressed in these meetings, often in 
silence, and used to make his decision later and in private. [18] Nasser's 
advisors included government ministers, colleagues from the Revolutionary 
Command Council and whomever Nasser chose. The power of those advisors 
and ministers depended on the continuity of Nasser's trust in them, rather than 
on the power of whichever government departments they were representing at 
the time. Moreover, Nasser did not necessarily inform the rest of his advisors as 
soon as he had reached a decision. [19] Therefore, in many cases, some of those 
advisors were not informed of Nasser's view at a certain stage, which 
accounted for the conflicting messages the U.K. used to receive about Nasser's 
views on relations with the U.K.
During the period covered by this research, one can identify three Egyptian 
views about relations with the U.K. One view advocated severing all links with 
the U.K. on account of the Suez affair, Egypt's anti-imperialist stance and the 
foreign policy clashes between the two states at the time. The adherents of this 
view saw no reason to restore the links with the U.K. and argued with Nasser 
against such a move. This trend was dominant in the National Union, and was 
represented in Nasser's group of advisors by Ali Sabry and Murad Ghalib. In 
the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Ali Sabry's brother, Hussein Zulfikar Sabry, 
attempted to carry through that policy — as it appeared to the U.K. in 1959. 
The second trend addressed relations with the U.K. as basically a matter of 
technical problems (those problems described earlier and which were created 
as a direct result of the punitive measures taken by the two states after the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal). This trend was represented by the
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technocrats among Nasser's advisors, such as the Minister of the Economy, al- 
Qaissuni, and al-Emary, the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt. They also 
included Colonel Abd al-Qadir Hatim, the head of the General Authority for 
Information. The third trend advocated a resumption of relations with the U.K., 
in the belief that it was impossible to ignore the power of the U.K. in the 
region, especially in view of Egypt's active Arab policy. This trend felt that 
solving the problems between the two states in the bilateral field was part of 
opening the channels of communication and starting a mutual dialogue. 
Solving the bilateral problems would come as a result of resuming the dialogue. 
The advocates of this view among Nasser's advisors were Mohamed Hassanein 
Heikal, the Editor of A l-A hram  and Nasser's closest friend and advisor 
throughout his presidency, as well as the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Dr. Mahmud Fawzi.
A The Start of The Anglo-Egyptian 
Financial Talks (Rome)
The Egyptian delegation in Basle had made the Basle Agreement conditional 
on talks over the resumption of current trade, and such talks started in Rome 
within two weeks of the Basle Agreement. These discussions lasted for almost 
two years (most of 1957 and 1958), with several rounds being conducted by 
the financial representatives of the two countries. In the case of the U.K. this 
meant the Treasury, and in some cases a representative of the Bank of England. 
The U.K. delegation included members of the Foreign Office (the Head of the 
African Department was mostly present in those discussions).
Throughout 1957, the U.K. insisted that the financial talks in Rome were
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exploratory in nature. The first round of Rome negotiations, on May 23, 1957, 
was extremely limited in both scope as well as goals. The objective of the U.K. 
in these exploratory talks was to learn what Nasser had to offer on the 
desequestration of British properties in Egypt as well as the withdrawal of the 
discriminatory legislation and executive measures against British companies 
and British subjects. [20] In fact Selwyn Lloyd, prior to the start of these talks, 
made a point of emphasising their exploratory nature and insisted that he had 
not even considered such questions as restoring diplomatic relations. [21] 
Furthermore he informed the United States Department of State of his views, 
insisting that "we are not thinking at present of anything like restoration of 
diplomatic relations and suggestions to this effect appearing in the press are 
altogether premature.” [22]
The negotiations conducted in May 1957 in Rom e betw een the 
representatives of both states achieved almost nothing. The reason was the 
fact that the U.K. had already achieved in the Basle round of negotiations (or 
“discussions”) what was, at that time, its im m ediate objective: the 
arrangements for the passage of U.K. ships through the Suez Canal. Thus the 
U.K. no longer had an urgent reason for reaching an rapid agreement with 
Egypt. The major outstanding problem for the U.K. at that time was the 
sequestered or nationalised British property in Egypt, which the U.K. 
government was dealing with by allocating funds from the Treasury to ease the 
economic hardship of British subjects whose property had been expropriated.
There were several other factors which accounted for the U.K. not wanting a 
reconciliation with Egypt in mid-1957, in addition to the fact that it had gained 
its immediate demand in Basle. Firstly and most importantly, the U.K. thought
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that the economic pressures it was applying on Egypt would help to bring 
Nasser down in the short term, so that an agreement with Egypt at that stage 
would help to give life to a regime the U.K. loathed and wanted to get rid of 
anyway, just when the Western sanctions were beginning to bear fruit.
The belief that economic pressures could topple Nasser gained credibility, at 
the time, from several factors. The weakness of the Egyptian economy, at that 
stage at its lowest ebb, was obvious. Moreover, there was no visible sources of 
funding to cover Egypt's immediate need for foreign exchange to replace its 
blocked foreign exchange balances in the West. With the decrease in the 
amount of available foreign exchange, consumer goods as well as essential 
goods such as medicines had begun to disappear from the shops, [23] and the 
U.K. estimated that this would increase popular disaffection against the 
Egyptian government. Moreover, the foreign exchange shortage and denial of 
credit to Egypt meant that Egyptian industry lacked access to the intermediary 
goods it needed, which had been mainly imported from the West.
In addition to these internal problems, Egypt's external relations at the time 
were also at their lowest ebb. After Suez relations between Egypt and the 
United States had gone from bad to worse. Indeed Dulles in July 1957 said, in 
the course of a dinner held at Downing Street, that the United States agreed 
with the U.K. that Nasser must be regarded as public enemy No. 1 in the 
Middle East. He further mentioned that Nasser must be taught that his 
“misdemeanours did not pay and it was not an advantage to get across the 
Western Powers.” [24] Indeed, the combined view of the U.K. and the United 
States was that there was almost universal hostility to Nasser in the Middle 
East and that his only friend was India.
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What gave added credence to this conclusion was the deterioration in Egypt's 
Arab relationships during the middle of 1957, after the earlier gains and 
successes. A major alliance to be affected was that between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. The U.K. observed with satisfaction the growing rift between President 
Nasser and King Saud of Saudi Arabia. [25] The U.K., with its experience and 
knowledge of Egypt, believed that these pressures could lead to the downfall 
of Nasser. British government officials anticipated that “internal and external 
pressures may be sufficient to produce a crack in the structure of the Nasser 
Regime within the next few months” (May 1957). Accordingly, the U.K. 
feared that normalising relations with Egypt might discourage Nasser's 
opponents and add stability to his regime. [26]
This hard-line British position was augmented by what they perceived as the 
U.K.'s relative strength in the region. For after the collapse of the U.K. foreign 
policy in November 1956, the U.K. had actually rectified the blunders which 
were made in 1956. It had managed to mend its relations with the United 
States, and thus the prime reason for the failure of the Suez campaign had been 
eliminated. Moreover, while U.K. officials witnessed the increasing Egyptian 
weakness, they found that they themselves were acquiring strength. This was 
illustrated when the Permanent Council of the Baghdad Pact held its normal 
meeting in June 1957 in Baghdad. Though the United States Secretary of State 
refused to participate in that meeting, the U.S. was nevertheless prepared to be 
associated with the Baghdad Pact and agreed to be represented in that 
m eeting by Loy Henderson, the Deputy Under Secretary of State. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Loy Henderson was supposed to be an observer, 
he had participated quite actively in that meeting. Indeed, the U.K. felt that this
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June meeting of the Baghdad Pact had not only strengthened the Baghdad 
Pact itself, but even more importantly, had consolidated the co-operation 
between the United States and the U.K. in the Middle East. [27]
At the same time, another incident occurred in the Middle East which gave an 
additional boost to the U.K.'s confidence. This was the July 1957 uprising in 
Oman against the Sultan, Said bin Taimur. [28] Initially, the U.K. government 
was in a dilemma. On the one hand, it had to intervene militarily in aid of the 
Sultan, who was the U.K.'s ally. On the other hand, a military intervention 
would be highly controversial, for two reasons. First, following the Suez 
experience, the U.K. government had to overcome a great many scruples 
regarding another military intervention abroad, especially in the Middle East. 
Second, there was concern over the effect that such an intervention would 
have on Anglo-American relations, in the light of the Buraimi dispute between 
Oman and Saudi Arabia in 1955 which had led to a sharp disagreement 
between the U.K. and the U.S. [29] The fact that the U.K. was able to mount a 
successful military operation in Oman, without encountering major opposition 
at home or creating a major rift with the Americans abroad, had demonstrated 
to the British government that Suez was indeed behind them. The Oman affair 
provided the first chance for the British government, since Suez, to take 
decisive action to safeguard its interests. It felt that this action had contributed 
to the return of confidence among the Gulf rulers in the U.K. and in its role in 
defending them against Nasser's rhetoric and subversion. [30]
1 — Egypt’s Attempts at Reconciliation
The fact that Egypt was keen to reach an agreement with the United Kingdom 
at that period — the summer and autumn of 1957 — was illustrated by the
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Egyptian negotiating posture at the time and by the attempts Egypt made to 
reach an agreement during that period. There were three such attempts.
The first was the extremely co-operative stance taken by the Central Bank of 
Egypt delegation in the Basle negotiations with the Bank of England over the 
method of payment of Suez Canal dues. The Egyptian delegation did not insist 
that the U.K. should release the Egyptian blocked balances in the U.K. or even 
the transferable funds that were held in the Number One account. Furthermore, 
the Egyptian delegation maintained that they would be prepared to continue 
to accept sterling as a method of payment. Egypt did not insist on extracting 
any advantage from this deal beyond the requirement that negotiations 
between the two sides on resuming trade and releasing the blocked Egyptian 
balances in the U.K. should begin as soon as possible.
Another attempt at reconciliation took place in July of that same year shortly 
after the agreement over the Canal dues. Nasser agreed to a television 
interview with a British television station (I.T.N. — Independent Television 
News). In that interview, Nasser showed no bitterness over the Suez crisis and 
the U.K 's role in that affair. On the contrary, he showed a desire for normal 
relations with the U.K. [31]
Egyptian attempts at reconciliation continued during the summer of 1957. The 
Egyptian government invited, through the Swiss government (who handled 
the British interests in Egypt), the British government to send a delegation to 
Egypt to examine at first hand the situation of the British property there. [32] 
The reason was to provide a front behind which Nasser could make an 
overture towards the U.K. without suffering any loss of face in the process.
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[33] The British government agreed to this, and thus in August it sent a mission 
consisting of a Mr. Milner and a Mr. Hallows. The U.K. continuously 
emphasised that this was merely a fact-finding mission and that its purpose was 
not to negotiate with the Egyptians. Perhaps as a response to the U.K.'s 
continuous downplaying of the mission's importance, as well as the fact that it 
contained relatively junior or middle-rank Treasury officials, the Egyptian 
authorities did not receive them as warmly as they could have done, to the 
extent that they were refused a meeting with the Egyptian Finance Minister 
and the Egyptian Minister of Finance and other senior officials also refused to 
meet them. [34]
Thanks to this cold reception, as well as the death of the head of the mission, 
Mr. Milner, while still in Cairo, this ill-fated mission naturally did not contribute 
to any positive development in Anglo-Egyptian relations. It even proved to be 
counter-productive, as the U.K. felt that the Egyptian reception of that mission 
had been very obstructive. Indeed some British diplomats who were involved 
in the negotiations with Egypt believed that the tense and oppressive 
reception which faced the Milner and Hallows mission in Cairo, “may have 
been a factor in the tragedy which overtook them when Mr. Milner (of the 
Treasury) died when still in Cairo”. [35] The only possible explanation for this 
cold reception and Egypt's lack of enthusiasm for the mission is perhaps the 
similar lack of enthusiasm the U.K. displayed, with its constant downplaying of 
the mission's importance and the fact that it was composed only of middle-rank 
Treasury and Bank of England officials.
While these efforts at reconciliation were underway, Egypt tried another 
method to attempt to induce the U.K. to respond to the Egyptian advances. 
Since India enjoyed good relations with both the U.K. and Egypt, the latter
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tried to engage India's good offices as mediator. India obliged, and the Indian 
Foreign Minister, Mr Krishna Menon, spoke to his British counterpart on the 
subject of the U.K. relations with Egypt on at least two separate occasions. 
Menon's message was that Nasser had a honest desire to make progress in 
restoring relations with the U.K. to normality, and also that the French were 
anxious to make a deal with Egypt to restore trade as well as diplomatic 
relations between their two countries. Nasser preferred that relations with the 
U.K. be restored first, Menon stated; it was implied that the U.K. should seize 
the opportunity to mend its fences with Egypt, before France did, since if 
France overtook the U.K. in that regard the U.K. would then be in a weaker 
position vis-a-vis Egypt. [36]
The details of the second occasion on which Menon broached the subject of 
Anglo-Egyptian relations with Lloyd clearly demonstrated that the Indian 
attempts at mediation were not a personal initiative of the Indian Foreign 
Minister, but were made as a result of an explicit Egyptian request. When 
Menon met Lloyd, while they were both attending the meetings of the U.N. 
General assembly in New York in September 1957, the latter complained about 
the treatment of the British Milner-Hallows fact-finding mission in the previous 
month. The Indian response shows not only the fact that Menon was acting at 
the request of Egypt, but also the preparation which had been undertaken 
before Menon breached the subject with Lloyd. Firstly, Menon responded by 
stating that there must be a misunderstanding, especially since “President 
Nasser had spoken to him (Menon) quite warmly about M ilner.” [37] 
Immediately after that conversation took place, Ambassador Jung, India's 
ambassador to Cairo, who was included in the delegation accompanying 
Menon to attend the General Assembly meeting, asked to see Lloyd to discuss
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that subject. [38] The Indian efforts at mediation failed to persuade the U.K. to 
change her policy towards improving relations with Egypt. Lloyd maintained, 
in his response to Menon, that the U.K. believed that improved relations with 
Egypt should come about slowly, and that the important issue which had to be 
addressed first was the sequestrated British property in Egypt. [39]
At that time — September 1957 — it became evident that Egypt was extremely 
anxious to improve relations with the U.K. The Indian mediation attempts 
occurred while the British and Egyptian delegates in Rome were beginning the 
second round of talks about a financial settlement. In its efforts to reach an 
agreement, Egypt did not rely only on the Indian Foreign Minister's talks with 
Lloyd or even on the extremely amicable negotiating stance adopted by the 
Egyptian delegation to the Rome talks. President Nasser began enlisting the 
efforts of other friends of the U.K. in the Middle East, such as Emil Bustani, a 
leading Lebanese political figure who had good contacts with the U.K., to try 
to hammer the message home that Nasser was in fact keen to reach an 
agreement.
However, as all these efforts failed to advance the desired goal of normalising 
relations with the U.K., Egypt attempted to accelerate the process by sending 
Colonel Abd al-Qadir Hatim to the U.K. Colonel Hatim was part of the Free 
Officers Movement and a close confidant of Nasser's. When he was sent to the 
U.K., in September 1957, he was the Head of the General Information 
Authority in Egypt. The public reason for his visit was to attend the Inter­
parliamentary Union Conference in London. Once Hatim was in the U.K., he 
began to use the efforts of Emil Bustani, who was a member of the Lebanese
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delegation to the same conference and a close associate of Nasser, to meet 
British parliamentarians and officials. Colonel Hatim's first contact with British 
parliamentarians occurred at a Lebanese party on September 14, 1957, where 
Bustani had arranged for Colonel Hatim to meet two British M.P.s — Mr. 
Shepherd and Lt. Col. Tilney. In that very first meeting, Colonel Hatim stated 
that he would like to hold “secret and exploratory talks”, with “someone in 
the Foreign Office”. [40] The way in which Colonel Hatim came to the U.K., 
together with his method of contacting British officials, as well as the initial 
British reaction to this overture, can only confirm the fact that Colonel Hatim's 
visit and talks in the U.K. were a purely Egyptian initiative, without prior 
consultation with the U.K.
Nevertheless, Colonel Hatim brought with him to London perhaps the best 
offer of a settlement which the U.K. had received. Indeed, what Hatim offered 
was even better than what the Egyptian delegations offered or even accepted 
in the latter phases of the negotiations between the two countries. Hatim 
implied that there would be no problem in allowing the two British prisoners 
being held on charges of espionage, Zarb and Swinburn, to go free (something 
which Egypt later refused to include in any agreement between the two states; 
indeed, much later, when the final settlement between the two states was 
signed and ratified, and diplomatic relations resumed, there was no provision 
for the release of British prisoners).
Secondly, Hatim stated that Nasser was prepared to announce that all 
sequestrated British property in Egypt would be desequestrated, and that 
compensation would be paid for the British property which had been 
Egyptianised. In return, Egypt wanted the U.K. to announce its readiness to
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make releases from the sterling balances held in the U.K. Colonel Hatim 
mentioned the sum of £20 million (this sum was in fact the sum which would 
have been due to be transferred at the end of December, 1957, according to the 
Sterling Releases agreement of 1950, to the Egyptian Number One “free” 
account).
Furthermore, Hatim suggested that the Egyptian claims for compensation for 
war damage during the Suez War could be offset against the value of the 
U.K.'s Suez Canal Base. The U.K. favoured this solution to the question of war 
damage compensation and the value of the base, since to pay compensation as 
such would have been seen as an admission of U.K. guilt for the Suez War and 
was therefore unacceptable. Equally, the U.K. knew perfectly well that the 
Suez Canal Base would be virtually irrelevant strategically without the 
consent — if not the support — of the Egyptians. Firstly, because the base 
needed Egyptian labour for its day-to-day operation. Secondly, because the 
U.K. understood that if Egypt showed hostility again vis-a-vis the Canal Base, 
as it did during the early 1950s, the British military force in the base would be 
of no use strategically, since its efforts would be concentrated on guarding 
itself from the Egyptians rather than on serving the U.K.'s strategic demands in 
the area.
Indeed, from May 1957, the British government came to realise that if they left 
these claims to be settled by mutual waiver, abandoning the U.K. claims for the 
Suez Canal Base and its contents (worth perhaps £70 million) against Egypt's 
claims for war damages, then the U.K. “shall have done well”, [41] In his 
attempts to soften up the British government, Colonel Hatim offered that 
Egypt would stop its broadcasts in Swahili and other anti-British broadcasts in
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return for the U.K. stopping anti-Nasser broadcasts from Cyprus. Indeed, the 
reason that Nasser chose Hatim to go to the U.K. was the latter's position as the 
head of the General Information Authority, which was in charge of the media 
in Egypt and especially, the propaganda campaigns on Egyptian radio. Egypt 
observed that whenever the subject of relations with Egypt was broached 
with U.K. officials, the latter bitterly complained about the propaganda 
campaign on Egyptian radio against U.K. interests in the Arab world and 
Africa, and British officials questioned the sincerity of Egypt's attempts at 
reconciliation with the U.K. while mounting vehement anti-British propaganda 
campaigns. It was to soothe British fears in this respect, and to assure the U.K. 
that a reconciliation would mean the end of media attacks, that Egypt had 
decided to send the man in charge of Egyptian media. [42]
Hatim exposed the Egyptian point of view on the prospects of resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries when he proposed that the 
states should exchange counsellors shortly, and that diplomatic relations 
should come later in “due course”. When Colonel Hatim was pressed on the 
aloof treatment which the Milner-Hallows mission had received in Egypt, 
especially the fact that they were denied a meeting with the Minister of 
Finance, he showed sensitivity to the U.K.'s grievance, stating that the minister 
had been extremely busy at the time. However, Hatim reminded Sir William 
Hayter that the U.K. had insisted that this mission had not gone to negotiate, 
but as a fact-finding mission (a point which Sir William acknowledged in his 
record of the meeting with Colonel Hatim). [43]
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B Second Round of Negotiations: Autumn
and Winter 1957
The second round of negotiations or discussions started in the autumn of 1957 
in Rome. The United Kingdom entered into this round of negotiations with the 
Egyptian governm ent with a great deal of apprehension and many 
reservations. The British government feared firstly, that any agreement would 
be claimed by Egypt in the regional context as a victory over the U.K. Such a 
claim would be quite negative — if not even damaging —  to the U.K.'s 
prestige in the area, since it would occur at a time when Egypt had been 
renewing its pressure against Jordan as well as Iraq, who were the U.K.'s allies 
in the region, not to mention the propaganda attacks on the U.K. (especially on 
the Egyptian radio, in Swahili as well as Arabic).
Secondly, the U.K. did not want to release the blocked sterling balances, a 
prerequisite for any agreement which Egypt might accept. Indeed, these 
balances were the main motive behind Egypt wanting an agreement with the 
U.K. at the time. The U.K. feared that such a release would help strengthen 
Nasser's regime, at a time when it hoped that the economic pressure against 
Nasser might either cause his downfall or produce a crack in his regime, or at 
the least limit his ability to cause damage to the U.K. position or its allies in the 
Middle East. [44] In addition, the U.K. government believed that any 
improvement in its relations with Egypt was subject to the satisfactory 
resolution of the Suez Canal Company claim against Egypt, or at least to some 
progress towards the settlement of that claim. At that time, the Egyptian official 
position was that it no longer even recognised the existence of the Suez Canal 
Company. [45]
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Indeed, British animosity towards Egypt, and its reservations about an 
agreement with its government in 1957, was demonstrated even further when 
news leaked out in September 1957 that negotiations between Egypt and the 
U.K. were to start soon, and might lead to the resumption of Anglo-Egyptian 
relations. The British government immediately instructed the U.K. ambassadors 
in the Middle East to inform the governments to whom they were accredited 
that, “Her Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of seeking a 
reconciliation with Nasser or alleviating his present isolation.” [46]
The Foreign Office explained that certain contacts with the Egyptians, in 
connection with the restoration of British property in Egypt, were 
unavoidable. The U.K. reaffirmed its position that “these (contacts) should not 
be taken to indicate any desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government for a 
political rapprochement.” [47] Nevertheless, and as explained by the Foreign 
Office instructions, there were other factors which compelled the U.K. to reach 
some sort of understanding with Egypt, despite its animosity towards the 
Egyptian regime and its reservations about making an agreement with it. The 
most important of these was the need to satisfy the claims of the British 
subjects whose property had been nationalised, sequestrated or Egyptianised 
as a result of Presidential Proclamation Number 5 which followed the Tripartite 
Aggression in 1956. The British Cabinet was not only pressured by public 
opinion inside the U.K., which commanded strong support, especially in the 
House of Lords, but also because it feared that the value of these properties 
would deteriorate even further under Egyptian administration.
There was yet another consideration, though of less importance than the 
previous one. Despite the deep animosity towards Nasser and his regime in the
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U.K., there remained some elements in the United Kingdom government which 
still wanted to preserve the U.K.'s position as a leading trading partner with 
Egypt, whether for the jobs which exports to Egypt might create or preserve, 
or for the revenues which these exports might bring back to the British 
economy. Indeed, the desire to continue or expand exports to Egypt had 
convinced the U.K., in 1957, to agree in the Basle agreement to allow the 
Egyptian authorities to use the new Number One Special account (the account 
which was created to allow British shipowners to pay the Canal dues to the 
Egyptian authorities) to purchase goods from the U.K. if they so chose. The 
British government decided to bar only the sale of military equipment to Egypt, 
and had decided not to levy a trade embargo on Egypt as this “would be an 
ineffective means of bringing pressure on the Egyptian government” . [48] 
Treasury officials, during the period of the rupture of the relations between 
Egypt and the U.K., had expressed their disappointment that, due to the 1956 
crisis, the U.K. had “lost what was in 1955 its most important market in the 
Middle East” . [49] Indeed, this was clearly shown by the decline in the U.K. 
exports to Egypt: from £22.7 million in 1955, to no more than £2.3 million in 
1957. [50]
The fact there was a divergence of views within the British government 
regarding trade with Egypt was illustrated when Egypt desired to purchase 
two Viscount aircraft (civilian aircraft) in the summer of 1957. The decision on 
that matter was deferred to be decided by the Prime Minister, due to a 
difference of opinion within the Cabinet (the President of the Board of Trade, 
Sir David Eccles, felt that it was not justifiable to permit such transactions while 
British claims against Egypt remained unsatisfied, while the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer, Peter Thorneycroft, supported the sale on the grounds that putting 
limitations on the way Egypt spent its funds in the Special account would be 
inconsistent with the statements made by the government to the House of 
Commons in May, 1957 as well with the assurances given by the U.K. 
government in the Basle agreement. The Chancellor also supported this sale on 
the grounds that it would ensure that part of the Suez Canal dues paid by 
British ships would be used to buy British goods.) Indeed, after over 25 days 
the Prime Minister and the British Cabinet agreed to allow the deal to proceed, 
provided there were no unsatisfied orders from any Commonwealth country. 
[51]
The pressure to resume trade with Egypt was not restricted to the desire to 
increase U.K. exports to Egypt. In fact, the U.K.'s prohibition on importing 
Egyptian goods created pressure from British industries relying on imported 
Egyptian materials for which they could find no substitutes, such as steatite, 
essential for the manufacture of certain electrical ceramic components. This raw 
material was not located in any other country except Egypt at the time, 
furthermore, there was no substitute. Before the Suez crisis, the U.K. had 
imported 626 tons of steatite a year from Egypt. Although this product was 
vital to the production of certain radar equipment, it was relatively cheap (the 
total annual import bill was no more than £18,000). Due to the importance of 
this material, as well as to the fact that it was cheap, the U.K. found itself in a 
situation whereby it needed Egypt more than Egypt needed it, for the total 
export value of steatite for Egypt at that time was far less than the importance 
of this product for the U.K. [52]
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that, even during the period when
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the U.K. was adamantly against any kind of rapprochement with Egypt, there 
remained a trend in the U.K. which wanted some kind of link to remain. Apart 
from trade (the issue of the sale of the aircraft) which could be justified on 
purely internal grounds — the benefits which would result to the British 
economy — there was other evidence as well. Despite the severing of 
diplomatic relations with Egypt, the U.K. allowed the Egyptian Cultural 
Attache to remain in London, attached to the Indian High Commission. Not 
only had the Foreign Office allowed Egyptian students to continue their 
studies in the U.K., but they had been extremely tolerant regarding the 
Egyptian Cultural Attache, who had remained in the U.K. to oversee them. 
They had not objected to the fact that he had violated his terms of stay by 
exercising consular functions, such as the issuing of visas to Egypt. The 
Foreign Office even turned a blind eye when he kept issuing visas under the 
stamp of the Egyptian Consulate-General in London, though the Foreign 
Office knew about the practice. [53]
Thus, and due to the above-mentioned reasons, the United Kingdom decided 
to enter into another round of discussions with the Egyptians in the autumn of 
1957. The sketchy start and rather loose structure of these “discussions” in 
Rome (they were called discussions and not negotiations) demonstrates their 
nature. Scheduled to start in September 1957, they were postponed first to 
October 8 (because the Egyptian representative failed to arrive), then to the 
first week of November, since the Egyptian representative had to return to 
Cairo for fresh instructions as he had misunderstood the basis of these 
discussions. [54] Apparently, he had thought that he had come to finalise 
whatever Colonel Hatim had proposed during his visit to London.
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The negotiations were conducted between the representatives of the financial 
ministries of each country, as the heads of the respective delegations. The U.K. 
delegation was headed by Sir Denis Rickett of the Treasury, and included a 
representative of the Bank of England as well a representative of the Foreign 
Office (Mr. J.H.A. Watson, Head of the African Department). [55] The head of 
the Egyptian delegation was Mr. H. Zaki from the Ministry of Finance.
Furthermore, the U.K. did not enter these talks with the Egyptian government 
seeking either reconciliation or rapprochement, [56] but merely to solve the 
problem of the sequestrated British property. When the financial talks finally 
started in earnest on November 4, 1957, the Cabinet was informed that these 
discussions were “exploratory in character”. [57] Indeed the U.K. delegation 
to these discussions did not have the authority to commit their government to 
even a provisional agreement with the Egyptians, even if the opportunity had 
arisen to get the Egyptian delegation to accept the release of a part of Egypt's 
blocked sterling balances against the deposit of a corresponding sum by Egypt 
with some neutral international body. [58]
On November 13, 1957, eight days after the start of the Rome discussions, the 
U.K. Cabinet finally reached a decision to conclude an agreement with Egypt. 
The Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, proposed a draft agreement [59] to settle 
the financial problems. The essence of this draft agreement, which the Cabinet 
considered on November 13, was that the Egyptian government should nullify 
all measures which had been enacted against British property and citizens 
(such as Presidential Proclamation No 5) and return all property which had 
been seized by the Egyptian government after October 31, 1956. At the same 
time, the Egyptian government was to pay a certain sum of money to the U.K.
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government as compensation for the U.K. property which could be returned, or 
for the damage done to U.K. property as a result of the measures enacted by 
the Egyptian government after October 31, 1956. A point which the U.K. 
position was very clear upon was the inclusion of an agreed form of arbitration 
over the treaty. Indeed, the draft agreement proposed by the Prime Minister 
clearly stipulated the need for an agreed machinery for impartial arbitration 
between Egypt and the U.K., for the settlement of disputes in matters arising 
from the return of all property —  unless its owners had willingly disposed of it 
— and in matters regarding the payment of compensation for the inability to 
return property, or when there had been harm done to that property due to its 
seizure by the Egyptian government. [60]
The U.K. wanted the Egyptian government to pay compensation for “the 
Egyptian Government failure to protect such property, rights or interests 
between the 31st of October, 1956 and the return to their rightful owners”. 
[61] The compensation desired by the U.K. government was also for any 
damage done to the property involved, whether because of looting, loss of 
value due to the deterioration of market conditions or because of the mistakes 
or inefficiency of the sequestrator appointed by the Egyptian government to 
manage these properties. The U.K. wanted around £37 million, but were 
prepared to accept £30 million. At the same time the Egyptian government was 
to agree to allow those property-owners who did not wish to return to Egypt 
to transfer the value of their property abroad.
This draft agreement specified that only after the Egyptian government had 
nullified the measures enacted against U.K. citizens, and after the return of 
these properties to their rightful owners, should the U.K. government raise the
168
restrictions which it had imposed on the Egyptian Number One account and 
thus release to the Egyptian government the £18 million pounds sterling which 
was in the account. Furthermore, the U.K. government was not to release more 
funds from the Number Two account, even in accordance with the sterling 
balances agreement, “except after examinations from time to time by the two 
governments in the light of progress made in effecting payment of 
compensation”. [62] This would have meant that Egypt would have been 
denied the £20 million which, according to the sterling balance agreement of 
1951, was due to be released from the Number Two account to the Number 
One account in 1957. That draft treaty proposed to keep the whole issue of the 
sterling balances of Egypt held in the United Kingdom suspended until the 
U.K. felt that Egypt had satisfied all claims for compensation for British 
property in Egypt.
Indeed, the main reason for the drive by Egypt to normalise its relations with 
the U.K. after 1957 was its desire to use its foreign exchange reserves held in 
the U.K., funds that Egypt needed badly to overcome the economic difficulties 
which it had incurred since it nationalised the Suez Canal. These difficulties 
were increasing as the economic sanctions imposed on Egypt began to take 
effect, and made Egypt desperate for foreign exchange to finance its growing 
import bill. Some of Nasser's advisors put the view to him that these blocked 
reserves were the answer to Egypt's economic difficulties. In addition, the fact 
that Egypt could no longer export its cotton to its most lucrative market, the 
U.K., meant that it was denied a traditional source of foreign exchange. This 
made Nasser willing to pursue an agreement with the U.K. in 1957 to be able to 
regain control of these reserves. [63] The total sum of these reserves or
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outstanding balances in the U.K. in 1957 was £70 million sterling, £18 million 
held in the Number One account and £52 million in the Number Two account.
[64]
The draft agreement proposed by the Prime Minister represented the maximum 
demands which the U.K. could make in stipulating the return of British 
property, or compensation in lieu, without actually releasing the blocked 
sterling balances (for the sum which was to be released was only £18 million, 
against the payment by Egypt of over £30 million). Nevertheless, members of 
the British Cabinet stressed that even under these strenuous conditions, the 
Egyptian representatives in Rome should be told that, before the U.K. would 
agree on the terms of the settlement, certain political elements would also have 
to be taken into account.
What the British Cabinet described as political elements included issues which 
were outside the sphere of the financial agreement and were subject to the 
political will of the Egyptian government. They included: a) the question of 
compensation for the Suez Canal company (this was a political element 
because the Egyptian government's public position at the time was that it 
refused to acknowledge the existence of the Suez Canal Company); b) the 
attitude of the United Nations to the proposal made by the U.N. Secretary 
General concerning the costs of the clearing-up operations in the Suez Canal, 
which stated that these costs should be met through levying an extra 
surcharge on the Canal dues; and c) that Egypt should release the two British 
political prisoners which it held on charges of espionage (Zarb and Swindon).
[65] Perhaps the one demand which might need further elucidation was that 
concerning the proposal of the U.N. Secretary General to meet the cost of the 
Canal clearance by levying a 3% surcharge on the Canal dues.
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Although this proposal suited the interests of the British government, it still 
presented it with a dilemma. On one hand, if the proposal failed to receive the 
necessary majority in the United Nations, it would revive the pressure in the 
United Nations to have the entire bill for the Canal clearance met by France 
and the United Kingdom. At the same time, if the U.K. supported the proposal 
it would be viewed by British shipowners as a betrayal of their interests, and 
they might either press the U.K. for reimbursement, or even refuse to pay this 
extra surcharge, which could compel the Egyptian authorities to refuse them 
passage through the Canal. This of course would involve the U.K. in yet 
another problem with Egypt over the Suez Canal, and one which would be 
viewed in the international community as entirely due to the U.K.'s actions.
[66] Thus the U.K. wanted this proposal to be approved without having to 
vote for it. A difficult attitude by Egypt at that time could have led the United 
Nations to refuse that proposal.
The memoranda by the relevant British officials at the Foreign Office and the 
Treasury, together with the draft treaty submitted by the Prime Minister and 
the Cabinet discussions concerning it, illustrate the hard-line position adopted 
by the U.K. regarding any agreement with Egypt at that moment in time. There 
were several reasons for this hard-line position. Firstly, despite the end of the 
Suez War, the reasons which compelled the British government to mount that 
military operation were still in existence. The Suez Canal had remained in 
Egyptian hands, despite all the attempts of the U.K. In fact, the Suez War had 
merely confirmed that Egypt would be allowed to manage and control the 
Canal. Secondly, the regional conflict between the United Kingdom and Egypt 
over supremacy in the Middle East had not only been maintained but had
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intensified. The main difference which had occurred in the conflict between 
the two states after Suez was that there were now even more problems 
between them on the bilateral level as a result of that political and regional 
conflict, the most important being the British property sequestrated or 
nationalised in Egypt, and the Egyptian balances in the U.K.
The U.K. had great difficulty in signing any agreement with Egypt in view of 
the opposition such an agreement would face in the House of Commons, as 
well as the fear that such a deal might compromise the U.K.'s position in the 
Middle East. Indeed, the memory of the violent response in the House of 
Commons in May 1957 to the Basle agreement was still fresh in the minds of 
the Conservative government. There was also the fact that the U.K. thought 
that the economic pressures being applied to Egypt at that time might cause 
either the collapse of, or at least a crack in, the Nasser regime. [67] Therefore 
the idea of releasing some or indeed any of Egypt's blocked balances in the 
United Kingdom, an action which the U.K. believed would enhance the power 
of Nasser's regime, was not only unattractive but unacceptable as well.
The British property expropriated in Egypt after the beginning of the Suez 
War in 1956 fell into three categories, according to the Egyptian government 
intention regarding their future ownership. The first category was the 
“sequestrated” property. This was the property which the Egyptian 
government was managing temporarily under the administration of a 
Sequestrator-General. The Egyptian government had no intention of placing 
these properties (which included the houses of U.K. citizens who used to live 
in Egypt etc.) permanently under public ownership, and it was prepared to 
return this class of property to the U.K. owners. The second category was
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“Egyptianised property” , which were properties which the Egyptian 
government had expropriated and sold to Egyptian citizens to manage. The 
Egyptian government did not want to return these to their U.K. owners, but at 
the same time did not want to own them themselves, hence their sale to 
Egyptians. The third and last category was the “nationalised” property. These 
were properties, such as foreign banks and insurance companies, which the 
Egyptian government had placed under state ownership and for which it had 
agreed to pay compensation to their previous owners. It was understood that 
nationalised and Egyptianised property would not be returned to its previous 
owners, and the only point which remained to be discussed between the 
Egyptian and British governments regarding them was the amount of 
compensation to be paid.
There were several claims made to the British government regarding these 
properties. However, it was widely agreed in Whitehall that some owners had 
over-valued their assets in the figures they gave to the British government.
[68] The claims for Egyptianised property totalled around £47 million, and for 
sequestrated property around £119 million. The latter figure was made up of 
£50 million for private property, £14 million for businesses and a further £55 for 
Shell, which included a refinery as well as a successful business. In fact, there 
was disagreement even within the British government regarding the amounts 
and the classifications (i.e. sequestrated, nationalised, or Egyptianised) of many 
of these claims. An example was the Shell claim, which the Prime Minister 
classified as Egyptianised property on November 12, 1957 while valuing the 
total claims regarding Egyptianised and sequestrated properties at £160 million.
[69] Treasury officials classified the Shell claim as a sequestrated property, and 
valued the total claims at £166 million. [70]
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That the U.K. was adopting a hard-line position in 1957 was clear from the 
demands it made and the conditions it insisted upon in the proposed financial 
agreement. Firstly, the U.K. insisted on Egypt returning all property which had 
been nationalised or Egyptianised in October 1956, while at the same time 
demanding an advance payment of not less than £30 million on account of 
compensation for damage that the returned British property had incurred, as 
well as for the British property which could not be returned to British 
ownership. In return, they offered only the release of the Egyptian funds in the 
Number One account. Therefore, under such an agreement the Egyptian 
government was: to return all properties which it had seized; to resume the 
favourable treatment accorded to U.K. and British nationals pre-Suez; and to 
pay £30 million on account of compensation. All the Egyptian government 
wanted to receive from this agreement was the release of the £18 million held in 
the Number One account, while the remainder of the Egyptian balances in the 
U.K. were to remain blocked until all claims for compensation from Egypt had 
been satisfied.
After lengthy negotiations, which lasted until the first week of December, the 
head of the Egyptian delegation, Mr. Hassan Abbas Zaki, the Under-Secretary 
to the Ministry of Finance, gave Egypt's response to the British proposals. He 
explained that what he offered was Egypt's last and final offer, and that, if it 
was not accepted, he would have no alternative but to end that round of 
negotiations and return to Cairo. [71]
The Egyptian offer can be summarised as follows: Egypt would sign an 
agreement based on the return of the sequestrated property which had not yet
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been Egyptianised. Egypt agreed to pay compensation for the Egyptianised 
property which could not be returned to the U.K. owners. Regarding 
compensation, Egypt was willing to make an advance payment of £30 million 
compensation for the nationalised and Egyptianised property. Moreover, 
Egypt agreed to resume normal trade with the U.K. after the treaty, and to 
remove the disabilities imposed on U.K. nationals (such as those under 
Presidential Proclamation Number 5). Another U.K. demand regarded the 
resumption of pensions and compensation for British officials who had been 
employed by the Egyptian government; the Egyptian delegation accepted to 
pay the compensation agreed in 1954. (This was an agreement made in an 
exchange of notes between the two governments on October 19, 1954 
regarding paying compensation for the British officials dismissed by the 
Egyptian government in 1951.)
However, Egypt refused to de-Egyptianise the U.K. assets —  except as might 
be agreed in individual cases without commitment. Egypt flatly refused to 
accept any liability for damages to the sequestrated properties, or to pay 
compensation for any such damages except in cases where there had been 
irregularities on the part of the sequestrator. The Egyptian delegation clarified 
that such irregularities meant only cases where the Egyptian sequestrator had 
contravened Egyptian law. An attempt by the U.K. delegation to bridge the 
gap, by proposing that Egypt should accept liability for the actions of the 
sequestrator in cases where he had failed to act as a reasonably prudent 
manager of property, was also refused by the Egyptian delegation. That 
proposal by the British delegation could have given the U.K. a good chance to 
claim for compensation if matters were brought to arbitration.
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Egypt also refused to accept neutral arbitration for the settlement of disputes 
between the two countries on all matters arising from the return of all 
properties, Egypt was willing to accept a limited form of arbitration in matters 
regarding the evaluation of properties, but only in extreme cases, where the 
difference between the Egyptian and British side exceeded 15% of the total 
value of the property. [72] Egypt insisted that disputes between the two 
countries over the matters arising from arbitration had to be decided by the 
Egyptian courts.
The Egyptian side refused to accept the British demand regarding the return of 
British rights and/or interests in matters other than property. Even a general 
formula proposed by the U.K. delegation covering these rights and interests in 
matters other than property was not accepted. However, the Egyptian 
delegation did agree to restore British nationals’ legal rights of access to courts 
as well as the use of Egyptian ports and airports. As for the original British 
demand, the Egyptian delegation offered to discuss each “right ” or “interest” 
individually, such as B.O.A.C. rights. [73]
The sudden Egyptian deadline, and especially the delegation's statement that if 
their final offer was not accepted they would have to break off the 
negotiations and return to Cairo, was a surprise for the British delegation. They 
had not anticipated a sudden break in the negotiations at that particular stage, 
even though they had accepted that each of the points under contention were 
indeed breaking points (especially those regarding liability for actions by the 
sequestrator, neutral arbitration and the return of U.K. rights and interests in 
matters other than property).
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In the face of this sudden ultimatum the British government had no alternative 
but to accept the suspension of that round of negotiations. Accordingly, the 
heads of the two delegations issued a statement on December 12, 1957, to the 
effect that both delegations were returning to their respective countries for 
consultation with their governments. [74]
The Rome negotiations thus ended abruptly. However, this break should not 
have been unexpected. It arose because the U.K. and Egyptian positions were 
so far apart and because the party which was at the time seeking an agreement, 
Egypt, was not given any of the incentives which might have induced it to 
accept even a tough compromise. To understand the stalemate of December 
1957, one should analyse the positions of both the U.K. and Egypt which led 
them to that impasse, and which later led Egypt to issue its ultimatum and thus 
break off the negotiations.
As for the U.K., it was in a dilemma. The British government had in its 
possession £70 million, the value of the blocked Egyptian assets in the U.K. 
banks; but these balances were supposed to cover a total of £166 million of 
over-valued British claims. The U.K. was therefore reluctant to release any part 
of these assets to Egypt, since they covered less than 50% of the declared 
value of the U.K. property held in Egypt. At the same time, the U.K. 
government had hoped that the political isolation and economic pressures 
Egypt was experiencing at the beginning of 1957 would either cause the 
downfall of Nasser's regime or at least weaken him to the point where he could 
not inconvenience the U.K. in the Middle East. Thus the U.K. did not want to 
allow Egypt any assistance which might prolong the life of the Nasser regime
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and accordingly did not want to release any of Egypt's sterling balances held 
in the U.K.
However, the U.K. realised that, if it failed to reach a treaty with Egypt, it 
would have to seize the Egyptian assets to satisfy the British claims, which it 
was reluctant to do because of the negative implications of such an action. The 
U.K. government recognised that the seizure of Egyptian assets would be a 
“blow to international confidence in sterling. Secondly the British government 
was aware that such an act would harm the prospect of any improvement in 
the Anglo-Egyptian relations for a long time” [75] Quite apart from the above 
factors, the value of the Egyptian assets was not enough to meet even half the 
value of the U.K. claims. In the event that no treaty had been been signed, 
each country would have seized the other country's assets; the U.K. would 
expropriate the Egyptian assets and Egypt on the other hand would 
nationalise all British property permanently. This prospect prompted some of 
the British officials involved to suggest that any deal which might be made 
with Egypt and which would involve desequestration of British property 
worth £119 million was much better than no deal at all, even if there was no 
advance payment made by Egypt. Indeed, this report suggested that, due to 
the above-mentioned factors, the British delegation in Rome could accept £20 
million, rather than demanding no less than £30 million as their absolute 
minimum. [76] Moreover, towards the end of 1957, the U.K. Cabinet began to 
recognise that the economic pressures on Egypt at that stage were not 
sufficient to topple Nasser from power, and the U.K. therefore began to re­
evaluate its position on the basis that it would have to deal with him. 
Accordingly, a deal with Egypt which might entail the release of some of its 
assets in the U.K. became more or less unavoidable. However, by the time that 
realisation came, the prospect of an easy deal with Egypt had passed.
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Egypt, on the other hand, was in a different position. Unlike the U.K., which 
initially was not keen to reach an agreement in 1957, Egypt was more than 
keen, as shown by its amicable negotiating stance and its efforts through 
mediators. Yet, by the end of 1957, this eagerness had cooled to the point of 
breaking off the Rome negotiations — which Egypt initially had struggled to 
convene.
There were several reasons for the change in the Egyptian position. First of all, 
the treaty or agreement that Egypt was offered in Rome fell short of the basic 
requirement which made Egypt want such an agreement in the first place, 
namely, the ability to use its blocked assets in the U.K. In 1957, the sanctions 
imposed on Egypt the previous year had begun to cause several major 
dislocations in its economy. As described earlier, the severing of its trade links 
with the U.K. led to the disappearances of a great deal of consumer and basic 
goods (such as pharmaceuticals) from the Egyptian market. At the same time, 
spare parts and intermediary goods for the few Egyptian industries were now 
denied, since they had mostly been imported from the West and from the U.K. 
in particular. [77] In addition, the fact that Egypt had stopped exporting 25% 
of its cotton crop to the U.K., sold for foreign exchange, and began to export 
over 60% of its crop as part of barter deals with the Soviet Union, meant that 
an important source of foreign exchange had been lost.
Therefore, Egypt began to feel an urgent need to utilise its blocked foreign 
exchange held in the U.K., France and the United States to finance its growing 
bill for imports. It needed to restore its trade links and position in the Western 
markets which used to purchase Egyptian goods — especially cotton. Egypt
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needed the U.K. in particular, as the latter had been Egypt's main trading 
partner prior to Suez, with total visible trade between the two states in 1955 
reaching around £40 million (with Egypt's exports to the U.K. being almost 
double the value of its imports from the U.K.). [78]
However, what Egypt was offered in Rome was merely access to £18 million of 
its reserves, with £30 million of the remainder to be paid to the U.K. as an 
advance payment for compensation. As the remaining assets (around £22 
million) were to remain blocked subject to later discussions between the two 
governments, the Egyptian negotiators were faced with having to accept 
returning the sequestrated property without receiving the financial windfall 
they were hoping for.
Secondly, the Egyptian delegation was shocked by the amount the British 
government was claiming for loss or damages to U.K. property. Indeed, that 
was the only reason which the British negotiators in Rome saw as the cause 
for the Egyptian side deciding to break off the negotiations at that time. [79] 
Thirdly, the British demand for neutral arbitration was totally unacceptable to 
the Egyptians, both to their political leadership as well as to their economic 
bureaucracy, on the grounds that it infringed their national sovereignty and 
was an affront to their independence. [80] Indeed, some of the Egyptian 
papers reported, after the break of that round of negotiations, that such a 
request was contrary to Egyptian independence and dignity. [81] It is not 
surprising that Egypt found such a request for neutral arbitration unacceptable, 
considering their colonial experience with the U.K. and in the light of the 
events which followed the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The idea of 
neutral arbitration brought to mind their experiences with the consular courts
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and the “mixed courts” which replaced them and remained in force until 1949. 
These had foreign judges and dealt with cases where foreigners were involved, 
Egyptian courts not being empowered to try such cases at the time. [82] In the 
atmosphere of mistrust of the U.K. after Suez, the Egyptians feared that a 
neutral arbitrator would be another name for the practices of the mixed courts. 
The idea of anything which even resembled the mixed courts and the 
privileges which were enjoyed by foreign nationals before the 1952 revolution 
was indeed a very sensitive issue which Egypt found hard to accept.
Another factor that hardened the Egyptian position was the fact that by 
December 1957 their need for a treaty with the U.K. was considerably less than 
it had been before. Until the start of the negotiations on November 4, Egypt 
had been in desperate need of foreign exchange; therefore it had started 
financial negotiations with both the U.K. and France at almost the same time. 
However, the negotiations with the U.K. proved to be more problematic than 
those with France and at the same time did not promise to deliver the expected 
rewards.
The change which occurred, however, was that Egypt's foreign exchange 
shortage was temporarily alleviated by the Soviet Union while the Rome 
negotiations between Egypt and the U.K. were in progress. On November 20, 
the U.S.S.R. signed a $200 million dollar loan with Egypt. This loan, in effect, 
offset Egypt's desperate need to solve its foreign exchange deficit. In addition, 
Egypt managed to sell its 1957 cotton crop, despite the fact that the U.K., 
previously a major purchaser of Egyptian cotton, refused to allow its 
manufacturers to buy any of it. Indeed, among the major purchasers of 
Egyptian cotton in 1957 was France, with a deal signed in August 1957. [83]
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Moreover, the 1957 cotton crop yielded approximately £E106 million, which 
was 6% more than the previous year. The successful sale of the cotton crop 
reduced Egypt's trade deficit, totalling £E44.8 million and £E43.8 million in 
1956 and 1955 respectively, to only £E11 million in 1957. [84] The fact that the 
Suez Canal was now operational, with all ships using it paying dues directly to 
the Egyptian government (unlike the previous year, when U.K. and French 
ships had not paid the dues to Egypt) meant a new source of invisible earnings, 
aiding the Egyptian balance of payments. These factors — especially the 
Soviet loan — made Egypt less anxious to sign an agreement whose only 
advantage was £18 million in foreign exchange. Indeed, the hope of getting 
some foreign exchange to solve the acute shortage which Egypt was suffering 
prior to the Soviet loan was the only reason, as far as the Egyptian delegation 
was concerned, for keeping the negotiations going for over a month. [85]
In addition to the material reasons which were relevant to the agreement itself, 
there was the point regarding the national feelings of Egypt regarding the U.K. 
after the Suez War. Prior to Suez, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 had 
just managed to begin to clear up the anti-British feeling in Egypt which had 
resulted from the occupation. That feeling had reached a climax with the 
seizure of Ismailia by British troops in 1951, an act which led to public anger in 
Cairo and the burning of Cairo immediately afterwards. All these feeling were 
beginning to clear up before Suez. There was hope and anticipation that the 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 would signal a new and fresh start 
between the two states based on equality and the independence of Egypt. 
There were great hopes in Egypt, especially in official circles, about the 
development of that new relationship. The Suez affair had created a sense of 
shock as well as anger towards the U.K., not only for the attack itself but also
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for disappointing such great hopes for the future of their relationship. [86] The 
Egyptian government was willing to put this disappointment aside for the sake 
of achieving an agreement which would allow Egypt to overcome its 
economic crisis. However, when the need for such an agreement decreased, 
and as the gain from it also became less visible, this led to the decision by the 
Egyptian government to break the negotiations.
Y CONCLUSION
The negotiations between Egypt and the U.K. passed through several stages in 
this period which were relevant to the changing fortunes of the powers of 
each state. At the beginning, immediately after the crisis, the U.K. was at its 
lowest ebb. Its relationship with the United States was in a shambles. It was 
isolated as far as the international community was concerned and its internal 
politics and economy were in disarray. Egypt, on the other hand, had emerged 
victorious.
This resulted in the fact that Egypt, as early as January 1957, was appearing 
more uncompromising towards Anglo-Egyptian relations than the U.K. had 
when it abrogated the 1954 agreement. The U.K., on the other hand, was 
desperate to get Egypt's agreement to the speedy clearance of the Suez Canal 
and the passage of British ships through it. After the U.K. obtained these 
objectives, there occurred a dramatic change in the fortunes and thus the 
position of each state. The Anglo-American rapprochement was coupled with a 
deterioration in American-Egyptian relations. The economic measures which 
had been taken after the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal began to 
bear fruit, and the concerted Anglo-American efforts against Nasser led in
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effect to his increased isolation in the Arab world. The result was a change in 
Egypt's position on reaching an agreement with the U.K.
Egypt had fought, since the first few months of 1957, to reach an agreement 
with the United Kingdom in order to be able to use the blocked sterling 
balances in the U.K. Meanwhile the U.K., thinking that the economic pressures 
on Nasser might lead to his downfall or at least to a crack in his regime, became 
extremely hard-line in its demands for the financial agreement with Egypt 
which was the basis of any political settlement. This uncompromising British 
position continued until almost the end of 1957, when yet another change 
occurred which will be explained later. This led to the Egyptian position 
growing harder while the U.K. became more amenable to an agreement.
The change occurred in the U.K. position, and it was due to the British 
government's realisation that, contrary to its earlier view, the economic 
pressures maintained on President Nasser were not sufficient to topple him 
from power, at least in the immediate future. Indeed, amongst the main reasons 
for the U.K. government's desire to come to some agreement with Egypt was 
their realisation that “there was little possibility of our being able to overthrow 
the present Egyptian government by economic pressures.” [87]
As for Egypt, its position hardened from their initial desperate eagerness to 
reach an agreement with the United Kingdom for several reasons. First, the 
terms the U.K. delegation was willing to offer did not satisfy the minimum 
demands that the Egyptian delegation found acceptable. Secondly, it appeared 
to the Egyptian government that such a proposed agreement would not bring 
the hoped-for financial windfall in releasing their blocked assets in the U.K., as
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the claims that the British government presented in fact amounted to more than 
the total worth of the assets in question. Last but not least was the fact that 
Egypt's desperate need for foreign exchange was becoming alleviated as the 
Suez Canal began to become profitable, which meant that the venture which 
had started in 1956 was finally paying off. Most important was the fact that 
the Soviet Union had offered Egypt a $200 million loan, which shored up the 
financial position of the Egyptian government and allowed it to wait until it 
was able to reach a satisfactory agreement.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINANCIAL AGREEMENT 
I INTRODUCTION
The Rome round of negotiations in 1957 merely served to show the two 
governments the great gap that had to be bridged before an agreement could 
be reached. Political considerations — the conflict in the foreign policies of the 
two states —  served to increase the gap between them. However, in 1958 
there occurred a shift in the roles of the two states. In 1957 it had been Egypt 
which worked hard at reaching an agreement, only to be faced with U.K. 
reluctance. But as the year progressed, the U.K. changed its attitude and began 
actively to seek an agreement with Egypt. It made compromises and 
concessions and engaged the offices of mediators for this purpose.
The main reason for this change of attitude on the part of the British 
government was the pressure on the U.K. stemming from the problems in the 
bilateral field between the two states. These problems generated enough 
momentum to force the British government to realise the importance of an 
agreement. It must be noted, though, that this occurred at a period which 
witnessed the climax of the regional confrontation between Egypt and the 
West, including the U.K. It was apparent that the intensifying regional 
confrontation between the two states in the Middle East had no impact on the 
negotiations aimed at resolving the problems that existed between them in the 
bilateral field.
195
Egypt on the other hand was no longer suffering the foreign exchange 
shortage which earlier had made it desperate to reach an agreement, and it, 
therefore, concentrated on getting the best terms it could. Indeed, the financial 
agreement finally initialled in January, 1959 and signed in Cairo the following 
month was only possible because of the compromises which occurred in the 
British position, together with the efforts of the mediators the U.K. engaged.
H CHANGES IN THE NEGOTIATING
STANCE OF BOTH COUNTRIES
A The U.K.
Towards the end of 1957, the U.K. government came to realise that it would 
not be able overthrow Nasser by economic pressure alone; that his regime was 
strong enough to withstand this pressure. [1] At that stage the United 
Kingdom government began to think realistically of the need to reach an 
agreement with Egypt. The Cabinet approved on November 13, 1957 a draft 
agreement with Egypt submitted by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. [2] 
Nevertheless, at that stage, the U.K. government did not intend to restore 
diplomatic relations with Egypt (as clearly shown in the previous chapter). At 
that stage in the negotiations, and as the Egyptian stance hardened, the U.K. 
position became more amenable and they actively sought an agreement with 
Egypt. At the outset of the negotiations in the previous year, the U.K. view 
was that an agreement with Egypt would give Nasser added prestige in the 
area and extra financial resources which would allow him to cause yet greater 
damage to U.K. interests. [3] The British government began to think that an 
agreement with Egypt would serve to ease the acute economic embarrassment
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of the Egyptian government, and would lead to a reduction, rather than an 
increase, in the incentive for the Egyptian government to foment fresh political 
tensions in the Middle East. [4]
The British government began to re-evaluate its negotiating stance vis-a-vis 
Egypt after the financial negotiations finally broke down in December 1957, 
when the British government found that the Egyptian government could 
definitely resist the financial pressure it was facing. The U.K. recognised that 
Nasser’s regime was going to survive and last for the foreseeable future. The 
new U.K. position in the negotiations was based on the realisation that its 
trump card in the negotiations, the Egyptian blocked balances in the U.K., had 
an inherent weakness: the funds under its control — no more than £70 million 
— did not cover the full value of the British property claims against Egypt — 
some £175, according to its owners. [5] And, in any case, the U.K. could not 
expropriate these funds without damaging confidence in sterling and thus 
harming the U.K. economy. [6]
As a result of this weakness in its position, the U.K. changed its stance. The 
first sign of that change occurred on January 2, 1958, when the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer proposed to the Cabinet that the U.K. should seek a partial 
agreement with Egypt, limited to the points the two sides agreed on and 
excluding the contentious points of compensation for desequestrated 
properties and the question of releases from the Egyptian Number Two 
account (which contained most of the Egyptian blocked assets). These points 
were to be left for a future agreement between the two countries. The U.K. 
Cabinet saw several merits in this course of action. A partial agreement would 
allow for the resumption of trade between the two states as well as for the
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restoration of diplomatic relations. Moreover, it would secure the return of 
property valued at £128.5 million (the sequestrated property) as well as 
securing £30 million of the compensation payment for Egyptianised assets. [7]
This proposal demonstrated a drastic change in the U.K.’s position on restoring 
diplomatic relations with Egypt from the previous year, when it had refused to 
grant Nasser the prestige and recognition that resumption would have brought 
him. Now, the U.K. believed it needed to restore diplomatic relations with 
Egypt. Once the Cabinet had decided in favour of reaching an agreement with 
Egypt in order to resume diplomatic relations, the same United Kingdom 
officials who had argued in 1957 for the exceedingly tough negotiating stance 
that the U.K. had adopted in the 1957 financial negotiations began — albeit 
gradually — to try to find ways of meeting some of the Egyptian demands 
which had appeared during those negotiations. These officials argued that the 
U.K. could not realistically expect more compromises than the Egyptian 
delegation had been willing to offer at that time. The lowering of expectations 
in the British government began to materialise initially in some minor issues, 
such as the acceptance that Egypt should allow and provide for transfer 
facilities of only up to £5000 for each British property owner who did not wish 
to remain in Egypt. This was half the amount the U.K. had earlier sought. 
Furthermore, British officials also decided to accept the Egyptians’ refusal to 
include an obligation to return Egyptianised British property in the proposed 
agreement. The British lowered their demands even further when they decided 
they would have to accept, subject to getting better terms from the Egyptians, 
that the entire compensation would be made in the form of securities which 
could not be encashed for three years. [8]
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The British government decided as early as January 1958 not only that it 
wanted to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt, but on the method of that 
restoration and the level of the diplomatic relations after they were restored. 
They decided that such a restoration would begin at the level of charge 
d ’affaires, following the signing of the financial agreement with Egypt. In 
addition to the other advantages of restoring diplomatic relations, the U.K. 
government believed that the financial treaty would create a situation in which 
they would need to have an embassy in Cairo to oversee its implementation. 
Moreover, the U.K.’s determination to resume relations with Egypt went 
beyond taking the decision in private. The British government informed 
France, which was also attempting to reach a financial agreement with Egypt 
over the French property in Egypt, of its intentions. The British Minister of 
State at the Foreign Office, Commander Noble, informed the French 
Ambassador on January 28, 1958, that “the practical problems which would at 
once flow from the conclusion of a financial agreement would make the 
resumption of direct relations with Egypt imperative. It would be quite 
impossible to deal through a protecting power with all the complications which 
would be involved in the release of British property in Egypt from 
sequestration. Our own intention was to resume relations at Charge d’Affaires 
level, and not to appoint an ambassador for a considerable period, perhaps 
even twelve months or more.” [9]
B Egypt
It was not only the U.K. which changed its negotiating stance. The change in 
the Egyptian position in the negotiating rounds which followed December 
1957 was equally dramatic. The positive changes which had occurred in
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Egypt’s internal economic situation (which was mentioned earlier), as well as 
in its diplomatic position (which will be explained in the course of this chapter), 
were certainly reflected in its stance during the rounds of negotiations which 
took place in 1958. After Egypt had been able to overcome its financial 
difficulties towards the end of 1957, its desperate need for its blocked balances 
in the U.K. subsided, as did its need to resume trade with the U.K. — needs 
arising from the dislocations which had plagued the Egyptian economy after 
Suez. [10] This allowed the Egyptian government and its negotiators the 
chance to try to seek a good agreement (on economic and financial grounds), 
rather than just any agreement which allowed for the resumption of current 
trade and the return of any part of Egypt’s blocked balances held in the U.K.
Therefore, Egypt no longer backed its own offer to the U.K. government in 
May 1957 (which the U.K. at the time had refused) of de-sequestrating British 
properties in return for the resumption of trade between the U.K. and Egypt. 
[11] When Egypt failed to reach even a mildly satisfactory agreement at the 
end of 1957, it decided to revive xenophobic nationalistic feelings against the 
U.K., stating that the latter had tried to infringe on Egyptian independence and 
dignity, and thus shifting the blame from the Egyptian government to the 
imperialist policy of the United Kingdom. This was shown by the response to 
the failure of the financial talks in the Egyptian Press in December 1957. Less 
than two weeks after the Rome negotiations broke down, Egypt’s most widely 
circulated weekly paper, Akhbar al-Yawm, printed a front-page article about 
the failure by the paper’s economics editor Sa‘id Sonbul, who had been the 
only Egyptian journalist present with the Egyptian delegation in Rome. The 
article strongly attacked the U.K. for the failure of the Rome financial talks and 
asserted that they had broken down because the U.K.’s request for neutral
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(third party) arbitration for claims of compensation for the actions of the 
sequestrator was an attempt to infringe on Egypt’s independence and dignity. 
The article continued with a veiled threat, stating that if these talks finally 
failed, it would mean that the remaining British assets in Egypt would be 
Egyptianised and their U.K. owners would not receive the value of their 
property. It also included a threat to Egyptianise the British oil companies in 
Egypt, a threat directed at the Shell Oil Company, the biggest single claim 
amongst the British properties sequestrated in Egypt. Akhbar al-Yawm  went 
on to say that such a result would mean the loss of all British interests in Egypt, 
as well as the loss of the Egyptian markets and the ruin of any hope of 
resuming diplomatic relations. [13] The importance of this article was not 
merely its prominence in a leading Egyptian paper, a paper owned and 
managed by Mustapha and Ali Amin who were — at that time — close 
confidants of President Nasser. The significance of the article was mainly that it 
was an indirect message from the Egyptian government to the U.K. about what 
the U.K. might expect if the negotiations failed. Indeed, the information in that 
article was given to the journalist through private briefings by the head of the 
Egyptian delegation in the talks, as well as by other senior officials in the 
Egyptian Ministry of Finance. [14]
Signs of the hardening of the Egyptian position were not limited to reports in 
the Egyptian press. At the beginning of 1958 a source close to President 
Nasser, Emil Bustani, informed a U.K. ally (the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo) 
that Nasser felt that the Anglo-Egyptian financial talks had finally broken 
down — and not merely stopped for consultations between the delegates and 
their governments, as had been announced by the leaders of the two
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delegations in December 1957. This was combined with what the French saw 
as a sudden hard-line stance from Egypt during the Franco-Egyptian financial 
talks. The United Kingdom did not know whether this was actually a new 
Egyptian hard-line position, or whether it was a tactical move by the Egyptian 
government to obtain more gains as a price of signing the financial agreements 
and resuming diplomatic relations with the two governments. [15]
When this information reached the Foreign Office, it aroused interesting 
comments which exposed the thinking of some of the U.K. negotiators at the 
time. For though deciding that such a report should not be taken too seriously, 
as it could be a tactical attempt by the Egyptians to obtain a “stiffer price on 
resumption than they would have settled for in December”, the Head of the 
African Department at the Foreign Office, who had participated in the financial 
negotiations in Rome earlier the previous month, concluded reproachfully that 
"This was one of the reasons I wanted to take what we could get before 
leaving Rome.” [16]
m  THE NEGOTIATIONS
The negotiations between the U.K. and Egypt resumed during the first month 
of that year. The structure of the negotiations in 1958 was as loose as that of 
the previous round in 1957, although the British government did term them 
financial negotiations and not merely financial talks. Most of the negotiations, 
which took place in January, February-March, June, July-August and 
September 1958, were held in Rome, During most of the negotiations, the 
British delegation was headed by Sir Denis Rickett of the Treasury and 
including Mr. Colin Crowe of the Foreign Office. The Egyptian side was 
headed by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, Mr. Hassan Abbas
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Zaki, in the early rounds of the talks, until he was promoted to become a 
minister involved with home affairs, when he was replaced by Dr. Emary, the 
Governor of the National Bank of Egypt. A representative of the Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was rarely present, as the negotiations were 
considered by the Egyptian government to be covering purely technical and 
financial matters.
The pattern of these rounds of negotiations was set by the structure of the first 
round, January 30-31, 1958, and could be summarised as follows: the Egyptian 
representative started the negotiations by stating the new position of his 
government regarding the British proposals submitted in the previous round. 
That usually represented a hardening of the Egyptian position in the 
negotiations. This was followed by an Egyptian request for the British 
delegation to hand him the British proposals in the form of a draft agreement so 
that he could return with it to Cairo and come back with his government 
response.
The hardening of the Egyptian position was demonstrated prominently by the 
insistence on payment of war damages by the U.K. to Egypt for the Suez War. 
This was coupled with a refusal to budge on any of the points under 
contention, mainly a refusal to accept any liability for damage to the 
sequestrated property, maintaining that it was a matter to be decided by the 
Egyptian courts. The Egyptian delegation also refused to accept a general 
formula proposed by the British side about U.K. rights and interests (other than 
property); a point was raised regarding the conditions under which British 
property would be desequestrated — i.e. freeing the firms returned to their
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British owners from liability or impediments imposed on them under 
sequestration. Egypt flatly refused to give a commitment to return the U.K. 
property to the status quo ante. [17]
The British delegates at the first round of these talks proposed the idea of a 
partial agreement — i.e. an agreement which dealt mainly with the 
compensation for Egyptianised properties and which left aside governmental 
claims. The proposed partial agreement also avoided the question of the 
compensation for damage done to sequestrated property (which was to be 
returned to its rightful owners under this agreement). [18] Under this proposed 
agreement, the U.K. would only release the assets in the Number One account, 
which contained the smaller part of the Egyptian blocked balances, while 
keeping most of the Egyptian balances (in Number Two Account) blocked 
until the claims for compensation for sequestrated property damage were 
settled. This proposal was submitted to the Egyptian delegation on January 31, 
in the form of a draft agreement (at the request of the head of the Egyptian 
delegation Mr. Hassan Abbas Zaki). [19] It was designed to try to override the 
problem of neutral arbitration on the sequestrated properties, which the 
Egyptian delegates had adamantly refused in the previous year. It was also 
designed to circumvent the problem introduced by Egypt’s insistence on the 
payment of war damages by the U.K. (which the United Kingdom could not 
accept).
The idea of a partial agreement was appealing to the U.K. because it permitted 
them to reach an agreement with Egypt and resume diplomatic and commercial 
relations. It allowed them to break the impasse resulting from differences in the 
above-mentioned points, without having to make any concessions regarding
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them. Even more attractively, it also allowed the U.K. to maintain its hold over 
the bulk of the Egyptian blocked balances held in the Number Two account.
In addition, the financial negotiations also covered other technical aspects of 
the problems between the two states, namely: the remittance facilities (the 
facility offered by the Egyptian government for British subjects who did not 
wish to remain in Egypt, to allow them remit their financial assets out of 
Egypt); the Egyptian request that whatever compensation Egypt agreed to 
pay to the U.K. should be in the form of securities which would mature in a 
period of up to three years; as well as the payments for the pre-zero contracts 
(a term that covered commercial and financial transactions contracted prior to 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956 and not fulfilled). On the 
first and third point, the Egyptian position was more amenable, as they had 
agreed to the payment of some of the pre-zero contracts. The Egyptian 
delegation indicated it would accept the resumption of the pre-1956 practice 
of allowing each British claimant to remit the sum of £5000. And though the 
British demanded that, after the initial cash remittances of £5000, a further 
annual remittance of the same amount should be allowed, until the entire 
balance of the assets of U.K. subjects was remitted, Treasury officials knew that 
they had little hope of the Egyptian side accepting such a proposal. 
Furthermore, they were resigned to the fact that they would have to accept 
that situation (the return of the pre-1956 remittance arrangement). Indeed, they 
justified such acceptance in their interdepartmental memos. [21] As for the 
Egyptian demand that their payment to the U.K. on account of compensation 
should be in the form of securities not realisable before three years, the British 
agreed to accept some of this in cash and the rest in securities which matured 
in one year’s time. The British officials realised that, if they went further in 
meeting the full Egyptian demand on that point, they would leave themselves
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exposed to criticism in Parliament, as well as to attempts by other nations — 
namely India, Malaya and Ghana, which held British government securities — 
to receive similar concessions. Nevertheless, they still thought that they should 
not break off the negotiations over this point. [22]
The British proposal of a partial agreement was later modified to make it even 
more acceptable to Egypt. The modification was rather cosmetic; to summarise 
it briefly: Egypt would pay a certain sum of money for compensation for the 
Egyptianised property. Egypt would also deposit with the U.K. a sum of 
money as security for compensation claims for the sequestrated property. 
Furthermore, the U.K. would allow supplementary releases from the Number 
Two account subject to the progress made by Egypt regarding these claims 
(for damage done for sequestrated property). [23] The reason the U.K. 
government amended its earlier draft was to try to make their offer more 
attractive to the Egyptians, so that financial agreement could be reached. 
Indeed, this proposal “was designed to enable the Egyptians to agree to 
postpone consideration of governmental claims”. [24]
The first serious prospect of an agreement appeared in May, when the 
Egyptian delegation indicated their wish to agree on a lump-sum settlement, in 
which all British claims for compensation for Egyptianised property and for 
damage done to sequestrated property would be met by a one-off lump-sum 
payment. [25] This avoided the thorny issue of neutral arbitration for 
sequestrated property. This proposal was first thrown in by the British 
delegation to the Rome talks in December 1957, when the difference between 
the two sides regarding arbitration and the release of part —  not all — of the 
Egyptian blocked balances had led to an impasse. The Egyptian delegation
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first indicated that they might accept a lump-sum payment in January 1958. 
However, it had then been put in the context of the Egyptian insistence on 
war damages from the U.K; the Egyptian delegation had suggested that since 
the payment of war damages would present the U.K. with the need for large 
funds, this could be offset by a lump-sum compensation payment from Egypt. 
[26] When, in June 1958, the Egyptian government finally rejected the British 
proposal for a limited financial agreement as outlined above, and proposed the 
lump-sum settlement, it was accepted by the two departments in the British 
government directly concerned with the financial negotiations with Egypt, the 
Treasury and the Foreign Office. [27]
The negotiations between the two sides now began to concentrate on one 
major point of difference — the amount of the lump sum. The British 
government at the time believed that the figure indicated privately by the 
Egyptian delegation, £25 million, was inadequate to cover the realistic (rather 
than the inflated value according to the claimants themselves) value of the 
claims. The U.K. estimated that figure to be between £40-45 million. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the Cabinet that anything less than 
around £35 million would be difficult to defend politically —  i.e. in Parliament 
— or among Arab states friendly to the U.K. Moreover, the U.K. was anxious 
not to give Egypt the opportunity to portray any agreement as a victory for 
Egypt or to accede to Egyptian demands for war damages. [28] To its allies in 
the Arab world, the U.K. intended to present the agreement and the ensuing 
resumption of diplomatic and commercial ties as a purely financial settlement 
for practical reasons, namely: compensation for the claims of British subjects 
and companies for their Egyptianised or sequestrated property. [29]
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The amount of the lump-sum settlement introduced considerable points of 
disagreement because it allowed the United Kingdom to offer to pay Egypt 
indirectly in respect of Egypt’s claims for war damages without publicly 
admitting liability for these. [30] These disputes over the amount of the lump 
sum, and the refusal of the U.K. to pay any kind of war damages, led to an 
impasse in the negotiations, which consequently broke down after the 
February-March round.
To break that impasse, the U.K. decided to kick-start the negotiations, using a 
similar method to that used by Egypt when the latter sent Colonel Hatim to 
conduct secret talks with the U.K. in September 1957. Therefore, the U.K. 
authorised Mr. Hamilton, of the Bank of England, to make a secret visit to 
Egypt in June 1958 (June 7-12) to discuss with Dr. Emary, the Governor of the 
National Bank of Egypt, the basis on which negotiations might be resumed 
between the two countries. [31] Mr. Hamilton’s visit managed to persuade the 
United Kingdom Cabinet to accept the principle of a lump-sum settlement with 
Egypt, and the Cabinet authorised the early resumption of the talks between 
the two countries on that basis. (This was made possible by a favourable report 
by the Secretary of State, which was requested by the Cabinet on May 13 
when it became probable that the Egyptian government would propose a 
lump-sum settlement, regarding the feasibility of the British government 
managing to distribute the lump sum among individual claimants for 
compensation.) [32]
Accordingly, the financial negotiations were finally resumed in Geneva (12-15 
July, 1958) between Sir Denis Rickett of the Treasury and Dr. Emary. These
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negotiations, which were mainly centred on the amount of the lump-sum 
settlement, managed to narrow the difference between the two countries. The 
British delegation insisted that Egypt pay at least £40 million, while Egypt’s 
official offer was £10 million. However, the chief Egyptian negotiator, Dr. 
Emary, indicated privately to Mr. Hamilton — when the latter was in Egypt 
during the previous month — that he believed that he might increase that offer 
to £25 million. [33] At the end of these negotiations, the Egyptian offer was 
officially raised to £25 million, and meanwhile Dr. Emary indicated that he 
would recommend to his government that it be raised to £35 million, provided 
that the U.K. conceded some administrative costs which would offset or 
decrease the net amount which Egypt would finally pay. [34]
At the end of this round of talks, the delegations of both states agreed to 
resume the negotiations later the same month after consulting their 
governments. The U.K. delegation hoped that Dr. Emary would manage to get 
agreement from Nasser to increase the Egyptian offer to around £35 million, 
and that their own government would consent to raise the payment due to the 
Egyptian government for the administration of the British property to 
somewhere in the region of at least £4.5 million. This would offset the lump 
sum paid by Egypt by around £2.5 million (as £E2 million — approximately 
£1.8 m illion sterling — had already been collected by the Egyptian 
Sequestrator General as a percentage of the revenues from these properties). 
[35]
Accordingly, negotiations were resumed in Geneva from July 29 to August 2, 
1958. During this round of negotiations the two delegations settled almost all 
major points of difference, [36] so that at the end of this round there was only
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one point outstanding — the amount of the lump sum to be paid by Egypt. 
The negotiations progressed — at the outset — extremely well, to the extent 
that the leader of the Egyptian delegation was hoping to reach an agreement 
before the weekend. He informed the British delegation that he had “full 
powers to initial an agreement which, if completed by the weekend would only 
require final signature to enter into effect.” [37]
Despite this optimism, the negotiations did not result in any agreement being 
signed at that stage, due to a sudden hardening of the Egyptian position on 
the last day of the talks. It was a surprise to the British delegation to be 
suddenly informed by Dr. Emary that he could not advance on the sum of £25 
million, with sequestration charges totalling £E4.5 million (approximately £4.1 
million sterling) —  thus the net sum of compensation was in effect £22.5 
million. This sudden rigidity of the Egyptian position led to the negotiations 
breaking up over the amount of the lump sum. But despite the fact that the 
second round of negotiations held in Geneva did not result in an agreement 
over the last point of difference, the amount of the lump sum, it still managed to 
produce a draft of an agreement acceptable to both delegations — excluding 
the amount of compensation money to be paid. In fact the U.K. delegation 
believed that Emary had received new instructions from Cairo to the effect that 
“no concessions” were to be made. Indeed, Emary mentioned as much to his 
U.K. counterpart, Sir Denis Rickett. [38]
The U.K. in August 1958 was extremely keen to reach this financial agreement 
with Egypt, for financial or technical reasons, as well as political reasons. The 
U.K. wanted to reach an agreement even when the amount of compensation 
offered was much less than the value of the U.K. property and below the
210
expectations of the British government and the owners of the properties. On 
the financial side, the U.K. doubted whether it could get better terms or a 
greater amount of compensation from the Egyptians. The British government 
believed that the sequestered property would continue to deteriorate the 
longer it remained under the management of the Egyptian government, and 
wanted to regain control of these assets to prevent their value from dropping 
even further. Moreover, an agreement meant the recovery of the Shell property 
in Egypt, valued at £171.5 million out of a total claim of £210 million, which 
was pending signing a financial agreement.
On the political side, the Cabinet, in its 67th meeting on August 12, 1958, 
recognised that there were strong political and economic advantages to be 
gained by the conclusion of an agreement which would enable the resumption 
of commercial and diplomatic relations with Egypt. [39] The British officials 
involved in the negotiations wanted to conclude an agreement with Egypt at 
that point in time. They saw two main arguments against doing so. The first 
was that an agreement with Egypt would put £40 million pounds at Nasser’s 
disposal, at a time when he was causing the U.K. and the West a great deal of 
political difficulty and when he was suffering from economic problems 
resulting from Egypt’s shortage of foreign exchange. [40] The second was that 
it was not going to be an incentive to Nasser to stop causing the U.K. damage 
in the Middle East.
On the other hand, British officials believed that there was a host of reasons in 
favour of concluding an agreement with Egypt. They believed that, in the 
absence of such an agreement, the U.K. was losing £10 million annually of 
trade with Egypt to the Germans and Japanese, who were attempting to take
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the place of the U.fein the Egyptian market. In addition, the U.K. needed both 
Egypt and Syria for their commercial sea and air communications. They also 
feared that the longer the negotiations lasted, the less hope there would be of 
ever reaching an agreement with Egypt (as in the case of the U.S.-China 
rupture, which continued for decades without an agreement between the two 
states). Furthermore, British officials believed that they needed diplomatic 
representation in Egypt so as to be able to talk directly to the Egyptians and 
observe developments at first hand. Additionally, they were aware that the 
state of the British property in Egypt was deteriorating, which meant that the 
longer they waited to sign an agreement, the more it would cost the U.K. in 
terms of its own compensation payment to the claimants. Finally, and most 
importantly, British officials believed that they had no option but to conclude 
an agreement with Egypt because, if they failed to do so, the only course of 
action available to the British government — due to pressure from the 
claimants for compensation — was either to seize the Egyptian assets, an 
option which was unacceptable because of its serious consequences for 
confidence in sterling, or to pay full compensation to the claimants from the 
Exchequer, an option which was also unacceptable because of the heavy 
liability of such a course of action to the British government. [41]
What prevented the U.K. in August of 1958 from accepting the Egyptian terms 
and signing the financial agreement was the fear that the Egyptian government 
did not want to sign a final agreement at that particular time. There were 
several signs that led them to that belief; the U.K. representative in the 
negotiations w ith Egypt formed the impression that the Egyptian 
representative had received last-minute instructions from Cairo to make no
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concessions. This impression was confirmed from other sources. The U.S. 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State, on his way back from the Middle East, told 
the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, that Nasser had indicated that he was not 
keen to improve relations with the U.K. at that time. Therefore the U.K. 
Cabinet, particularly the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
did not want to agree to the Egyptian terms at a time when Egypt was not 
prepared to sign the agreement anyway, so as to avoid being in a worse 
bargaining position vis-a-vis Egypt. [42] The Prime Minister, Macmillan, took 
the view that it was important to conclude an agreement even at the Egyptian 
figure because it “would serve our interests by enabling us to recover 
possession of sequestered property and to resume normal commercial and 
diplomatic relations with Egypt.” Macmillan even proposed “to consider to 
open the next round of negotiations by tabling a draft agreement whose 
detailed terms would be acceptable to the Egyptians and concentrating 
discussions purely on the sum to be paid.” [43]
The impasse which blocked the agreement between the two states at the 
beginning of August had convinced the U.K. Cabinet that they should not 
attempt to reach yet another compromise with the Egyptians at a time which 
they felt that Egypt did not want to sign an agreement. Moreover, the U.K. 
Cabinet decided they should not make any fresh attempt to restart the financial 
negotiations with Egypt. [44] The British ministers and officials negotiating 
with Egypt feared that if they made any initiative to restart the talks they 
would weaken their position. This created a deadlock, especially since Egypt 
was not eager to restart the negotiations, or indeed to make any concessions, at 
a time when British forces were in Jordan.
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The deadlock was only broken through the good offices of the United Nations 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjoeld. To try to stimulate the situation, the 
British Foreign Secretary met his Egyptian counterpart, Dr. Mahmud Fawzy, in 
Mr. Hammarskjoeld’s office on August 21, 1958. During that meeting, Dr. 
Fawzy expressed his hope that the difference between the two states might be 
bridged and indicated that a compromise could be reached on the suggested 
compensation figure. Both ministers agreed that financial negotiations should 
restart as soon as possible. [45]
That meeting resulted in the negotiations starting again in Rome on September 
3, British officials were so encouraged by the position of Dr. Fawzy that they 
thought that this round of negotiations would result in reconciling the 
differences between the two sides over the agreement. Foreign Office officials 
were so concerned and optimistic that they objected to Treasury demands that 
the leader of the U.K. delegation, Sir Denis Rickett, should leave the Rome 
negotiations early in order to join the Treasury team in a meeting in Montreal. 
They feared this might offend the Egyptian delegation and thus jeopardise a 
settlement which the U.K. badly needed. [46]
However, the British delegation to these talks was surprised to be told by the 
Egyptian negotiator, Dr. Emary, the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, 
that he was entirely ignorant of the meeting between the two foreign ministers 
in New York. The British delegation were also surprised to be informed by 
Emary, while he was still waiting for instructions from President Nasser, that the 
Minister of Finance had been assured by the Egyptian Foreign Minister that 
the latter had made no offer of a compromise on the basis of splitting the 
difference between the Egyptian and British figures, and that he had not
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intended to imply that the Egyptian offer for compensation might be increased. 
Indeed, the British delegation were convinced that the Egyptian negotiator 
knew that his offer, which he described as final, had little chance of being 
accepted. [47]
The Egyptian position at that round of the negotiations made it clear to the 
British officials that, unless Egypt changed its stance, there was no hope of 
reaching a financial agreement in the immediate future. In fact, this prompted a 
Foreign Office view that it might be better to try to establish diplomatic 
relations with Egypt before reaching a financial agreement. [48] The 
uncompromising attitude of the.Egyptian negotiator at that round of talks 
suggested that Egypt definitely did not want to reach an agreement with the 
U.K. For not only did the Egyptian negotiator refuse to advance on his initial 
offer of £25 million (the offer he had submitted during the previous round of 
the negotiations July 29-August 2, 1958), but he even demanded a 10-year 
loan from the U.K., at nominal interest, of a sum greater than the amount of the 
net compensation which Egypt was to pay to the United Kingdom. In addition, 
though the draft text of the agreement had mostly been agreed during the 
previous round of the talks, Dr. Emary made fresh objections on points the 
United Kingdom considered to be substantive. [49]
The failure of this round of negotiations led in effect to the United Kingdom 
temporarily halting direct approaches to Egypt to restart the financial 
negotiations or reach an agreement. The U.K. believed that the main reasons 
for the toughening of the Egyptian position were the accommodating attitude 
of the British delegation [50] and the presence of British troops in Jordan. [51] 
This led the United Kingdom to try yet another way to bring Egypt to the
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negotiating table without prejudicing their bargaining position. It began to 
actively seek mediation to bring the two countries closer together, and 
engaged the help of two mediators. The first was the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, who had intervened previously to get the two sides talking. It 
was thought that he might help in convincing Egypt of the need for diplomatic 
relations with the U.K. The second and most important intermediary was Mr. 
Eugene Black, the President of the World Bank, who was known to be 
listened to by Nasser. [52] In fact, the British government decided to engage 
the efforts of Mr. Black. This decision by the Cabinet was qualified with the 
stipulation that Mr. Black’s efforts should be conducted with as little publicity 
as possible, and that it should be understood that the U.K. regarded his efforts 
as mediation on its behalf rather than arbitration, which would leave the United 
Kingdom freedom of manoeuvre if it did not like any of Mr. Black’s proposals, 
especially regarding the way Egypt should pay the lump sum. [53]
IV NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF THE REGIONAL 
CONFLICT ON BILATERAL ISSUES
In 1958, major events and developments occurred in the Middle East, as well as 
in the field of bilateral relations between the U.K. and Egypt. An examination 
of these developments sheds some light on the dynamics of the relations which 
had developed between the two states. On the one hand, 1958 witnessed the 
escalation of the foreign policy conflicts between the two states into a full­
blown regional confrontation between Egypt and the West (including the 
U.K.). On the other hand, in that very same year, the negotiations which had 
taken place between representatives of both countries had almost led to the 
signing of an agreement to settle the problems between them in the realm of
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bilateral relations. Indeed, it was during the peak of the regional competition in 
the Middle East that the two countries had come so close to settling their 
differences and been prepared to restore diplomatic ties. This is exceptionally 
relevant, in the light of the fact that it was the foreign policy conflicts which 
had led to the destruction of the bilateral relations between the two states in 
the first place. The U.K. was willing to restore its relations with Egypt, even 
though this entailed Nasser’s regaining possession of over £40 million of the 
Egyptian blocked balances in the U.K., an act which would have solved 
Egypt’s foreign exchange problems. In fact the U.K. was willing to allow 
Nasser to regain his assets in July 1958, at a time when he was causing 
maximum damage to U.K. interests in the Arab world.
That year witnessed the culmination of Egypt’s active Arab policy. Egypt’s 
Arab alliance at the outset of the Suez War was comprised of Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Egypt. However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Saudi- 
Egyptian relations cooled down considerably during 1957. The struggle for 
Syria, between the West, on the one hand, and Egypt on the other, 
characterised the remainder of 1957. [53] The resolution of that struggle in 
1958 proved to be the most spectacular success of Egypt’s Arab policy up to 
that date. Some factions in Syrian politics had been pressing Egypt for unity 
since November 1957, and Nasser finally agreed to this in January 1958. The 
rapid succession of events which led to the declaration of unity between 
Egypt and Syria, after the plebiscite of February 21, and the formation of the 
United Arab Republic was Nasser’s greatest achievement. His influence in the 
Arab world reached unprecedented heights. In addition, Nasser had 
recognised, during the Suez crisis, his influence over the masses in the Arab 
world, a hold which he believed transcended the existing regimes there. [54]
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He began to utilise that power by talking directly to the masses, overruling 
governments and whatever regimes were in power at the time. He especially 
exercised this policy of overruling governments vis-a-vis countries whose 
regimes were following a pro-Western line contrary to Nasser. [55]
N asser’s power and influence over the Arab masses manifested itself 
throughout 1958. The Egyptian-Syrian Union and the formation of the United 
Arab Republic was a startling success of Nasser’s influence. However, it was 
not the only one. During the course of 1958, Nasser managed to disrupt 
governments and cause tremendous damage to hostile regimes in the Arab 
world, mostly by the power of his speeches. At the zenith of the rift between 
King Saud and Nasser in February 1958, Nasser managed to use his speeches 
to contribute to the collapse of King Saud’s power. Nasser’s speech in 
Damascus on the 25th of February, where he exposed King Saud’s role in the 
conspiracy against the resolution of the Egyptian-Syrian Unity, [56] created 
such problems for King Saud that by March of that year he had to delegate all 
powers of state to the Crown Prince Faisal, in a last attempt to save the ruling 
regime in Saudi Arabia from collapse. [57] Moreover, Nasser managed to topple 
the cabinet of Prime Minister Morgan in Iraq solely by the pressure generated 
in that country by a fiery speech by Nasser; indeed that speech was the only 
pressure Egypt exerted on Morgan’s government, as Egypt was not engaged 
in any other overt or covert action against Morgan at the time. [58]
The wave of pro-Nasser feeling in the Arab world which was unleashed by the 
formation of the U.A.R. began to cause problems for Western interests 
throughout the region. The first result was the decline in the power of King 
Saud. However, there was an improvement in Egyptian-Saudi relations, due to 
the good relations between Crown Prince Faisal and Nasser.
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This did not mean that Saudi Arabia fell under the influence of Nasser, for the 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States (which was opposing 
the spread of Nasser’s influence in the Arab world) remained strong. The pro- 
Western government which became destabilised as a result of that unity was 
Lebanon. The formation of the U.A.R. unleashed strong pressures within 
Lebanon to join Egypt and Syria. Indeed, it has been estimated that over half a 
million Lebanese crossed the border to Syria to participate in the pro-unity 
marches and celebrations taking place in Syria in February and March 1958. 
[59] This prompted the West, especially the United States, to try to counter 
Nasser’s influence in Lebanon, and the C.I.A. spent over $50 million in 
propaganda and a covert action program to prevent Lebanon from joining the 
U.A.R. At the same time Shamoun, the President of Lebanon, portrayed the 
opposition he was facing in trying to change the Lebanese constitution to 
permit his re-election for a second period as a fight between himself, as the 
defender of Western interests, and the Christians in Lebanon. This internal 
debate was blown up out of all proportion by the Lebanese president, into a 
regional confrontation, in order to save his power and position and to try to 
ensure his re-election prospects. [60] In addition, Shamoun requested the 
support of the United States, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, and asked for 
U.S. troops to save Lebanon from communist-led insurgences. The official 
request for such intervention was received in the middle of June 1958, but 
Shamoun had been privately asking the United States government for it since 
May. [61]
By that time, the summer of 1958, the U.K. believed that Nasser was causing 
maximum damage to the interests of the U.K. and the West in the Middle East.
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The foreign policy clashes between the two states had finally developed into a 
fully-fledged regional conflict between Nasser and the U.A.R., on the one 
hand, and the U.K., the U.S. and the pro-Western regimes in the Arab world, on 
the other. The pro-Western Arab states were Iraq and Jordan, who had formed 
the Arab Federation (the union which was created by both states to try to 
counter the unity between Egypt and Syria and the creation of the United 
Arab Republic). The U.K. believed Nasser was fostering dissension and 
political instability in these states as well as in the trucial states of the Gulf. 
With the creation of the United Arab Republic in February of that year, Egypt 
had intensified its efforts to try to shake pro-Western regimes in the Arab 
world. The U.K. believed that the instability in Lebanon, which almost led to 
the outbreak of full-fledged civil war in May 1958, was due to Egypt’s efforts. 
The U.K., from the beginning of July, called for a joint effort with the United 
States to try to counter Egyptian pressure and infiltration in Lebanon. [62]
Just prior to the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution on July 23, the entire 
foundation of United Kingdom alliances in the Middle East began to shake. It 
started with the Iraqi coup on July 15. The fall of Iraq represented a major 
setback for the United Kingdom’s Middle East policy. The reason was not just 
because of the death of one of the major and most reliable of the U.K. allies in 
the Middle East, namely the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, or even the 
burning of the British Embassy in Baghdad and the death of a British member 
of the staff. More importantly, the fall of Iraq represented the fall of the only 
reliable partner that the United Kingdom had hoped to use in its effort to 
combat Egypt and defend the declining British position. From the mid-1950s, 
the British government knew that it needed a partner within the region to help 
it combat the rising Egyptian influence in the Arab countries. [63] British
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policy makers were convinced that their “only effective measure seemed to be 
the creation of an Arab bloc led by Iraq”. [64]
Evidence of such a policy in action appeared throughout the mid-1950s, 
starting with the creation of the Baghdad Pact, the constant attempts by the 
U.K. to bolster the power and standing of Iraq and later in 1958, when the U.K. 
supported the “Arab Federation” , which Iraq formed with Jordan as a 
counter-measure against the U.A.R. The loss of Iraq had two major 
implications. Firstly, it meant that the pro-Nasserite camp led by Egypt was 
gaining ground over the U.K. and its allies in the region. Secondly — but more 
important — it meant the failure of the policy designed to counter Egyptian 
influence because of the fall of the main and only credible opponent to 
Egyptian influence — Iraq. The U.K. feared that the negative developments it 
was facing in the Middle East were all engineered by Nasser. The U.K.’s initial 
reaction was to try to mobilise the support of the U.S., France and the 
Commonwealth countries for a major intervention in the Lebanon, Iraq and 
Jordan to prevent what it believed to be insurgences instigated by Egypt, [65] 
insurgencies which would lead to the loss of the entire Middle East. [66] And 
though the United Kingdom may not have necessarily believed that Nasser 
was involved in actually plotting the coup d’etat in Iraq, it still was convinced 
that this result (i.e. the Iraqi coup) was one that Nasser had exerted maximum 
efforts to obtain. Furthermore, it was convinced that Nasser’s attempts at 
undermining the Iraqi regime had contributed directly to the fall of the Iraqi 
government in the bloody coup of 1958. [67]
The U.K. government was alarmed by the reports which it was receiving from 
the Middle East, whose gist was that Nasser was trying to implement a grand
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design to control the Arab world and eliminate U.K. and Western standing in 
the Middle East. This design included toppling King Saud from the throne and 
replacing him with Faisal (though Saud had delegated Faisal in March to run 
the affairs of Saudi Arabia, he remained on the Saudi throne), overthrowing the 
Lebanese government and creating a Jordanian Palestinian government to 
pressurise King Hussein and stopping the supply of petroleum passing through 
the T.A.P. Line in Syria. [68]
The reaction of the U.K. to the rise in Egypt’s influence in the Arab world and 
the decline of its own influence in 1958, compared with its reaction to the same 
variables in 1956, shows that a drastic change seems to have occurred. In 1956 
a considerably less significant event — the dismissal of General Glubb — had 
led the United Kingdom into an extreme anti-Egyptian policy which had led it 
in the final analysis to forfeit the gains achieved in the area of bilateral relations 
between Egypt and the U.K., the Sudan Agreement of 1953, and the 1954 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement, in favour of the regional conflict between Egypt 
and the U.K. In 1958, however, when a major confrontation took place 
between Egypt and what the U.K. perceived as the entire Western interest in 
the Middle East, the outcome was quite different. In 1956, the threat was the 
possible loss of Jordan to Egypt. But in 1958, the reality was that Egypt 
gained Syria and the U.K. lost Iraq. In addition there was also a threat of civil 
war in Lebanon, which prompted United States military intervention, as well as 
the threat that the U.A.R. might make a military move against Jordan, or that 
some of Nasser’s sympathisers in the Arab Legion might to try to stage a coup 
d ’etat against King Hussein, which led the U.K. to send troops to the support 
of King Hussein in Jordan.
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Nevertheless, and despite the active Egyptian Arab policy which the U.K. 
believed to be fostering insurgencies which might lead to the entire loss of the 
Middle East, [69] the U.K. did not even contemplate forfeiting bilateral 
relations with Egypt because of this regional conflict. Indeed, while it was 
underway the U.K. was actively pursuing negotiations with Egypt to reach a 
financial settlement. It was during that confrontation between the two states 
that the U.K. sent Mr. Hamilton of the Bank of England from 7-12 June to try 
secretly to reactivate the financial negotiations between Egypt and the U.K. 
[70] The result of this mission was the U.K.’s decision to resume negotiations 
with Egypt to try to reach an agreement allowing for the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two states. This occurred while British forces 
were on maximum alert in Cyprus, ready to intervene in the Lebanon in case of 
a direct Egyptian military intervention there. [71]
Certainly the major negotiations (described earlier in this chapter), in which the 
British government was actively seeking a treaty and resumption of relations 
with Egypt, occurred at the climax of the conflict between the two states. This 
was the case even though at the time British troops were in Jordan trying to 
shore up the position of King Hussein against any possible attempt by Egypt 
at subversion and infiltration. The U.K. position can best be summarised in the 
words of a British diplomat who worked resolutely in favour of the 
reconstruction of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship, the late Mr. Colin Crowe, 
when he briefed Mr. John Greville Beith, the Counsellor at the United 
Kingdom Embassy in Paris, [72] on how to reply if the French government 
enquired whether the confrontation between the U.K. and U.A.R. in Lebanon 
might have harmed the prospects of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement. The U.K. 
response was to be “that we consider that a financial agreement on British
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property and related matters should still be pursued on its merits, and the re­
establishment of a foot-hold in Cairo by means of an agreement becomes even 
more desirable with the passage of time: we have been finding our absence 
from Cairo an increasing handicap.” [73]
That position expressed by Colin Crowe is extremely important for two 
reasons. The first part of that statement, “that we consider...on its own merits”, 
illustrates in no uncertain terms that the U.K. had finally come to realise that 
problems related to its bilateral relations with Egypt should be divorced from 
the clashes in the foreign policies of the two states. The second part of that 
statement confirms that the more powerful a country appears to be becoming, 
the more the advantages to others of re-establishing formally correct relations 
with it and the stronger their desire to do so, even if it means paying a financial 
price. And indeed, that latter belief was not limited to the U.K. Among the 
major factors that had convinced the Egyptian government to pursue an 
agreement with the U.K. since 1958 was their belief that they had to establish 
some formal contact with the U.K., especially since the U.K. was a major player 
in the politics of the region, a power that could not be ignored. [74]
VI PRESSURES ON THE UNITED KINGDOM 
TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
The course of the negotiations in 1958 illustrates unequivocally the will and 
the desire of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with Egypt, regardless 
of the political and regional conflicts which reached their peak during the same 
period. There were several reasons for this desire, reasons which influenced the 
way the United Kingdom viewed the negotiations as well as its relentless
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efforts to achieve an agreement. They could be classified into two main areas. 
The first was concerned with factors strictly limited to bilateral relations 
between Egypt and the U.K. These factors included the internal pressures 
exerted on the U.K. government because of: the plight of the British evacuees 
from Egypt; the state of the British property in Egypt, the need to resume trade 
with Egypt and the concern over the U.K.s oil supply. The other set of reasons 
concerned the regional dimension and were not directly related to the bilateral 
relations between the U.K. and Egypt. They included: the Franco-Egyptian 
financial settlement, the success of the Egyptian Arab policy during that period 
and the effects they had on these negotiations.
A Internal Pressures 
1 — British Evacuees From Egypt
One of the major negative results of the Suez affair was unquestionably the 
plight of the British evacuees from Egypt whose property and assets were 
Egyptianised or sequestrated after the Suez War by Presidential Proclamation 
Number 5. This issue was of paramount importance to the British ministers and 
therefore to the British officials who were responsible for relations with Egypt 
at the time and those who conducted the negotiations with Egypt. The 
problems related to the British property in Egypt were entwined with the 
problems of the British evacuees, and it was an issue which commanded public 
and powerful political sympathy in the U.K. for two reasons. Firstly, the public 
and the members of both Houses of Parliament sympathised with the plight of 
the “small men” — a term which consistently appeared in the Cabinet 
discussions as well as memoranda of officials, and which referred to those 
whose entire life savings had been expropriated by the Egyptian government.
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Secondly, substantially powerful British concerns were also requesting 
compensation for expropriated property and assets. Indeed one such claim, the 
Shell Claim, was the major stumbling block to concluding an agreement 
between the two countries. [75]
The plight of the British evacuees not only commanded public sympathy but 
also the support of some powerful Conservative Party figures such as Lord 
Salisbury, a former senior Conservative Cabinet Minister. He wrote to the 
Secretary of State regarding the Egyptian refugees on June 11, 1958. [76] and 
also led a deputation to see the Secretary of State on the afternoon of July 3, 
1958, to complain about their plight. The refugees and their supporters were 
exerting a great deal of pressure on the British government with two 
contradictory demands: for the U.K. to get the maximum compensation and the 
best terms from the Egyptian government, and for a quick settlement with 
Egypt. This naturally put the British negotiators in a dilemma, because 
pursuing the first demand might mean waiting to receive the best possible 
terms from the Egyptian government, which would risk undermining the 
second demand regarding a quick settlement. [77] The refugees and their 
pressure groups criticised the government for the long and protracted 
negotiations it had with Egypt without reaching a settlement. They pressed the 
government to seize the Egyptian balances in the United Kingdom, or accept 
to pay full compensation for the British refugees from Egypt. [78]
To seize the balances was clearly unacceptable, as it would result in the U.K. 
losing any hope of restoring relations with Egypt and the loss of the Egyptian 
market for a very long time. Moreover, it would shake confidence in sterling. 
Further, the value of the balances, £70 million, was insufficient to cover the
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entire British property in Egypt, which was valued at £130 million. The second 
option, paying full compensation for the refugees from the Exchequer, was also 
unacceptable, as it would commit the British government to a heavy liability 
(£130 million). Additionally for the British government to assume the 
responsibility for making good the loss of British citizens’ property abroad 
would set a bad precedent.
The Cabinet was preoccupied with this issue. On more than one occasion there 
were debates and/or questions regarding it in both Houses of Parliament. To 
ease the hardship of the refugees without prejudicing the U.K.’s position in its 
negotiations with Egypt, the U.K. designed an Ex-Gratia Loan Scheme in
1957. However, when political pressures on the government increased in 1958 
in the absence of an agreement with Egypt, it was forced to examine ways of 
extending the scope of the loan scheme to increase the cover given to the 
refugees. [79] Therefore, on October 30, 1958, the British Cabinet approved 
and announced in Parliament another scheme of ex-gratia advances for 
compensation for the personal and business claims of the British evacuees from 
Egypt. The total cost of the scheme was £3 million. The U.K. believed that this 
scheme weakened its bargaining position vis-a-vis Egypt, but it also believed 
that it was essential, to save the government further criticism from the British 
public, which was sympathetic to these claims. [80] However these ex-gratia 
advances were so heavily criticised as inadequate that the government was 
threatened with a defeat on the issue in the House of Lords on November 12. 
This compelled the Cabinet to indicate in the House of Lords that the 
government was prepared to consider according special treatment to cases of 
exceptional hardship. [81] This kind of pressure made the government increase 
the public funding for this loan scheme to around £9 million [82], a drastic 
change from what it had originally envisaged.
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2 — Trade with Egypt
Am ongst the factors which persuaded the British government to try to seek a 
financial agreement and resume relations with Egypt was the issue of trade and 
commercial relations. In fact, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer spoke in 
the House of Commons (March 16, 1959) about the advantages of the treaty 
which was eventually signed with Egypt, among his main arguments in 
defence of the treaty was that it would allow for the return of British 
companies to Egypt. He cited the total British exports to Egypt in 1955, prior 
to the Suez crisis (around £28 million). [83]
Trade with Egypt influenced the United Kingdom government from several 
points of view, namely: the need to export to Egypt so as not to lose the 
Egyptian markets to competitors, the need to import certain commodities from 
Egypt; and the inability to enforce a strict trade embargo on Egypt as a way of 
exerting pressure. The British government regretted its earlier refusal, in May 
1957, to accept the Egyptian offer of a resumption of trade between the two 
countries in return for desequestration of British property in Egypt. [84] The 
issue of the U.K.’s return to the Egyptian market put considerable pressure on 
the British government, especially in 1958. The memoranda of British officials 
concerning negotiations with Egypt, as well as the conclusions of Cabinet 
meetings about the same subject, show an overriding concern that the delay in 
signing a financial treaty with Egypt was costing the United Kingdom 
between £10 and £14 million a year in terms of lost exports to Egypt, and a fear 
that the longer British companies stayed away from Egypt, the more deeply- 
rooted their competitors would become in positions occupied previously by 
British concerns. [85]
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Certainly the business community in the United Kingdom had exerted 
sufficient pressure on the government to make it aware of its demands. The 
lobbying of the business community was not restricted to private briefings for 
the relevant ministers or officials. Towards the end of 1958 a new high- 
powered body was formed with top-level representation from major British 
firms such as Shell, I.C.I., the British Bank of the Middle East etc., under the 
chairmanship of the Minister of State, Board of Trade. Its Foreign Office 
member was the Mr. Roger Stevens, Deputy-Under Secretary of the Foreign 
Office, who noted, at one of their meetings on December 1, 1958, that the 
predominant view of those present was the need to resume diplomatic relations 
with Egypt, as the current situation was damaging British interests. He was 
asked to transmit their views to the Secretary of State Selwyn Lloyd. [86] It 
was not only a question of the need to export to Egypt, but also of the need to 
import certain commodities from Egypt which were considered necessary for 
British industry, such as steatite (see Chapter Two) and long staple cotton. 
Steatite is an Egyptian raw material which was — up to 1958 — indispensable 
for the manufacture of certain electrical ceramic equipment necessary for the 
production of radar equipment. The British firms who used this component 
could not find a replacement for Egyptian steatite. The need for Egypt’s 
cotton was a direct result of the failure of the Sudan cotton crop in 1958. This 
left the United Kingdom manufacturers, who relied on long staple cotton, in a 
tight spot. For the only alternative to buying the cotton from Egypt was either 
to buy from other sources at a prohibitive price or to rely on inferior cotton; the 
end result of either would be that U.K. suppliers would lose their share of the 
international textile market. [87] And though there was no official ban on trade 
with Egypt — except on the export of military equipment —  it was prohibited 
to purchase directly from Egypt, [88] a restriction imposed after the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal in an attempt to deny Egypt the ability to
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accumulate foreign exchange. Thus British companies realised that the trade 
restrictions the U.K. had imposed on Egypt to hurt its economy and exert 
pressure on its government were, in fact, having exactly the opposite effect. 
They were exerting pressure on the United Kingdom government and causing 
damage to United Kingdom industries.
The final point which made trade a factor of pressure against the United 
Kingdom was the inability to enforce the trade sanctions which were levied on 
Egypt after the latter nationalised the Canal. The United Kingdom observed 
that the result of the trade ban on Egypt was that Eastern bloc countries were 
replacing the British position in the Egyptian markets. Moreover, it realised 
that other Western bloc companies from the United States, Japan, Germany and 
even France were competing for contracts in the Egyptian markets. Even 
worse, Commonwealth countries were themselves breaking ranks and actively 
importing from Egypt. Australia resumed commercial flight links with Egypt; 
South Africa imported Egyptian cotton and Australia was considering 
following suit etc. [89] The United Kingdom could no longer prevent its own 
firms from getting into Egypt; two British companies had agreed to work in 
Egypt on the High Dam and the Aswan Dam projects, and Standard 
Telephones was constructing a telephone network between Cairo and 
Alexandria. The U.K. government had to accede to Thomas Cook’s request for 
the sterling facilities necessary to arrange for quick tours to Egypt, and to I.C.I. 
opening a representative office in Egypt. [90]
3 — Oil
The importance of Egypt for the U.K.’s oil situation was highlighted even 
further by the Egyptian-Syrian union and the formation of the United Arab
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Republic. After the creation of the U.A.R., the routes of most of the British oil 
supplies fell under Egyptian control. These were the Suez Canal, the route for 
the oil supply from the Gulf and the refinery in Aden; and the oil pipelines 
passing through Syria (which was mainly the route for the oil supplies from 
Iraq). It had been a painful experience during the Suez War when both routes 
were blocked, and the U.K. had endured severe damages and cost. The U.K. 
calculated the extra cost that Western Europe would have to pay in 1958, if 
such a case occurred again, at around one billion dollars. The U.K. felt 
extremely vulnerable as it could see no way to put pressure on Nasser if he 
choose to block the oil supply routes. The U.K. even entertained the idea of 
exerting pressure on Nasser through threatening the supply of the Nile waters; 
however, when studied this idea proved impracticable. [91]
B External Pressures 
1 — Franco-Egyptian Agreement
The negotiations between the Arab Republic of Egypt and France to settle the 
claims against each other had a direct impact on the United Kingdom 
negotiating stance versus Egypt, since both the U.K. and France were in a very 
similar position vis-a-vis Egypt in terms of the fact that, as a result of both 
countries waging war against Egypt, the Egyptian government had 
expropriated their — and their nationals’ — property in Egypt. The separate 
negotiations which both the U.K. and France were conducting with Egypt 
were attempting to settle similar, if not identical, claims of compensation from 
the Egyptian government. At the same time, both countries were facing claims 
for war damages from Egypt. The U.K. and France had different positions of 
strength and weakness as well as different cards to deal during their
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negotiations with Egypt. Nevertheless, it was feared that any concession from 
either country to Egypt would mean that the other would face increasing 
pressure to make the same concession. The French authorities were the first to 
recognise this, and thus, when they feared that the United Kingdom might give 
in to the Egyptian insistence on refusing neutral arbitration, they submitted an 
aide memoire to the British Embassy in Paris stating their position — that it was 
important to insist on neutral arbitration —■ and emphasising their fear that for 
the U.K. to give way on this issue would create an awkward precedent. [92] 
Furthermore, it was feared that if one of the two countries managed to reach to 
an agreement with Egypt first the other would be left out in the cold. In fact, 
the leader of the British delegation to the financial negotiations with Egypt 
expressed these thoughts, during the critical round of the negotiations which 
almost led to an agreement in August 1958, when he learnt that France would 
manage to reach an agreement with Egypt first. [93]
Although it was the French who were initially concerned that any British 
negotiating concession would compromise their own negotiating position, 
what unfolded later on in the course of the same year proved to be entirely the 
opposite. France managed to beat the U.K. in reaching an agreement in August
1958. The most important and relevant aspect of the Franco-Egyptian financial 
agreement of August 1958 was the fact that France agreed to pay around 
£E30 million as war damages to Egypt. Most of that money was paid in kind, 
by France relinquishing most of its educational establishments in Egypt, such 
as the lycee schools, etc. In that agreement, most of what France requested in 
terms of compensation for Egyptianised and nationalised property and 
damages to the sequestrated property was deducted from the war damages 
which France was to pay to Egypt. Therefore, France’s payment of war
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damages was either in the form of French property which France agreed to 
leave to Egypt, or compensation claims which France agreed to relinquish. [94] 
Moreover, as the French relinquished all claims to compensation, such claims 
being offset by the war damages, France also avoided the issue of neutral 
arbitration. Nevertheless, by signing an agreement with Egypt France exerted 
even further pressure on the United Kingdom’s negotiating stance, primarily 
because France, in its eagerness to reach an agreement, had conceded most of 
the Egyptian demands. Indeed the French officials involved in these 
negotiations confided to their British counterparts that they considered the 
agreement they had reached a bad one. [95]
The Franco-Egyptian agreement had a compound effect on the British 
negotiating stand. It whetted the appetite of the Egyptian negotiators, who 
thought that they might be able to get as much, or at least nearly as much, from 
the British as their colleagues had got from the French. Secondly, it made the 
Egyptian political leadership less prone to accept their negotiators’ request for 
more concessions to the U.K. as they thought that they had already achieved 
more from France. Therefore, the Franco-Egyptian agreement increased the 
expectations of the Egyptian government and made it less prone to accept or 
offer more compromises. Indeed, this could account for the sudden Egyptian 
toughness at the end of the round of negotiations in August when the British 
delegation thought that the instructions from Cairo to the Egyptian negotiator 
were “no concessions” .
C The Removal of the Obstacles to the Agreement
The U.K., after the Suez War, was faced with two major obstacles to reaching a
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treaty and restoring relations with Egypt. The first was the absence of an 
agreement between Egypt and the Suez Canal company, the reason which 
compelled the U.K. and France to the course of action they took against Egypt 
in October of 1956. The second obstacle, which appeared during the 
negotiations, was the failure to settle the largest single claim for compensation 
in Egypt, the Shell claim. With the removal of these two obstacles the British 
government had no excuse, in the eyes of its own people, for refusing to come 
to terms with Egypt, especially since it could not cite any problem it had with 
the Egyptian offer regarding the lump sum or the terms of the treaty. This was 
due to the fear that it might later have no alternative but to accept those 
conditions; it would put the U.K. government in great difficulty internally if it 
accepted terms it had attacked earlier. Therefore, the settlement of the Suez 
Canal Company claim as well as the Shell claim paved the way for an 
agreement and increased the internal pressure exerted on the United Kingdom 
to come to terms with Egypt.
1 — Suez Canal Agreement
The first of these obstacles to be removed was the agreement between the 
Suez Canal Company and Egypt over the compensation the latter was to pay 
for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company assets. In fact, as soon as 
agreement was reached between the Suez Canal Company and Egypt, in 1958, 
diplomats in the relevant British embassies began to prepare what their line 
ought to be in explaining the inevitable resumption in the U.K.’s relations with 
Egypt. [96] Certainly this agreement, which was reached in May 1958 and 
formally signed in July of that year, whereby Egypt paid the Suez Canal 
Company the sum of £26.5 million as compensation for the nationalisation of 
its Egyptian assets, [97] removed the U.K.’s major excuse for not normalising
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its relations with Egypt. It also increased speculation about and expectations 
of a quick settlement between the two countries.
2 — Shell agreement
The second obstacle which blocked the reaching of an agreement took a 
longer time to be removed. This obstacle, the settlement between Shell and the 
Egyptian government, was a major one, as the Shell property in Egypt 
represented a huge part — £55 million — of the British property expropriated 
by the Egyptian government after the Suez War. [98] The agreement over the 
Shell claim was reached separately, through direct negotiations between Shell 
and the Egyptian government. During the Rome negotiations in February- 
March 1958, arrangements were made for a delegation from Shell to go to 
Egypt. This delegation, consisting of Shell and British Petroleum staff, went to 
Egypt from March 14 until April 9, 1958 when they submitted a draft 
agreement to the Egyptians to settle their claim. [99] The Shell negotiations 
were a protracted affair which lasted until December of that year, and though 
they were conducted directly between the Egyptian government and Shell, the 
British government negotiators kept stressing the need to settle the Shell claim 
before any agreement could be reached between the two states. [100] These 
efforts finally resulted in a private settlement between Shell and the Egyptian 
government in December 1958. However, the Shell settlement was subject to 
the conclusion of the financial agreement between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom. [101] Thus the settlement which was supposed to alleviate the 
pressure on the United Kingdom for a quick agreement with Egypt, since it 
meant the resolution of the largest single British claim against Egypt, had the 
opposite effect because the execution of that settlement was subject to the 
conclusion of the financial agreement, a factor which exerted substantial
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pressure on the U.K. in the final stages of the negotiations prior to the signing 
of the treaty. [102]
IV REMARKS ON THE EGYPTIAN 
NEGOTIATING POSITION
During the course of the negotiations in 1958, and especially in June-August, 
there were hopes and expectations from both the British and Egyptian 
delegates regarding the possibility of reaching an agreement. However, on the 
last day of the negotiations, in August, the Egyptian stand suddenly hardened, 
causing an abrupt break in the negotiations. In September, the Egyptian 
negotiators showed a position far more rigid than ever before, completely 
disregarding the positive attitude displayed by their own Foreign Minister a 
few weeks earlier in August. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, some of the 
British officials assumed that the presence of British troops in Jordan at the 
time was the reason for the new hard-line Egyptian position. This assumption 
implied that factors pertaining to regional conflict had managed, once again, to 
spill over into the field of bilateral relations between Egypt and the United 
Kingdom.
However, there are elements which suggest that this was not the case. The 
presence of the British troops in Jordan certainly increased the pressures and 
strains on the loose fabric of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that it was the regional conflict that was responsible for 
the break in the negotiations. Firstly, the negotiations between the two 
countries in June-July and early August took place against the background of 
increasing tension and conflict between the two states in the region. If the
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presence of the British troops in Jordan was the cause of damaging the 
chances of an agreement between the two states at that juncture, then it would 
have led to Egypt withdrawing its negotiators from the negotiations which 
took place in Geneva in the middle of July. Further, the Egyptian negotiator 
would not have been able to return to Geneva at the end of July expecting to 
reach an agreement. And he certainly would not have informed the British side 
that he had the authority to initial such an agreement. In the light of the way 
the Egyptian system of government worked at the time, it would have been 
unthinkable that the Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt would arrive in 
Geneva at the end of July to conduct a new round of negotiations with the 
U.K., with the authority to initial an agreement, without the explicit approval of 
Nasser.
As mentioned earlier, Nasser made all major decisions on his own. However, he 
convened sessions where his advisors and officials debated the major issues 
and decisions facing Egypt. The decision to conduct negotiations with the 
U.K. since 1957 was a triumph for those bureaucrats and technocrats among 
Nasser’s advisors who believed that relations with the U.K. were based on 
solving technical (financial issues) which would bring Egypt the acquisition of 
its blocked sterling balances in the U.K. Nasser gave the green light for those 
holding this view to proceed with an agreement. However, he was to be 
informed of every development during the negotiations. [103] Indeed, as 
Emary told the British negotiators, every decision at that time had to be taken 
by Nasser. Therefore, for the Egyptian negotiator to come to Geneva in July- 
August 1958, he had to have had a clear and direct mandate from Nasser. If he 
had failed to receive that prior to his departure, then his job was going to be 
the least important of his losses.
237
Indeed, the dispatch of U.K. troops to Jordan and the increased role of the 
United Kingdom in the region at the time became factors which increased the 
desire of the Egyptian government to come to some form of agreement with 
the U.K. Nasser believed that Egypt had become a regional power in its own 
right, “a mini-superpower” in the Middle East. [104] This self-perception made 
the Egyptian government feel that it had to deal with all the parties concerned 
in the Middle East. The British intervention in Jordan confirmed to the 
Egyptian government that the U.K. was still a major force in the Middle East, 
perhaps beaten, but still one which had to be reckoned with. This was due to 
the U.K. influence in the Gulf, in Iraq and in Libya. Egypt also believed that 
the United States, despite its rivalry with the U.K., still sought consultation 
with the U.K. because of the latter’s experience and knowledge of the Middle 
East. [105] But since Nasser was the one responsible for making any major 
decision in Egypt at the time, and as he did not write (as far is known) any 
memoirs, it is indeed impossible to know for certain whether the factor which 
prevented him from allowing the signature or the initialling of an agreement 
with the U.K. at that juncture was the presence of the British troops in Jordan. 
Nevertheless, even if this was what made him refuse a treaty, his reservations 
could have been due to the likely internal reaction to his signing an agreement 
with the U.K. at that time rather than to the regional confrontation itself. An 
agreement with the U.K. could be interpreted by Nasser’s political enemies as a 
surrender on his part because of the presence of British troops so close to 
home. His constituency then was not limited to Egypt, for it included Syria as 
well. In 1958, the only Syrian political party which refused to dissolve itself 
was the Syrian Communist Party. Its leader, Khaled Bakdash, escaped to 
Lebanon where he concentrated his efforts on trying to undermine Nasser’s 
position. Moreover, an exiled political party led by Ahmed Abul Fath, based in 
Lebanon, mounted a propaganda campaign against Nasser (with French
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support). [106] And though these groups posed no serious threat to the 
Egyptian regime, still Nasser was not necessarily keen on giving them 
ammunition to use against him.
In addition, there is another point which supports the view that it was not 
regional conflict which caused the Egyptian negotiators to balk at the last 
minute before signing an agreement. This was related to Egypt’s ability to pay 
the lump-sum compensation required by the U.K. The main point of contention 
between the British and Egyptian sides during the negotiations in 1958 was 
the amount of this lump sum. In fact, the British government and its delegation 
to the financial negotiations in Rome were surprised to find that just when 
they thought they would about to reach agreement with Egypt, the Egyptian 
negotiators either balked at the last moment or hardened their position 
suddenly without a reasonable explanation.
A feasible explanation was given to the British Foreign Office for the Egyptian 
refusal to go ahead with an agreement during the first half of 1958 by the 
London correspondent of Al-Akhbar, Zag. [107] He informed a Foreign Office 
official that the reason Egypt was not forthcoming in the negotiations with the 
U.K. was that the Egyptian officials had prepared themselves to spend a 
certain amount of funds in order to patch up relations with the West at the 
time. Thus the first priority was the amount of compensation Egypt had to pay 
the Suez Canal Company, a prerequisite to any agreement with the U.K., 
France and United States. According to the Egyptian correspondent, Egypt 
wanted to know its entire commitment, as negotiations with the Suez Canal 
Company were underway, before they settled with the U.K. [108] Another 
factor which probably influenced the Egyptian government’s decision not to
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give any concession during the July-August negotiations was the situation 
regarding the Franco-Egyptian financial agreement negotiation. As mentioned 
earlier, the fact that the Egyptian side had managed to obtain much better 
terms in the financial treaty signed with France convinced the Egyptian 
government that the terms they were offered from the U.K. were not as 
attractive. Indeed, the agreement which France and Egypt signed on August 
13, 1958 was more attractive than the proposed deal with the U.K. as it 
stipulated that France should pay Egypt war damages.
A final point, which had a direct effect on the course of the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations, was the ineptitude of the Egyptian negotiator Dr. Emary, the 
Governor of the National Bank of Egypt. In his discussions with Mr. Hamilton 
of the Bank of England, Dr. Emary mentioned privately that he thought that 
the Egyptian official offer of compensation, £10 million, could be increased to 
around £25 million. The British side took this figure of £25 million, which 
Emary had indicated privately, as a starting point in order to restart the 
negotiations with Egypt. According to what Emary told Sir Denis Rickett, he 
feared that he had made a mistake by mentioning the sum of £25 million, and 
what Emary told the British delegation in Geneva also implies this. It appears in 
fact that £25 million was the maximum Egypt was prepared to pay; but, as a 
result of Emary’s mention of this sum, British negotiators managed to use it as 
the starting bid, not the final offer. [109] Therefore, when the Egyptian 
negotiator asked his government to increase the Egyptian offer to £35 million 
they were bound to refuse, especially in the light of the Egyptian achievements 
in their negotiations with France which were conducted at the same time. Thus, 
the failure to reach an agreement in that period could be attributed to the 
Egyptian negotiator’s mistake in giving his final offer early on in the
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negotiations and in allowing that offer to be the starting offer for a 
compromise.
YII FINANCIAL AGREEMENT
The events in 1958 demonstrated that a certain role-swapping occurred 
between the U.K. and Egypt in the matter of the desire to reconstruct their 
bilateral relations. Egypt, after trying throughout the second half of 1957 to 
reach almost any kind of agreement with the U.K., re-evaluated its position and 
adopted a tough negotiating stance in order to get better terms in the financial 
agreement. The U.K. on the other hand, after re-examining its position, almost 
reversed its negotiating stance, for three reasons. First was the realisation that 
they could not bring the Nasser regime down through economic pressure, and 
that Nasser would stay in power in Egypt at least for the foreseeable future. 
The U.K. therefore knew that in solving the problems in the bilateral field with 
Egypt it had to deal with Nasser’s regime. Secondly, and as a result of that 
realisation, a re-evaluation of the strength and weakness of the British 
negotiating position showed the policy makers that the trump card they held 
over Egypt, the blocked Egyptian sterling balances, had inherent weaknesses. 
The U.K. could not seize these because of the negative implications of such an 
act on the Sterling Area and because their value was less than half the value of 
British property in Egypt. Thirdly, there were considerable internal pressures 
(from the business community wanting to export to Egypt and from the British 
evacuees from Egypt) on the British government to reach an agreement with 
Egypt.
Therefore, by the end of 1958, there was a will in both countries to reach a
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financial agreement; for Egypt also wanted that agreement as it still faced 
shortages in foreign exchange and needed to be able to export its main cash 
crop to the United Kingdom and import British goods openly. The problem 
was — as outlined earlier — the terms of such an agreement, or to be more 
precise, the amount of money which Egypt had to pay the United Kingdom as 
a lump-sum payment for the British property that had been Egyptianised, as 
well as for damages done to the sequestered property. (Another point was the 
method of payment of the lump sum: i.e. how much was to be paid immediately, 
and how much in securities maturing later. The maturity date for these 
securities was also an issue, but the issue of the method of payment was of less 
importance than the amount of compensation to be paid). As the U.K. was the 
country that was more anxious to reach an agreement, it tried to break the 
impasse in the negotiations by seeking mediation with the Egyptian 
government.
A British Attempts at Using Mediation over 
the Financial Agreement
Until the third quarter of 1958, the U.K. tried to induce Egypt to signing an 
agreement mainly through improving the British offer —  i.e. decreasing the 
minimum that the U.K. would accept as a lump-sum payment. [110] The British 
government’s efforts to persuade Egypt to reach an agreement were not 
limited to its amicable negotiating stance. A main feature of British policy at the 
time was the care that it took not to appear to insult Nasser, or to give any 
impression that it had changed its mind about wanting to reach an agreement 
with Egypt. This is most interesting, especially in that such a policy was 
executed while the U.K. and Egypt were engaged in a fierce regional conflict.
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Therefore when a Labour Member of Parliament wanted to propagate an idea, 
suggested to him by the Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, that Nasser be 
invited on an official state visit to the United Kingdom, the British response 
was surprisingly restrained. Although British officials believed the suggestion 
was “absurd”, the Foreign Office decided against shooting it down on the 
grounds of its absurdity if Mr. Yates, the Member of Parliament concerned, 
made his suggestion public as he intended. The Foreign Office decided that its 
reaction to this suggestion should be guarded, stating the reason the visit 
could not occur was that it “is not possible to invite here on an official visit the 
head of a state which H.M.G. are not in diplomatic relations” . [ I l l ]
This policy of not giving Egypt the impression that the U.K. was changing its 
attitude on the financial agreement, or toughening its restrictions against 
Egypt, was also evident in other cases. One of these concerned the travel firm 
Thomas Cook. In April of 1958, the chairman of Thomas Cook went to Egypt 
where he made an agreement to arrange for “quick trips” to Egypt for tourists 
from ships transiting through the Suez Canal. This project was against British 
policy for several reasons, both financial and political. Politically, this venture 
was contrary to British policy, which aimed at discouraging tourism to Egypt 
because it appeared to mark the return of normal relations between the two 
countries and because the U.K., in the absence of diplomatic relations and 
having no consular representation in Egypt, could not fully protect its 
nationals. [112] Furthermore, this venture meant easing the U.K.’s restrictions 
on sterling dealings with Egypt, and would give Egypt around £80,000 a year 
in foreign exchange. The British government initially refused to grant Thomas 
Cook the sterling facilities to continue executing their project. Nevertheless, it 
had to agree to grant Thomas Cook the facilities to proceed with their
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agreement with Egypt because Thomas Cook announced the details of its 
venture to the Press. The U.K. feared that if the Thomas Cook arrangement 
were abruptly cancelled due to a British government decision, this might 
jeopardise the negotiations with Egypt. [113]
However, when the British government discovered that, despite its 
compromises in the negotiations, its efforts were fruitless, it decided to try yet 
another avenue. After the failure of the negotiation rounds held in Geneva and 
Rome (August-September 1958), British officials became increasingly aware of 
the limited prospects of these negotiations. They were frustrated by the fact 
that “nothing in Egypt can be decided except by Nasser” . [115] Thus, they 
became more sceptical of reaching an agreement with Egypt through the 
existing level of negotiations between Sir Denis Rickett and Dr. Emary, the 
Governor of the National Bank of Egypt. This brought the suggestion that the 
U.K. might try to enlist the good offices of Mr. Eugene Black, the President of 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), 
who was known to be listened to by Nasser. [116] After much deliberation, the 
British government finally endorsed a proposal to engage the efforts of Mr. 
Black to try to break the deadlock in the Anglo-Egyptian financial 
negotiations.
The British Cabinet did not authorise the Chancellor of the Exchequer to 
approach Mr. Black officially, except after sounding him out first and being 
assured that he would accept the task. However, the U.K. government 
conditioned that these mediation efforts should be informal, and with as little 
publicity as possible.[117] Eugene Black agreed to mediate between the U.K. 
and Egypt after both countries requested him to do so, and his efforts began in
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earnest on December 31, 1958. The U.K. Cabinet authorised the Chancellor to 
tell Mr. Black that he could inform the Egyptian government that the U.K. 
would concede to the Egyptian request to draw £3.3. million, which was 
required as part of the compensation to the Suez Company. This concession 
was an attempt to soften the Egyptian government’s position and give Mr. 
Black’s mediation a chance to succeed. [118]
Eugene Black’s mediation proved to be invaluable in reaching a financial 
agreement between Egypt and the U.K., but it was not the only, or the first 
attempt at mediation that the U.K. had engaged in during 1958. The first 
attempt was that made by the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, when he 
engaged the efforts of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag 
Hammarskjoeld. This mediation was first attempted in August 1958, and, as a 
result, a meeting was held between the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Dr. Fawzi, 
and Selwyn Lloyd in the office of the Secretary General in New York. This 
meeting succeeded in activating the negotiations, and, as a result, the next 
round of negotiations was held in Rome in September, 1958. However, when 
that round of the negotiations failed disastrously, the British Foreign Secretary 
continued his attempts to try to engage the services of the United Nations 
Secretary General when he gave him a written message the following month, 
complaining to him about the about-face which had occurred in the Egyptian 
position. [119] Moreover, the British government had also accepted the 
mediation of President Tito to try to convince Nasser to come to terms with the 
U.K. When the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister proposed that President Tito 
should use his influence with Nasser, Selwyn Lloyd readily agreed, provided 
that Tito did not give Nasser the impression that the U.K. was desperate to
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come to terms with Egypt or that it was willing to change its bargaining 
position. The British Foreign Secretary wanted Tito to assure Nasser that the 
U.K. wanted to establish some working relationship with Egypt [120] and did 
not intend to overthrow Nasser.
B The Conclusion of the Financial Agreement
The efforts made by mediators engaged by the British government to try to 
bring Egypt to accept a financial settlement, especially those of the President 
of the World Bank Eugene Black, began to bear fruit in January 1959. Shortly 
after Mr. Black began his consultations in Cairo, on December 31, the U.K. 
gave in to another compromise with the Egyptian government in agreeing to 
send a delegation to Cairo to negotiate and sign the financial agreement. In 
fact, this request was submitted to the British delegation during the last round 
of the Rome negotiations in September 1958. [121] The President of the World 
Bank stayed in Cairo to broker the agreement between the two sides. This 
mediation led finally to the agreement being initialled between the heads of the 
delegations of the two countries on January 17, 1959 in Cairo.
According to that agreement, the major point of difference between the two 
sides, the amount of the lump sum, could only be resolved through 
compromises on both sides. During the final stages of the negotiations in Cairo, 
before the initialling of the agreement, the U.K. refused to accept less than £28 
million as the lump-sum payment. Eugene Black intervened and persuaded the 
British side to make a concession of £0.5 million as a compromise. [122] The 
final figure for the one-off compensation payment then became £27.5 million. 
At the same time the United Kingdom also accepted that only £3.5 million
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should be paid on the signing of the agreement and that the rest (£24 million) 
be be paid on February 29, 1960. [123]
However, the final conclusion of this agreement proved to be just as difficult as 
the start of the negotiations which conceived it. After it was initialled, two 
issues halted its ultimate signature, one political and one technical. The political 
issue was mainly that of diplomatic relations. At the last moment, the U.K. 
raised the resumption of diplomatic relations as a condition of the financial 
agreement. [124] The British delegation to the financial talks had, prior to their 
departure for Cairo, instructions to try to secure an agreement over establishing 
a British diplomatic mission in Cairo, and had chosen Colin Crowe, the Foreign 
Office representative in the British delegation to the financial negotiations, to 
be the charge d’affaires in Cairo when diplomatic relations were resumed. At 
the same time, it had been decided that Crowe was not to return from Egypt 
until he secured an agreement to resume relations. [125] However, this 
ambitious hope was dashed when the British government received press 
reports to the effect that the U.K. would only receive permission for consular 
relations. This prompted London to sent instructions to the British delegation 
in Cairo which hardened the British stand. The Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, ruled out the signing of an agreement unless a satisfactory 
agreement could be reached over the British diplomatic mission in Cairo. This 
meant “a proper mission, adequately staffed and with proper immunities, 
communications and diplomatic contacts with the Egyptian Government” . 
[126] The reason the British government gave to Mr. Black and the Egyptian 
government was that they felt that such a mission was essential for fulfilling 
the agreement, whether in terms of helping the British claimants for
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sequestrated property, or in terms of the re-establishment of trade. Crowe’s 
instructions were to inform the Egyptian government that even if initialling 
had taken place before the Egyptian government agreed on establishing the 
mission, British ministers would find it difficult to approve the signature of the 
treaty until the question of the mission was agreed. When it became probable 
that an agreement would be concluded, Crowe stressed the importance for the 
U.K. of establishing a diplomatic mission with proper immunities and facilities. 
Crowe also stated that the U.K. would not accept merely consular relations, 
insisting on a mission led by a charge d ’affaires and adequately staffed to 
handle the problems arising from the implementation of the agreement. [127] 
Subsequently, Crowe wrote to the Egyptian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs 
outlining the U.K.’s proposals in that regard. In his letter, Crowe explained that 
the U.K. believed that the mission should be led by a charge d’affaires and that 
the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations should be announced at the 
signing of the financial treaty. [128] Again Crowe, after the agreement was 
initialled, asked to see the Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Fawzy to ask him 
about the Egyptian governm ent’s reaction to the U .K .’s request for 
resumption of diplomatic relations. He pressed for a response on the grounds 
that the British Foreign Secretary would have to issue a statement about it 
when the financial agreement had been signed and was presented to 
Parliament. In response, Dr. Fawzy suggested that such a statement should say 
that “it is understood that diplomatic relations will be resumed as soon as 
possible”. [129] However, Fawzi said he would only accept such a statement 
on condition that particular care was taken when issuing it so as not to “create 
an unwarranted impression that there exists any relation of cause and effect 
between it (i.e. diplomatic relations) and the conclusion of the agreement” . 
[130]
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British pressures to achieve the resumption of diplomatic relations on signing 
the financial agreement were by and large unsuccessful. All the U.K. was able 
to obtain was a personal message from Dr. Fawzi to his British counterpart 
stating that the Egyptian government would find it acceptable for the U.K. 
government to appoint “a representative” for the implementation of the 
agreement, who would be accorded diplomatic immunities and facilities. [131] 
As for the resumption of diplomatic relations, Dr. Fawzi assured the British 
Foreign Secretary that it would eventually take place.
This was not the only political matter of substance which was still pending; 
there was also the question of the two British political prisoners held in Egypt 
at the time. The United Kingdom government, despite the importance it placed 
on their release, still decided the matter should not be allowed to delay the 
signing of the financial treaty. They therefore decided to raise the issue 
without linking it to the signature of the financial agreement, stating merely 
that it was an important matter for the U.K. and that its resolution would help 
improve relations between the two countries. [132]
The other issue which halted the process of signing the financial agreement 
was a technical issue, namely the definition of “land” in that agreement. The 
question arose concerning what was to be considered as Egyptianised land 
which Egypt was not to return, and for which compensation was to be paid to 
its owners by the British government out of the lump sum (the £27.5 million) 
which the Egyptian government was to pay. This problem emerged after the 
initialling of the agreement, when the text of the agreement was sent to 
London to be finally checked with the list of properties at the Foreign Office.
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The claim of one family, Smouha, was the main one under contention and it 
opened the door for a British demand that the Egyptian government include in 
the agreement — or the accompanying exchange of letters — some detailed 
commitment explaining what they considered agricultural and what building 
land and the implications of this for individual claims, including that of the 
Smouha family. [133] Negotiations regarding this issue appeared to reach an 
impasse, mainly due to the Egyptian government’s inability or unwillingness to 
supply the facts required by the U.K. delegation. [134] This was purely a 
technical hitch, for it was the U.K. which brought it forward fearing a financial 
commitment of some £12 million on the Smouha claim alone. The attitude of the 
Egyptian negotiators was not antagonistic, but nevertheless they were unable 
to meet the British delegation’s requests for the facts of the case as it appeared 
that they did not have them. [135]
This stalemate prompted the U.K. government to ask the President of the 
World Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, to act as an arbitrator in this issue, subject to 
the acceptance of the Egyptian government. For this purpose the leader of the 
British delegation to the talks, Sir Denis Rickett (who had returned to London 
after initialling the agreement), went to Washington to meet Mr. Black and 
present the U.K.’s case. The deadlock was only resolved when the U.K. finally 
accepted a draft form of an exchange of letters to be included in the treaty. 
[136] And though the draft form did not in any way satisfy the U.K.’s demands 
on the subject, [137] it was finally [138] accepted merely because it was 
believed that the Egyptian side was not going to make any advance on their 
offer, and British officials feared that if they did not sign the agreement at that 
stage they would risk everything they had gained in the agreement and might 
have to re-negotiate the whole deal again from scratch.
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Another factor putting pressure on the U.K. position was the fact that the Shell 
agreement reached the previous month (December 1958) could not be 
executed until the financial treaty was finally signed. [139] The last minor 
hurdle before the signature of the treaty concerned protocol. The Egyptian 
side designated Dr. Abd al-Moneim al-Qaissuni, the Central Minister of the 
Economy, to sign the treaty on behalf of the Egyptian government. It was then 
highly embarrassing that his counterpart signatory was to be Colin Crowe, 
whom the U.K. had chosen as the senior U.K. diplomat to stay in Cairo after 
the resumption of diplomatic relations. The Egyptian government mentioned 
this issue to Mr. Black, who passed it on with his own recommendation that 
the U.K. should send a “very senior British Official” to sign the agreement. 
[140] Although the Egyptian side did not broach the subject directly with the 
British delegation, they also gave Colin Crowe in Cairo that impression. [141] 
The point was finally resolved when the United Kingdom sent the Economic 
Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Frederick James Erroll, to Cairo where he signed 
the financial treaty with Dr. Qaissuni on February 28, 1959.
The signing of the financial treaty allowed for the resumption of the trade 
relationship between the United Arab Republic and the U.K. It also meant that 
the main obstacles to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the U.K. 
and Egypt, the settlement over the Egyptian balances in the U.K. and for 
British property in Egypt, were now finally removed. The way was clear to 
concentrate on reconstructing official and diplomatic relations between the 
two countries.
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v m  CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of 1958, the attitude of both the United Kingdom and 
Egypt towards settling their bilateral problems changed drastically. The U.K., 
on the one hand, began actively to seek an agreement with Egypt. This led the 
British government to make several compromises on its initial stand in the 
negotiations, as well as to send a representative on a secret visit to Egypt to 
break the stalemate in the negotiations. Moreover, the internal pressures on the 
British government which resulted from these problems led it to engage the 
help of mediators, such as the President of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, to convince the Egyptian government to 
settle these bilateral problems.
The Egyptian government’s position, on the other hand, also changed. This 
change was manifested by a sudden rigidity in the Egyptian stand during the 
negotiations. Egypt only became interested in signing a favourable agreement 
with the U.K. although it had been keen, in 1957, to reach an agreement of any 
kind. This Egyptian position resulted from the alleviation of the pressure Egypt 
had faced during 1957, due to its shortage of foreign exchange. The Egyptian 
position was also bolstered by the fact that it managed to reach a favourable 
financial settlement with France whereby the latter paid for war damages.
The fact that the financial negotiations and the financial settlement took place 
against a background of heightened regional confrontation between the two 
states, illustrates that the resolution of the problems in the bilateral field 
between the two states became more important to both governments than the 
clashes between their general foreign policies and the regional confrontation
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which was the main reason for souring past Anglo-Egyptian relations. Indeed, 
the problems which were created in the bilateral field during, and as a result of, 
the events of 1956 gave a raison d'etre for both countries to initiate and 
maintain contacts between themselves in order to resolve these problems. 
Moreover, it led both governments, eventually, to realise the importance of 
maintaining official links between themselves to oversee the execution of the 
settlement that they had agreed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE RESTORATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS 
I — INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom intensified its efforts to reach a financial settlement with 
Egypt in the period 1958-1959. Once this goal was achieved, there remained 
two issues that the U.K. tried to resolve. The first was the restoration of 
diplomatic relations between the two states, the second was the release of the 
two British subjects imprisoned in Egypt on charges of espionage.
The same pattern that occurred in 1958 and 1959, regarding the signature of 
the financial treaty, repeated itself in 1959-1961 regarding the restoration of 
full diplomatic relations between the two states. Once again, there were 
consistent British pressures to induce the Egyptian government to accept 
restoration of diplomatic relations in the face of an Egyptian posture that can 
best be described as reluctant. The United Kingdom employed the same 
methods it had used with regards to the financial treaty, namely a personal 
message from the British Foreign Secretary to his Egyptian counterpart and the 
efforts of mediators. The U.K. also tried to put pressure on Egypt through 
threatening to block the path of the I.B.R.D. loan to the Suez Canal project, as 
well as trying to calm down Egyptian fears about the role of the U.K. in 
undermining Nasser’s position in the Arab world.
However, though the regional conflict that existed between the two states at
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the time had not affected the financial negotiations and settlement, it did affect 
the speedy restoration of diplomatic relations, because the issues involved 
were generically different from those involved in the financial agreement. 
These issues included the effect of the historical legacies, the strength of the 
domestic constituencies involved, and the perceptions of the decision-makers 
of bilateral relations in general and their effect on their constituencies. 
Nevertheless, diplomatic relations were eventually restored to charge d’affaires 
level in December 1959. The restoration of full diplomatic relations to 
ambassadorial level finally occurred in 1961, after much delay due to the refusal 
of the U.K. to grant Egypt consular posts in some of its colonies.
The restoration of diplomatic and official relations between the two states did 
not mean that the U.K. reached a genuine reconciliation with Nasser or vice 
versa. It occurred because the severe and sudden rupture of 1956 had created 
a multitude of problems which had to be redressed, to the extent that the 
problems between the two states were settled and relations restored at a time 
that witnessed the climax of the regional conflict between them. Nevertheless, 
the restoration of relations led to an improvement in the atmosphere between 
the two states; a direct result of this was the release of the last British subject 
imprisoned in Egypt. The restoration of the relationship not only improved 
bilateral relations between the two states but also led to a decrease in the 
regional conflict between the two states, as the events in Kuwait in 1961 
proved.
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n  THE U.K.’S EFFORTS AT RECONSTRUCTING THE
OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP AND EGYPTIAN 
OBJECTIONS
The issue of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt was one on 
which the U.K. government placed great importance. As previously explained, 
since 1958 the U.K. had considered the possibility of resuming relations prior 
to the final settlement of British claims in Egypt. The U.K.’s determination to 
resume relations with Egypt was further manifested by the decision to appoint 
Mr. Colin Crowe, the Foreign Office representative in the delegation that went 
to Cairo and negotiated the financial agreement, as the Charge d’Affaires there 
when relations were restored. Indeed, the eventual reconstruction of the 
official and diplomatic relations between the U.K. and Egypt shows a 
consistent pattern of British efforts at establishing relations faced with firm 
(though gradually easing) Egyptian resistance.
A The Mission
The United Kingdom initially tried to make the financial agreement conditional 
on the resumption of diplomatic relations. Later, and as a last resort, the U.K. 
tried to establish a diplomatic mission, which it thought to be essential for the 
implementation of the financial agreement. The U.K. had to lower its sights 
from seeking the immediate resumption of relations because of the Egyptian 
position, which, while accepting the eventual resumption of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries, would only agree to start with a 
diplomatic mission for the U.K. in Egypt. The British government was informed 
by Western diplomats who had access to President Nasser that he favoured 
resumption of relations with the U.K., but in stages, fearing that an immediate
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resumption might be too drastic in the sense that it might be exploited against 
him by communist and left-wing elements in the United Arab Republic. [1]
Nasser’s concern that his relations with the U.K. might be used as a weapon 
against him by left-wing elements and communists in Egypt and Syria was 
evident during that period. This was because the greatest opposition to 
Nasser’s rule at the time appeared to be the communists in Egypt and Syria. 
Nasser believed that the enemies of the Egyptian-Syrian unity in Syria centred 
around the Syrian Communist Party. Moreover, communist activities in Egypt 
during that period intensified. This belief was strengthened by the rise of 
Qasim’s regime, which Nasser believed to be communist, in Iraq and by the 
animosity that developed between Nasser and Qasim. [2]
Several indications at the time served to soothe U.K. anxieties about the 
prospects of Egypt agreeing to resume diplomatic relations. The information 
received through the Italians, the confidence of Mr. Black that Egypt would 
agree to the immediate resumption of relations after the signature of the 
financial agreement took place [3], as well as the personal message from Dr. 
Fawzi to Selwyn Lloyd on 25 January, [4] convinced the British government 
that relations would be resumed after the agreement. Indeed, the brief prepared 
for the Economic Secretary to the Treasury F.J. Erroll, before his departure for 
Egypt to sign the financial agreement, asserted that there “should be no cause 
to discuss this” (resumption of full diplomatic relations), as the U.K. was 
“relying on an assurance by the Egyptians that diplomatic relations will be 
resumed as soon as possible following an agreement”. [5] Therefore it was 
with this in mind that the British government signed the financial treaty with 
Egypt on February 28, 1959. Mr. Erroll was asked to convey to the Egyptian
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several points intended to dispel Egypt’s and Nasser’s suspicions of the U.K. 
He was to stress that the British government was not opposed to Arab unity, 
that it wanted normal relations with Arab countries and that it did not want to 
exploit inter-Arab differences or even interfere in them. More importantly, 
Erroll was to confirm that the U.K. was neither working with Iraq against 
Egypt, nor encouraging the Sudan to quarrel with Egypt. He was also to deny 
that the U.K. was operating a clandestine radio broadcasting station to attack 
Nasser. [6]
This attitude by the British government proved to be highly optimistic and 
their hopes of establishing diplomatic relations soon became frustrated. After 
the signing of the financial agreement, the U.K. found the Egyptians reluctant 
to re-establish diplomatic relations on the level of charge d’affaires, or even to 
establish a British diplomatic mission until the formal resumption of relations. 
The Foreign Office instructed Colin Crowe, who had remained in Egypt after 
the signature of the financial treaty, to make representations to the Egyptian 
government regarding this point and stressing its urgency, as there was going 
to be a debate on the financial treaty in the House of Commons. The Foreign 
Office asked Crowe to mention that the absence of a British mission in Egypt 
would strengthen the hand of the enemies of the financial agreement. [7] To 
carry out this instruction, Colin Crowe met Qaissuni, the Central Minister for 
the Economy, after being unable to meet the Egyptian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs or the Vice Minister, who had promised to investigate the matter. [8] 
After that meeting, Crowe was asked to see the Director of the Economic 
Department at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who listened to his 
request to be formally accepted as the U.K. representative in Cairo with the 
customary privileges and immunities and to be allowed to bring the necessary
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staff from the U.K. for the work of the British mission. The only response that 
Crowe received was a request — for formality or procedure’ sake — that the 
Embassy of Switzerland, the protector of British interests in Cairo while 
relations were severed, might submit a note to the Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding Crowe’s appointment as the U.K. representative in 
Egypt. [9]
After that meeting, Crowe was again asked by the Egyptian authorities (on 
March 23) to submit a formal note from the Embassy of Switzerland regarding 
his appointment as the U.K. representative and was promised a speedy reply to 
it. Accordingly, he persuaded the Swiss Embassy to submit the note the same 
day [10] In fact the delivery of this note marked an intensification of the U.K.’s 
long efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Egypt, whether by merely 
having a diplomatic mission in Cairo, or by proper diplomatic representation on 
the level of charge d ’affaires, or by full representation on the level of 
ambassador. This diplomatic effort included seeking the mediation of Western 
countries and constant messages and gestures from the British government to 
the Egyptian government. When the formal note by the Swiss Embassy failed 
to have the desired effect, Selwyn Lloyd sent a message to his Egyptian 
counterpart, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, reminding him of his promise to establish a 
British diplomatic mission in Cairo. In his message, Lloyd treated the issue of 
the British diplomatic mission as a matter “in connexion” with the financial 
agreement between the two states. He reminded the Egyptian Foreign Minister 
of the U.K.’s desire to resume diplomatic relations. [11] This message also 
reminded Dr. Fawzi of the importance the U.K. placed on the release of the two 
British prisoners held in Egypt, stating that such a release would help improve 
the relations between the two countries. [12]
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The U .K .’s efforts to secure Egyptian acceptance of a British diplomatic 
mission transcended simply utilising mediation efforts or personal high-level 
messages between some of the leaders of both countries. To try and shift the 
Egyptian position, and as part of an effort aimed at confidence-building 
between the two states, the U.K. reversed its restrictions on selling goods of 
military use to Egypt. These restrictions had been put into effect in 1956 as a 
result of the events leading to the Suez War and had resulted in halting the 
delivery of several shipments of arms and military equipment that Egypt had 
paid for. [13] Egypt could now receive these shipments, the U.K. stated, if the 
Egyptian government still wanted them. [14] That this was an attempt to soften 
the Egyptian position was demonstrated by the fact that Selwyn Lloyd, in his 
message of March 26 to Dr. Fawzi, made a point of of informing the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister of the U.K. decision to lift the restrictions in the same message 
in which he asked for the resumption of diplomatic relations. [15] The U.K. 
decision not to prevent the sale of military equipment to Egypt was not limited 
to the delivery of old contracts; indeed the U.K. also approved new contracts 
to Egypt in March of that year when it approved the sale of Marconi radar and 
monitoring equipment. [16]
The significance of the U.K. allowing the sale of military equipment to Egypt 
can be summarised in the following points. Firstly, it marked the ending of the 
trade restrictions imposed on Egypt after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
assets in Egypt in 1956. Secondly, the U.K.’s willingness to allow the sale of 
arms to Egypt, after being in military conflict with it in 1956 and after sending 
troops to Jordan a year before to shore up the latter's defences against Egypt, 
shows the strength of its desire to restore relations with Egypt. Moreover, 
though most of the military equipment designated to Egypt was not thought
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likely to drastically increase the fighting capabilities of the Egyptian armed 
forces, nevertheless it was a thorny issue which could have laid the British 
government open to criticism, whether from supporters of Israel or from 
Nasser’s enemies in the U.K.
The U.K.’s efforts continued and intensified. It developed a two-tier approach 
or pattern, which it used to establish a diplomatic mission in Cairo, restore 
diplomatic relations and finally upgrade relations to ambassadorial level. The 
first tier was the direct approach to Egyptian officials, with assurances that the 
U.K. was not trying to utilise Arab differences to attack Egypt or undermine 
Nasser. The second tier was the indirect approach, the use of the good offices 
of other W estern diplomats in Cairo and the m ediation of leaders of 
international organisations, especially the United Nations and the World Bank 
for the same purpose, i.e. to assure Egypt that the U.K. was not gunning for 
Nasser through the exploitation of inter-Arab differences, especially the 
Egyptian-Iraqi conflict which marked that period.
When the British Representative in Egypt could not gain access to Nasser or 
his close advisors, the U.K. authorised Sir Frank Lee, the Permanent Secretary 
to the Board of Trade, to visit Egypt in April 1959, where he was excellently 
received by Egyptian officials. [17] Egypt’s desire to promote the sale of 
Egyptian cotton to the U.K., when British firms showed no interest in 
purchasing it because of the high price Egypt imposed, contributed to the 
excellent reception accorded to Sir Frank. [18] That visit allowed Mr. Crowe 
his first chance to meet Amin Shaker, the Chef de Cabinet of the President, 
when he accompanied Sir Frank to a meeting with him organised at the latter’s 
request. It allowed the U.K. representative and the visiting British officials to
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try to dispel the Egyptian anxieties arising from Anglo-Iraqi relations and their 
fear of the effects of the U.K. policy in the Arab world on Egypt.
During the meeting, Amin Shaker informed the British envoy that President 
Nasser would be taking a decision soon regarding the British mission in Cairo 
and promised that “very soon there would be good news for Mr. Crowe”. 
Nasser’s Chef de Cabinet said that the United Arab Republic wanted to 
establish diplomatic relations soon with the United Kingdom. However, he 
stated that the main complication was the fact that other Arab countries had 
already severed diplomatic relations with the U.K. at the time of Suez, and that 
these had to be consulted first. Moreover, Amin Shaker said, these Arab 
countries suggested that some preconditions ought to be met by the U.K. 
before the restoration of diplomatic relations. Naturally the country referred to 
by Shaker was Saudi Arabia, as the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia were the only 
Arab countries without diplomatic relations with the U.K. The British envoy 
understood that the preconditions implied by Shaker referred to the U.K. 
position on the Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Sultan of Oman. 
[19]
The Foreign Secretary, anxious for the speedy establishment of the British 
diplomatic mission in Cairo, instructed Crowe to continue his demands for the 
mission by directly approaching the Egyptian authorities. Selwyn Lloyd’s 
desire for the establishment of the mission was heightened by the pressure for 
it in Parliament. [20]
At the same time the United Kingdom was engaging the efforts of Western
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ambassadors to Cairo to try to hammer the message home to the Egyptian 
government about the need to establish diplomatic relations between the two 
states. Therefore, in April 1959, Western ambassadors to Cairo, at the U.K.’s 
request, undertook a concerted effort to stress that message and argue the 
British government case. This began with the Italian Ambassador, Fornari, who 
put the U.K.’s case to the Egyptian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Zulfikar 
Sabry, who was also the brother of Ali Sabry, the Egyptian Minister of 
Presidential Affairs. The same message was also drilled home by the German 
Ambassador, who argued the same points during his contacts with Egyptian 
officials. [21] It was also emphasised by the United States Ambassador to Cairo 
when he met Ali Sabry. [22] In addition, the U.K. diplomatic effort in Cairo was 
also reinforced by the help of the Canadian and the Swiss ambassadors to 
Cairo. [23] Moreover, the U.K.’s efforts were not limited to relying on the aid 
of the Western ambassadors to Cairo; other British nationals from outside the 
government who got a chance to meet Egyptian officials stressed the 
importance of restoring diplomatic relations and tried to disperse Egyptian 
apprehensions regarding U.K. policy in the Arab world. These nationals 
reported what transpired during such meetings to their governments. [24]
However, when the diplomatic efforts of Colin Crowe proved insufficient to 
persuade the Egyptian government to change its position, the British Foreign 
Office started to increase the pressure on the Egyptian government even 
further. During a dinner between Selwyn Lloyd and the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjoeld, the former asked Mr. Hammarskjoeld 
to assign Dr. Bunche, his envoy, who was about to visit Egypt, to speak on 
behalf of the British government to the Egyptian government. He wished Dr. 
Bunche to state that the Secretary General of the United Nations had spoken
276
with the British Foreign Secretary and received his assurances that the U.K. 
was anxious to resume relations with Egypt. Dr. Bunche should confirm to the 
Egyptian government that the U.K. did not want to undermine Nasser’s 
position and that they did not intend to build up Qasim as a substitute for or an 
enemy to Nasser. Lloyd asked Hammarskjoeld to give this as a message from 
himself to Nasser with his own recommendations. [25] The Secretary General 
of the United Nations agreed to the U.K. request and wrote a message to the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister endorsing the U.K. position.
At the same time the United Kingdom engaged the help of two other allies in 
trying to persuade the Egyptian government to yield to the British demand of 
opening a British diplomatic mission in Cairo and the resumption of diplomatic 
relations. The first was Mr. Eugene Black, President of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.). The U.K. government asked 
Mr. Black to impress on Egypt the importance of a British mission in Cairo. 
[26]
The mediation of Mr. Black was extremely critical and effective in exerting 
pressure on Egypt as it was on the eve of the departure of the I.B.R.D. 
delegation to Egypt to finalise the $100 million World Bank loan for a Suez 
Canal development project. [27] When the U.K. engaged the mediation of Mr. 
Black at that stage to try and convince the Egyptian government to accept a 
British diplomatic mission in Cairo, there was the insinuation or implication that 
the U.K. could take an unhelpful attitude to the I.B.R.D. loan. Moreover, the 
Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Washington was asked by the British 
Foreign Secretary to ask the U.S. State Department that Mr. Hare, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Cairo, should make representations on behalf of the American
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government to the Egyptian government regarding the U.S.’s hope “that the 
present deadlock in connexion with the establishment of Mr. Crowe’s 
Mission” be broken. The U.K. wanted the American message to be in “the 
strongest possible terms ”. [28]
The fact that all of these efforts began to bring pressure to bear on the 
Egyptian government at the same time was one of the factors that helped the 
U.K.’s case. To start with, Hammarskjoeld’s message to Dr. Fawzi (which also 
included a personal message from Lloyd to Nasser) was received on April 20, 
the same time the I.B.R.D. mission arrived in Cairo. Hammarskjoeld’s message 
to Nasser was exceptionally effective, according to what Dr. Fawzi said after 
reading it, because it explained the British attitude to Qasim. [29]
At last, on April 25, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the editor of A l-Ahram  
newspaper and the close confidante of Nasser, asked to meet Colin Crowe late 
that evening. In that meeting, Heikal informed Crowe that Nasser had 
approved the establishment of a British mission and Crowe’s credentials as the 
representative of the United Kingdom in Egypt. Heikal said that Crowe would 
receive the official notification within 24 or 48 hours, and that Nasser had 
given him special permission to inform Crowe in advance of the official 
notification. [30] Heikal explained to Crowe that the reason for the delay was 
the religious festival Ramadan as well as Nasser’s absence. Crowe was not 
totally optimistic about the truth of this report, as he had been receiving similar 
promises for several months, whether from Amin Shaker or from Dr. Fawzi a 
few months previously. Heikal’s information, however, was accurate and on 
the next day the Swiss Embassy received the official reply from the Egyptian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the approval of Colin Crowe’s credentials and 
permission for the establishment of a British mission in Cairo.
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Thus the United Kingdom's first immediate goal of opening a mission was 
finally achieved, albeit after haggling that had lasted for over three months. 
However, the U.K. found that, after all the delay, the permission finally granted 
fell far short of what they had requested . The most important shortcoming was 
that the mission received no diplomatic status, with the exception of some 
diplomatic tax privileges, and was refused either Diplomatic Bag or cypher 
facilities. The name of the mission was the British Property Commission, and it 
was not allowed to use the premises of the British Embassy in Cairo or even 
the Residency of the British Ambassador. Moreover, only five diplomats and 
five secretaries were allowed to work in the mission, and their work was to be 
strictly limited to areas of trade and desequestration (i.e. matters related to the 
financial agreement). Although the mission was allowed direct access to the 
Ministry of Finance, they were not permitted to contact the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; they had to continue to be in contact with the Egyptian 
Foreign Ministry through their protecting power, i.e. the Swiss Embassy. [31]
The U.K. government found these terms unsatisfactory. It had expected 
diplomatic status and the use of the premises of the British Embassy —  or at 
least the use of the Residence of the British Ambassador. The U.K. also 
expected the mission to have direct access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(by virtue of being a diplomatic mission). It also wanted the mission to 
comprise a larger number of staff than was granted. As for the title of the 
mission, it wanted it to be called “The Office of The United Kingdom”. [32] 
Despite the shortcomings of the Egyptian offer, the British government 
decided to accept it, under protest, and to try to gradually improve the status 
and facilities of the mission. [33] The reason the U.K. accepted the Egyptian 
offer was that it thought that politically “the most important (thing) for our
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Middle East policy is that we should be back in Cairo without delay” . And 
since “nothing would be gained by our having a row with the Egyptians over 
the inadequacies of their offer on the Mission”, the British government 
decided to accept the Egyptian offer. [34]
B The Reasons for the Egyptian Refusal to 
Normalise Relationships with the U.K.
From August 1958, it became obvious that the U.K. faced serious objections, if 
not outright rejection, from Egypt in attempting to restore diplomatic relations. 
No matter how hard the U.K. tried to persuade the Egyptians to do so, whether 
by direct contact or through intermediaries, the Egyptians adamantly refused 
to yield. There were several reasons behind Egypt’s continuing refusal to 
restore diplomatic relations. However, before outlining these, one has to be 
aware that at the time the only authority in Egypt able to decide on the matter 
was Nasser himself. There were some in the Egyptian government who were 
willing to resume relations with the U.K., such as Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister, whose favourable attitude was manifest in his 
conversation with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd at the office of the United Nations 
Secretary General in August 1958; but restoration of relations was Nasser’s 
decision in the final analysis. Even the agreement to grant the U.K. a mission in 
Cairo was N asser’s decision, a fact that was made clear to the U.K. 
Representative in Egypt at the time, Mr. Colin Crowe. [35]
Indeed the events which occurred in the field of bilateral relations between the 
U.K. and Egypt since the severance of relations illustrate several points. The 
problems between the two states in the field of bilateral relations, created as the
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result of the rupture in the relations, forced the two countries to meet, negotiate 
and finally reach compromises towards their settlement. Therefore the fully- 
fledged regional confrontation between the two states in 1958 had almost no 
effect on bilateral relations or the efforts of both countries to reach a 
settlement. However, the restoration of official relations between the two states 
proved to be not as straightforward as the settling of financial issues. The 
issues involved in the restoration of official relations were generically different 
from those related to the financial settlement. These issues included the 
reactions and strength of the domestic constituencies, the symbolic meaning of 
the restoration of relations, the historical legacies as well as the regional 
confrontations between the two states.
The reasons for Egypt’s reluctance to normalise diplomatic relations with the 
U.K. could be divided into psychological, internal, and regional reasons. By 
psychological reasons is meant the attitude and frame of mind of Nasser 
towards the U.K. and relations with it. This was largely due to the colonial 
legacy of the U.K. in Egypt but more importantly due to the events which had 
led to the tripartite aggression in October 1956.
The Suez War had caused tremendous feelings of anger, bitterness and mistrust 
of the U.K. amongst the Egyptians in general and for Nasser in particular. [36] 
These feelings made the decision to resume diplomatic relations with the U.K 
psychologically difficult for Nasser. Indeed that very point was reiterated by 
the Vice Minister at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Zulfikar Sabri, to the Italian 
Ambassador in April 1959. [37] Nasser’s difficulty in taking the decision to 
resume diplomatic relations with the U.K. was relayed to the British 
government via the Canadians. The Canadian Ambassador to Cairo was
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stressing to Nasser the need for direct contact between the U.K. and Egypt 
and the exchange of views between the two countries, especially in the light 
of the developments in the Arab world. And though Nasser conceded this 
point, his response illustrated his personal and psychological difficulty in 
restoring relations with the U.K. “What do you want me to do?” Nasser asked. 
“ Do you expect me to welcome the British in Cairo after all they have done, 
not only in November 1956 but subsequently?” The Canadian Ambassador 
was convinced that Nasser’s remark was not a debating point but an 
expression of perplexity. [38]
This psychological difficulty contributed to the Egyptian tendency to mistrust 
every British move in the Middle East. It made Egyptian officials, particularly 
Nasser, prone to believe anything that linked the U.K. with their problems and 
whatever ill was aimed at Egypt at the time. As a result some Egyptian officials 
held implausible beliefs; for instance, that the U.K. (namely the British secret 
service) was aiding the communists in Iraq. [39]
President Nasser told the Canadian Ambassador to Cairo, in May 1959, that a 
few months earlier he had contemplated an early resumption of relations 
between Egypt and the U.K. W hat prevented him at the time was the 
discovery that the British secret service were trying to recruit members of the 
Syrian minorities (especially the Druze) from Beirut. Nasser said that he feared 
that to allow a diplomatic mission would be to assist the recruitment efforts of 
British intelligence and increase the prestige and respectability of the U.K. [40] 
Moreover, Nasser formed the belief that the U.K. was running a clandestine 
radio station in the Middle East, directing its broadcasts towards Egypt and 
attacking him. He persisted in this belief (he actually mentioned it to a British
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member of Parliament, Mr. Woodrow Wyatt, in the course of his complaints 
about the U.K). [41] No matter how hard the U.K. tried to assure him it was not 
true, their efforts were to no avail. His belief that the U.K. was running that 
clandestine radio station was apparently among the reasons which prevented 
Nasser from restoring diplomatic relations with the U.K. at that time. [42]
This point sheds some light not just on Anglo-Egyptian relations or the 
conduct of Egyptian foreign policy during that period. It exposes the nature of 
foreign policy decision-making in such a “one-man-band” regime, or 
Presidential-Type system. In such a system, the final arbiter of all major 
decisions is the president, or leader of the state. Indeed in such a regime, the 
state’s foreign policy is decided by its leader’s perceptions of reality. However, 
that perception of reality is also influenced by the past experience of that 
leader. [43] Thus, the leader’s perceptions of reality and his past experience 
directly influence his immediate decisions of foreign as well as domestic policy. 
In Nasser’s case, his delaying the restoration of relations with the U.K. out of 
the belief that the U.K. was aiding the communists in Iraq and operating a 
clandestine radio station that attacked him, and more importantly out of anger 
at the U.K.’s actions against Egypt in 1956 or even before 1952, illustrates 
how the autocratic type of decision-making affects the foreign policy of the 
state in question. Moreover, it shows how the fear of the foreigner reflects 
fears closer to home, namely the position of Nasser internally and in the Arab 
world. Nasser apparently felt threatened on both fronts because of the 
activities of the communists in Iraq and the clandestine radio station referred 
to. The crisis that was facing Nasser’s position in the Arab World at the time 
contributed to his tendency to fit “incoming information into pre-existing 
beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there”. [44] Nasser saw the
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invisible hand of the U.K. and its secret service in whatever threat was facing 
Egypt.
Another reason which prevented Nasser from restoring diplomatic relations 
with the U.K. was his concern about the internal implications of normalising 
relations with the United Kingdom. After constantly attacking the U.K. ever 
since Suez, in his speeches as well as in the mass media, blaming all evils in the 
Arab world on that country, Nasser found it difficult to normalise relations with 
the U.K. abruptly. He mentioned these implications of the restoration of 
relations with the U.K. to the Italian Ambassador in January 1959, when he 
said that although he was prepared to resume relations with the U.K., he was 
not prepared to do it in one.
Instead, he was willing to start by opening a U.K. office in Cairo responsible 
only for carrying out the financial agreement, followed by charges d’affaires 
and then later by the exchange of ambassadors. The first reason that Nasser 
gave for this course of action was the fear that immediate resumption of 
relations would be too spectacular and would be exploited by communist and 
left-wing elements in the United Arab Republic to make trouble for him. [45] 
These apprehensions about the effects of the normalisation of relations with 
the U.K. on the left-wing elements in Egypt were particularly important 
because of the U.A.R. policy at the time, which was aimed at putting a check 
on the communist elements in Egypt with the resulting arrest of several 
hundreds of them in Egypt and Syria at the time. Indeed, what adds to the 
credibility of this account of Nasser’s motives and intentions was that this 
course of mass arrests was exactly the course adopted by Nasser when the
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resumption of diplomatic relations between the U.K. and U.A.R. actually took 
place.
The third important set of reasons for Egypt’s willingness to resume relations 
with the U.K. at that time were related to regional issues. The struggle between 
Egypt and Iraq was at its peak. Egypt suspected that the U.K. was actively 
aiding the communist elements in the Iraqi regime against the nationalist forces 
in that country, which were sympathetic to Nasser and adhered to his doctrine 
of Arab nationalism. There was a widespread story in Egypt at the time, a story 
which was believed by Egyptian officials close to Nasser, regarding the British 
responsibility for Qasim getting rid of Arif and Gailani, two leading figures in 
the Iraqi regime who were sympathetic to Nasser. [46] Egyptian officials 
believed that the U.K. Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Michael Wright, had given 
Qasim information incriminating Arif and Gailani at two o’clock in the morning. 
Egyptian officials believed that the U.K. Ambassador’s keenness to go to 
Qasim at that late hour, simply to give him incriminating evidence against these 
pro-Nasser men, was yet another proof of the U.K.’s animosity towards Nasser 
and the U.A.R., and it confirmed their fear that the U.K. was aiding the 
communists in Iraq to undermine Nasser.
The Egyptian government increased its violent attacks on Iraq to fever pitch. 
[47] Moreover, Heikal, the editor of Al-Ahram, published an article accusing 
the U.K. of collaboration with Iraqi communist elements. [48] The significance 
of Heikal’s article was not merely that Heikal was a close friend and confidant 
of Nasser, but more importantly that Al-Ahram became, during Nasser’s time, a 
semi-official newspaper and that Heikal himself used to represent the official 
view of the Egyptian government. The belief that the U.K. was supporting the
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communists in Iraq against Egypt was predominant among Egyptian 
officialdom, who spoke freely to Western diplomats and others to the effect 
that Egypt would not resume relations with the U.K. because of the latter’s 
policy vis-a-vis Iraq. Thus, the Vice Minister of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry 
told both the Belgian Ambassador [49] and the Italian Ambassador [50] that 
the difficulty Egypt was having with the U.K.’s policy in Iraq was the cause of 
the delay in resuming relations. The same message was also reiterated by two 
members of the Free Officers who were among Nasser’s small circle of 
intimates, Colonel Hatim and Murad Ghalib. Hatim expressed anger to a British 
journalist, Rawle Knox of the Observer, at the U.K. policy towards Iraq, 
especially the arms deliveries to Iraq which were announced at the time, stating 
that the U.K. arms were being given to communists to shoot down Arab 
nationalists and that because of this Egypt would not establish diplomatic 
relations with the U.K. [51] Murad Ghalib repeated that message in a private 
conversation with a British businessman who was in Cairo attending the Arab 
Oil Conference in April 1959, [52] Murad Ghalib emphasised the point 
regarding Sir Michael Wright giving Qasim the information about the Gailani 
revolt to Colin Crowe in a private dinner at the Residence of the Canadian 
Ambassador. [53]
That the question of Iraq was a major impediment to the restoration of relations 
between the two countries was further confirmed by Dr. Fawzi, the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister, when Dr. Bunche of the United Nations gave him a letter to 
President Nasser from Dag Hammarskjoeld, which stated the Secretary 
General’s positive views about the need for the establishment of relations 
between the U.K. and the U.A.R. and also tried to dissipate Egyptian alarm at 
the U .K .’s Iraq policy. The Egyptian Foreign Minister confirmed that the
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U.K .’s support for President Qasim was the only serious obstacle to the 
continued development of good relations between the United Kingdom and 
the United Arab Republic. [54]
As mentioned earlier, the restoration of diplomatic relations involved issues 
different from those related to the financial settlement. Among these were the 
regional confrontation and the implications of such a conflict on Nasser’s 
domestic constituencies. The issue of Iraq was an illustration of such an effect 
on bilateral relations, specifically on the prospects for the restoration of 
diplomatic relations.
Although the Iraqi problem was classified as a regional issue, one has to realise 
that its importance for Nasser was largely due to its internal dimension. The 
Egyptian-Iraqi dispute of 1958-1960 coincided with or even resulted from the 
ongoing doctrinal clash in the Arab world between two ideologies: Arab 
nationalism as represented by Nasser on the one hand, and Communism on the 
other. Egypt believed that the Iraqi regime of that period represented 
Communism in power and it soon clashed with Nasser’s active Arab policy, 
especially since a communist Iraq was diametrically opposed to Egyptian Arab 
policy. Nasser did not see his constituency as simply limited to Egypt but as 
including most of the Arab world — especially Syria, as Egypt's partner in the 
U.A.R. After the Iraqi revolution in July 1958, the movement in Syria which 
favoured unity with Iraq gained considerable strength.
In fact, the main political power rallying opposition to Nasser in Syria at the 
time were the communists, the only party which had managed to survive the 
dissolution of Syrian political parties in 1958 with a functioning apparatus.
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[55] At that time, the Egyptian-Iraqi rift seemed to be causing embarrassment 
for Nasser in Syria. The failure of the Gailani revolt in Mosul (northern Iraq), 
which had been backed by the U.A.R., had been considered in Syria as a sharp 
blow to Nasser’s prestige. [56] Certainly the danger from Iraq, whether 
controlled by communists or by non-Nasserite Arab nationalists, was mainly 
that it presented a serious threat to the Egyptian control of Syria and thus to 
the very existence of the United Arab Republic itself. [57] Therefore, the main 
reason for Nasser’s quarrel with Qasim’s Iraq was in effect the fear that the 
northern province of the U.A.R. would defect. Indeed this feeling was 
predominant in the thinking of Egyptian officialdom at the time.
In looking at the ill effects of the Iraq problem on Anglo-Egyptian relations, 
one must take three factors into account: the effects of the Iraqi-Egyptian 
conflict on the state of the union between Egypt and Syria; Nasser’s belief that 
British intelligence was trying to recruit Syrian agents to work against Egypt; 
and finally Nasser’s state of mind regarding the U.K. This perspective allows us 
to realise that the problems between Egypt and Iraq transcended a mere 
conflict over power in the region and managed to reinforce Nasser’s belief that 
the U.K. was actually gunning for him, [58] a belief that was undoubtedly 
responsible in the final analysis for Nasser’s refusal to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with the U.K.
A final point relevant to the Egyptian refusal to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with the U.K. was the absence of diplomatic relations between the 
U.K. and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had severed diplomatic relations with the 
U.K. as a result of the Suez War in 1956, and up until that time (1959) 
diplomatic relations between the two had not been restored. Since the
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beginning of 1959 Egyptian officials had been giving this fact as the reason for 
the delay in resuming diplomatic relations with the U.K., saying that Egypt 
would have to consult Saudi Arabia before doing so. The U.K. initially 
considered this a mere delaying tactic by the Egyptian government. However, 
this belief was almost dispelled when Amin Shaker voiced the same argument 
to the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, Sir Frank Lee. [59] The same 
argument was given to the Secretary General to the United Nations, Dag 
Hammarskjoeld, when he argued the U.K.’s case with Nasser and the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Dr. Fawzi. The latter had explained that they found it very 
difficult to resume relations with the U.K. before Saudi Arabia did so — 
especially since Saudi Arabia had severed relations with the U.K. as a sign of 
solidarity with Egypt.
This was even more important at that time (July 1959) in the light of the 
improved relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and also in the light of 
Saudi Arabia’s attempt to achieve some concession from the U.K. — vis-a-vis 
the Buraimi dispute — in return for the resumption of relations. [60] Although 
the U.K. representative in Egypt dismissed this as the reason for the Egyptian 
delay in the resumption of diplomatic relations, [61] there was growing 
evidence that this issue (U.K.-Saudi Arabia diplomatic relations) did have an 
impact on the decision-making process of the U.A.R. vis-a-vis diplomatic 
relations with the U.K. This was confirmed when the U.K. learned, from the 
Swiss Embassy in London, that the Swiss Charge d’Affaires in Jedda had been 
told by Prince Faisal — in July — that the latter had received a message from 
President Nasser stating that Egypt wanted to resume relations with the U.K., 
but, for internal reasons, wanted to take that step at the same time that Saudi 
Arabia did. [62]
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There are two possible explanations for the importance of the restoration of 
Saudi Arabian relations with the U.K. Firstly, if both Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
restored relations with the U.K. at the same time, it would dilute any negative 
effects Nasser might endure inside Egypt and in the Arab world as a result, 
since he would be able to portray it as a joint Arab action. Secondly, Nasser 
was very keen at the time to preserve the excellent relations he enjoyed with 
Prince Faisal, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. [63] He was, therefore, 
anxious to take no risk of souring relations with Faisal by restoring relations 
with the U.K. at a time when Saudi Arabia, which had severed relations with 
the U.K. in solidarity with Egypt, had not.
The fact that conflict between the foreign policies of Egypt and the U.K. 
managed to delay the resumption of diplomatic relations illustrates the generic 
differences between the restoration of diplomatic relations and the resolution 
of bilateral problems. Resolving those bilateral problems certainly needed 
political will to sign an agreement, but it involved relatively straightforward 
technical and financial issues. Diplomatic relations, on the other hand, involved 
more complex issues. The psychological attitudes of the decision-makers of 
both states towards each other became a major issue in the restoration of 
diplomatic relations. Thus, the legacies of imperialism and the feelings of anger 
on the part of Nasser and some of his colleagues because of the Suez affair, 
contributed to Egypt’s reluctance to restore diplomatic relations with the 
United Kingdom.
Moreover, the particular perceptions of the decision-makers of the benefits and 
dangers of restoring diplomatic relations naturally affected their decision. For 
instance, the perception of Nasser that the the U.K. was encouraging his
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opponents inside the U.A.R., as well as outside it, made him reluctant to allow 
an official U.K. presence in Cairo and Damascus which he feared might become 
a centre for anti-Nasser movements. This meant that Nasser was also concerned 
by the internal ramifications of the restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
U.K. It was Nasser's concern for his power inside Egypt and in the region 
which led to his hesitation over restoring diplomatic relations with the U.K.
C The Resumption of Diplomatic Relations
1 — Charge d’Affaires
The period which followed the U.K. obtaining a mission in Cairo witnessed the 
continuation of the U.K.’s efforts to normalise its relations with Egypt. The first 
objective in that policy was the resumption of diplomatic relations. In the 
absence of a direct official link between the two countries, the efforts of the 
U.K. in trying to convince the Egyptian government to resume diplomatic 
relations were through the occasional opportunities that Mr. Crowe in Cairo 
had to meet senior Egyptian officials or leading Egyptian personalities who 
were close to and had direct access to Nasser.
However, as these opportunities were haphazard and not necessarily 
consistent, the U.K. relied on other channels of communication. These 
continued to be some of the Western ambassadors in Egypt as well as some 
world leaders, especially Mr. Eugene Black and Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld, who 
were asked to represent the U.K.’s case to the Egyptians. In these contacts, the 
U.K. was trying to dissipate Egyptian fears and assure Nasser that the U.K. was 
neither trying to overthrow him nor was it against nationalism. More 
importantly, the messages which the U.K. sent to Egypt concentrated on
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explaining British policy towards Iraq, stressing that the U.K. did not 
encourage Communism in Iraq and that it was not trying to build up Qasim as a 
rival to Nasser.
The main thrust of these messages was to try to dispel the fears behind the 
Egyptian refusal to allow the official relationship between the two countries to 
resume. The first opportunity to do that occurred to Colin Crowe, when he met 
Murad Ghalib at the Canadian Ambassador’s Residence at the beginning of 
May, where he tried to persuade Ghalib that the U.K. was not against Nasser. 
[64] This did not bring any positive developments.
Nevertheless, there immediately occurred an opportunity to improve the 
atmosphere of the relations between the two states. This happened, strangely 
enough, when the U.K. decided to sell arms to Iraq. The U.K. government 
feared that the announcement of that decision would eventually lead to 
worsening relations with Egypt. To prevent this, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, sent a personal message to his Egyptian counterpart informing him of 
the U.K.’s decision, and explaining that the U.K.’s main reason for selling arms 
to Iraq was to attempt to strengthen the internal position of Qasim vis-a-vis the 
Communists inside Iraq. However, other negative circumstances provided the 
opposite effect. As Dr. Fawzi was away in Geneva, Colin Crowe asked to see 
Zulfikar Sabri, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was totally against the 
U.K., but the latter refused to see him. Therefore, the Canadian Ambassador to 
Cairo met President Nasser and argued the British case and the reasons for the 
U.K. position. He emphasised that the U.K. was not out to get Nasser, and 
stressed the importance of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
They would facilitate direct access and contacts between the U.K. and Egypt,
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and thus prevent misunderstandings. Nasser’s reaction to the British gesture of 
forewarning him of the arms sale to Iraq was “much more favourable than we 
(the U.K.) could reasonably have hoped”. [65]
Nasser’s initial favourable reaction dissipated to some extent when the 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs revealed, in response to a question in 
Parliament later the same day (May 11), that Selwyn Lloyd had taken the 
necessary steps to inform Nasser of the U.K.’s decision, a disclosure which 
Nasser found embarrassing. But the U.K.’s gesture in forewarning him about 
the arms shipment to Iraq still had a positive effect. This was confirmed when 
Nasser spoke to the Pakistani Ambassador to Cairo with understanding about 
the U.K. decision to sell arms to Iraq and expressed appreciation for being 
forewarned. [66]
At the same time, the U.K. engaged, yet again, the help of Mr. Black who 
visited London in May (1959) and was about to visit Egypt. The Foreign 
Secretary asked Mr. Black to speak to Nasser about the resumption of 
diplomatic relations, the need for immunities and diplomatic facilities for the 
British diplomatic mission, the delay of the Egyptian government in giving 
permission for the opening of the British mission in Egypt and also about the 
release of the two British prisoners held in Egypt (Zarb and Swindon). [67] Mr. 
Black accepted that task. When he talked to President Nasser, shortly after the 
meeting between the president and the Canadian Ambassador who delivered 
the message from Lloyd (in fact it was the same day), Nasser told him what he 
had told the Canadian Ambassador earlier the same day: that he recognised 
that his policy towards the U.K. should be reviewed and had given 
instructions to that effect. [68]
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Once the U.K. learnt of Nasser’s decision to review Egyptian relations with the 
U.K., it decided to send another message to Nasser through the Canadian 
Ambassador. However this message, unlike the previous one, was to appear as 
coming from the Canadian government and not as inspired by the U.K. Its 
essence was that the U.K. was definitely not recruiting agents in Syria or 
operating a clandestine radio station against Nasser. Furthermore, this message 
stressed that the U.K. was not involved in any effort to use inter-Arab 
differences to topple Nasser but, on the contrary, was interested in a 
rapprochement between Egypt and both Iraq and Jordan. [69] The U.K.’s 
efforts to seek mediation with Nasser was by no means limited to the 
Canadians. The U.K., believing that Tito had a beneficial influence over Nasser, 
engaged the efforts of the Yugoslavs. [70] In the hope of inducing Egypt to 
respond favourably to the U.K. demand regarding the resumption of relations, 
the Minister of State at the Foreign Office responded to a question in the 
House of Commons that the U.K. would like to have fuller diplomatic 
representation in Cairo. [71] However the Egyptian government did not take 
the hint and this favourable answer by the U.K. Minister of State went 
unheeded.
However, the U.K.’s optimism in May and June turned out to be ill-founded. 
British officials discovered that they were still far from achieving their hopes of 
a quick restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt. There were some 
positive indications in that regard, such as the briefing which the U.K. Minister 
of State received from Mr. Hammarskjoeld in Geneva about the latter’s recent 
conversation with Nasser and Fawzi. Although the Secretary General of the 
United Nations informed the British Minister of State of Egypt’s desire to re­
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establish diplomatic relations, he added that there was no hope of this 
occurring in the next few months. [72]
When the U.K. found that its policy was not achieving the required result, it 
changed its tactics completely. Instead of hammering home the message to 
Egypt, through intermediaries, that the U.K. wanted to normalise its relations 
with Egypt and meant Egypt no harm, the U.K. began to try to exercise 
pressure on Nasser in the hope that this would persuade him to change his 
stance. When the Secretary of State met Eugene Black on July 9, 1959 in 
London, the Secretary of State complained bitterly to Mr. Black regarding 
Egypt’s policy. These complaints were centred on the slow rate of 
desequestration, the state of the British diplomatic mission in Cairo and 
Egypt’s refusal to free the two political prisoners still held in Egypt. And as 
Mr. Black was intending to discuss with Selwyn Lloyd the issue of the $100 
million World Bank Loan to the Suez Canal development project, the Foreign 
Secretary seized the opportunity to inform him that unless Egypt changed its 
policy on the passage of Israeli cargoes through the Canal, and accelerated the 
rate of desequestration of British properties, the U.K. would find it difficult to 
agree the Suez Canal loan with the World Bank. [73]
The same line was taken by the Foreign Secretary when he met Hammarskjoeld 
in Geneva on July 14, 1959. Furthermore, Lloyd indicated to the United 
Nations Secretary General that there was a large probability that the United 
Kingdom would object to the World Bank Loan, unless “Nasser would make 
some public statement about freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and 
had also come to some satisfactory modus vivendi over Israeli shipping”. [74] 
Although there is no record to prove this, nevertheless, it seems that the U.K.
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decided to try to impose certain demands which Nasser could not afford to 
accept, such as public statements about freedom of passage through the Canal 
and the freedom of passage for Israeli shipping. This was also evident when the 
U.K. refused to accept Hammarskjoeld’s assurances that Nasser’s private and 
actual position was quite different from his public stance.
The rationale behind such a policy, asking requests from Nasser which he 
could not deliver, was that it served to force Nasser to realise the need for some 
kind of dialogue with the U.K and would open the subject of diplomatic 
relations and give the U.K. a leverage versus Egypt, after it lost its only 
previous leverage when it released the Egyptian blocked balances in the 
United Kingdom according to the stipulation of the financial agreement. This 
leverage could aid the U.K. efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and to free the two British prisoners in Egypt.
However, this policy of exerting pressure on Nasser was not successful in 
immediately achieving any of the goals of the U.K.: diplomatic relations, the 
release of the two prisoners or even granting the British property commission 
in Cairo proper diplomatic facilities. The result was a stalemate until September 
1959. Nevertheless, the policy apparently served to soften the Egyptian 
position, for when one of the two British prisoners, Mr. Swindon, became 
eligible for a Presidential parole after completing over half his sentence, he was 
released and allowed to return to the U.K. Indeed, Nasser decided to release 
Swindon as a gesture to the U.K. and as an attempt to break the stalemate 
which had occurred in the relations between the two states. However, Egypt 
privately requested that the U.K. should not greet the release of either of the 
two British prisoners with massive media attention, so as not make the release 
appear as a U.K. victory over Egypt. [75]
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By October, the U.K. representative began finally to see a glimmer of hope of 
reaching the end of the road and achieving diplomatic relations. The editor of 
Al-Ahram, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, met Colin Crowe on 13 October and 
informed him that President Nasser had decided to establish diplomatic 
relations with the U.K., first on the level of consular and economic missions and 
then to move within a couple of months to the ambassadorial level of 
representation. However, Heikal said that the initiative for the restoration of 
relations should come from the U.K., either with an official note forwarded 
through the Swiss Embassy in Cairo, or with a statement from the British 
government which the Egyptian government would pick up and respond to 
with an official note to the Swiss. [76] Crowe expressed his personal view that 
he doubted whether consular relations would be feasible for technical reasons. 
It would entail a difficult process of negotiation over the status, rights and 
privileges of the consular mission, since there was no consular convention at 
the time between the two countries. [77] Nevertheless, Crowe asked his 
government to accept the Egyptian proposal of an exchange of consulates, in 
case he could obtain no more than that from the Egyptians. [78]
The U.K. reaction to this sudden opportunity for diplomatic relations to be 
resumed was mixed, and accordingly the Foreign Office response was 
confused. On the one hand, the Foreign Office instructed Crowe to inform 
Heikal that the U.K., like Egypt, had an internal difficulty in restoring relations 
— the continued imprisonment of Zarb in Egypt. Thus, the U.K. attempted to 
link the release or the promise of the release of their remaining political prisoner 
(Zarb) with the restoration of diplomatic relations without making this a 
precondition. At the same time, the U.K. felt some uneasiness about sending
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the Egyptian government a note requesting the return of diplomatic relations; 
yet it wanted a quick agreement with the Egyptian government to enable it to 
open U.K. consulates, especially in Damascus. The confusion in the U.K. 
position was demonstrated by its slightly hard-line attitude, in comparison to its 
position during the negotiations throughout 1959, and finally by the British 
officials’ resignation to the fact that, in the end, they might have to accept the 
Egyptian offer (of merely upgrading the U.K. Property Commission in Cairo to 
a consular and trade mission) if Egypt refused to improve on its offer. [79] The 
Foreign Office instructed Crowe to try and secure an improvement in the 
Egyptian offer, and to try to achieve at the same time the release of Zarb.
The talks between Heikal and Crowe aimed at reaching the resumption of 
bilateral relations continued on October 17, 1959. Heikal instantaneously shot 
down the U.K. attempt at linking the resumption of the relations to the release 
of Zarb when he replied that such a linkage would delay the restoration of full 
relations for some time. Crowe stressed to Heikal the advantages of the 
resumption of relations at the level of charge d’affaires rather than consular 
relations. [80] As for the formal method of restoration of relations, it appeared 
that the best method was through the U.K. taking the initiative by making a 
statement in Parliament — similar to the one the U.K. had made in June about 
its desire to resume relations with Egypt — which the Egyptians would pick 
up.
The talks between Heikal and Crowe dispelled any hope Crowe might have 
had about the possibility of securing the release of Zarb in the process of the 
resumption of bilateral relations. Therefore, and shortly after that meeting, 
Crowe warned his government that linking the question of Zarb at that stage
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threatened not only to break down the negotiations for resuming diplomatic 
relations, but would make them “stay broken down”, as the Egyptians felt 
strongly about the Zarb case and considered that they had given him a fair 
trial. [81]
The U.K.’s hopes of finally achieving diplomatic relations were confirmed 
when President Nasser informed the Canadian Ambassador on October 19 that 
he intended to re-establish diplomatic relations with the U.K. within a few 
weeks. This message was also reported to the Canadian Ambassador by other 
members of the Egyptian government, which together with what Heikal told 
Crowe established the fact that the U.A.R. had finally made up its mind. [82]
In spite of the signs for the quick resumptions of relations, these hopes 
received a slight setback. There was an increased campaign against the U.K. in 
the Egyptian media on the eve of the anniversary of the Suez crisis, 
concentrating on attacking the U.K. because of the events in 1956 and 
because of the U.K.’s relations with Israel and Iraq and the reports that it was 
about to provide these countries with more military equipment. [83] These 
attacks alarmed the British government as threatening a relapse of the U.K.- 
Egyptian relationship. [84] Another sign of this apparent relapse was what the 
Egyptian acting Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Sabri (Dr. Fawzi was away in New 
York) said to the Italian Ambassador about the U.K., claiming that it was trying 
to undermine the position of Egypt and that if Egypt accepted the opening of 
a British embassy, this embassy would be a centre of hostility to Egypt in 
Cairo. [85] Despite the fact these media attacks were expected by the U.K., 
since it was the anniversary of the Suez crisis, and even though Nasser himself 
had warned the Canadian Ambassador to expect them, [86] there was a more 
serious threat to the prospects of Anglo-Egyptian relations.
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This was the increased deterioration in the politics of the Middle East, 
especially a failed assassination attempt at the life of Qasim. There was a fear 
that the success of such an assassination might tempt King Hussein of Jordan 
to intervene militarily against Iraq. This led the U.K. and others to fear that 
such a chain of events might lead to Israel intervening militarily against either 
Egypt or Jordan. [87]
The volatile politics of the Middle East at that point had indeed cast a shadow 
on the prospects of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship, but they had also had a 
different effect. Both states feared the dangers of the advance of Communism 
in the Middle East and especially in Iraq, and, as major players in the Middle 
Eastern political arena at the time, they each suffered from the lack of contacts 
between them. The need for a continuous dialogue between the two states 
prompted them to intensify the dialogue between Heikal and Crowe. Heikal’s 
position as a close friend of Nasser with direct access to him meant that the 
U.K. messages which were passed through Crowe were indeed forwarded to 
Nasser without being changed or delayed. Therefore, this channel of 
communications between the two countries was used to inform the U.K. that: 
Egypt was not in any way involved in the attempted assassination of Qasim; 
that Egypt was worried about the possibility of Jordan attacking Iraq and that 
in such an event, Egypt might instruct its army in the Northern Province (Syria) 
to attack the Arab Legion (the Jordanian Army). [88] The U.K., on the other 
hand, used that channel to inform Egypt that: it was also concerned about the 
advance of Communism in Iraq; it did not favour Jordanian military 
intervention in Iraq and it did not anticipate that eventuality. Indeed, when the 
U.K. feared that the turbulent politics of the Middle East might affect relations
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with Egypt, it used that channel of communication to deliver a message to 
Nasser from the British government. This message stated that both states had 
common interests in the Middle East and for this reason they had informed 
Nasser of their intentions to sell arms to Iraq in advance. Moreover, the U.K. 
emphasised that it was equally concerned about the situation in Iraq and that 
they had interests in not having a communist coup there. The U.K. also stated 
that it did not want to interfere in Arab problems. That message also stressed 
the need for diplomatic relations between the two states to help the exchange 
of views between them, especially since the U.K. were anxious to know the 
views of President Nasser about the Middle East situation speedily. The U.K. 
ended the message by explaining that they were using that channel of 
communication to deliver that message because they believed it was the 
quickest. [89]
At the same time Crowe asked the Foreign Office to persuade the B.B.C. and 
the British press to be careful in their handling of allegations that the U.K. was 
interfering in Syria, in the light of the complaints that Zulfikar Sabri had made 
to the Italian Ambassador. [90] Since the issues involved with the restoration 
of official relations were generically different from those involved with the 
financial settlement, the political problems of the Middle East kept spilling over 
the area of bilateral relations despite British assurances. The final effect of that 
was the delay in the restoration of diplomatic relations.
There were particular reasons which caused the Egyptians to pause in the 
contacts regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations. The first were the 
allegations that the United Kingdom was actually supporting the P.P.S. 
(Partie Populaire Syrienne, a Syrian political party that was operating from
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outside Syria and opposing the Egyptian unity with Syria and which was 
actually causing several problems for Nasser and the Egyptian government in 
Syria). [91] The second issue was Israel. Israel, which enjoyed excellent 
relations with the U.K. (which was supplying it with military equipment) at the 
time, was adopting an aggressive policy in the region (especially so at that 
period), as illustrated by the flights by Israeli military aeroplanes over Egypt 
and particularly over Sinai. This considerably alarmed the Egyptian 
government and led to a substantial Egyptian military build up in Sinai as a 
result. Indeed these issues, especially the collaboration between the U.K. and 
P.P.S., as well as an interview with Ben Gurion in The Times at the time of 
these military tensions, led to a pause in the Crowe-Heikal meetings for the first 
two weeks of November, Heikal avoiding any contact with Crowe. [92]
This pause however, ended on November 14, 1959, when Heikal asked to see 
Crowe to discuss bilateral relations. He stated that the Egyptian government 
was concerned about the information about the P.P.S. connection with the 
British, as well as the recent Ben Gurion interview in The Times. H eikal 
explained that the information about the U.K. support for the P.P.S., the Ben 
Gurion interview and the visit of the U.K. Foreign Secretary to France had 
given rise to suspicions in the Egyptian government that the U.K. was 
conspiring against Egypt yet again, exactly as in 1956. He also explained in 
detail Egypt’s grievances about the B.B.C. coverage, at a time when there 
were serious problems in Egyptian-Syrian relations. The B.B.C. report about 
quarrels between Syrian and Egyptian officers was the one which Heikal 
referred to in particular. [93] Heikal asked Crowe for a statement about the 
U.K.’s policy towards Israel, stating that this was the stumbling block in the 
way of the resumption of diplomatic relations which Nasser wanted. During
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that meeting, Crowe explained the position of the B.B.C. and denied any 
collaboration between the U.K. and the P.P.S.
The following week (November 21), Crowe explained the U.K. position vis-a- 
vis Israel to Heikal and expressed the British government’s view: that Israel’s 
actions and press announcements at the time did not necessarily mean that the 
Israeli government intended to escalate military conflict in the area, but were a 
result of the situation in the Middle East in general and the aftermath of the 
general elections in Israel. [94] Indeed the events of that period, in terms of the 
situation in the Middle East, had several effects on bilateral relations between 
the U.K. and Egypt. On the one hand, the increased atmosphere of conflict and 
tension in the area at the time, where the U.K. was supporting the sides which 
were (independently) opposed to Nasser’s Egypt, namely Iraq and Israel, was 
bound to have a direct and negative effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations, 
especially as there was always the fear that these tensions might escalate into a 
military conflict. On the other hand, this very same variable, i.e. tensions in the 
Middle East which might escalate militarily, was such a frightening prospect 
that it forced the two states to realise the importance of keeping and 
maintaining official and open lines of communication between them, to avoid 
misunderstandings and misperceptions which might make the Middle East 
situation worse.
Indeed, it was exactly the foreign policy conflicts in the Middle East at the time 
which convinced Nasser and the Egyptian government of the need to restore 
relations between the two states to avoid the escalation of the conflict in the 
area, out of fear that such conflict might spill over into the realm of bilateral 
relations. [95] Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the U.K. was keen
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to resume relations even during the climax of its regional conflict it had with 
Nasser, even if this resumption meant that the U.K. had to incur a financial loss 
in the financial settlement with Egypt. [96]
Following these contacts, it was by then clear that diplomatic relations would 
have to be restored. The problem was the way such a restoration was to be 
orchestrated, Heikal managed to engineer this through the use of Al-Ahram. 
He asked the diplomatic correspondent of A l-A h ra m  to interview the 
Canadian Ambassador on November 13, to ask the latter about the Canadian 
efforts at restoring diplomatic relations between Egypt and the U.K. The next 
day, he reported the reverse of what the Canadian Ambassador had said to him, 
thus Al-Ahram  had a prominent article stating that Canada in effect was 
mediating the return of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the U.K. [97] 
Before the Canadian Ambassador or Colin Crowe could deny this, the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr. Fawzi, when asked by reporters about the story, 
said that relations were in the wind. At the same time, an Egyptian Foreign 
Ministry spokesman in an answer to a question said that the story was 
basically correct. When pressed about the time of resumption he said it would 
be in the “very near future” and “before the end of the year”. [98]
These reports, as well as Crowe’s recommendations that the supporters in 
Egypt of restoring diplomatic relations with the U.K. be given “ammunition” 
to help them in their efforts, [99] led to a statement made by the Foreign 
Secretary to the House of Commons on November 18, in which he said: “We 
should like to have fuller diplomatic representations in Cairo.” [100] This 
announcement in the House of Commons was prominently reported in a front­
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page article in Al-Ahram  on November 19, with a picture of Selwyn Lloyd. 
The article implied that the resumption of the relations was expected soon. 
[101]. Finally, Heikal agreed with Crowe on the method of resuming of 
diplomatic relations — namely the simultaneous announcement of a joint 
communique between both states. On November 23, Heikal informed Crowe 
about President Nasser’s decision to proceed with the resumption; the date 
chosen was December 1 at 1400 hours. Egypt initially proposed Mr. Mahmoud 
Riad as Charge d’Affaires, to be later named Ambassador, while the U.K. 
proposed Mr. Colin Crowe. [102] The detail and content of the joint 
communique were agreed between Crowe and Heikal during the last week of 
November.
Finally, and after several months of inconclusive negotiations, relations were 
restored when the agreed brief joint statement was released on December 1, 
1959, announcing the resumption of relations between the two governments, 
and naming Colin Crowe and Kamal Khalil as the Charges d ’Affaires in Cairo 
and London respectively. Although the Foreign Office had instructed its 
embassies in various posts to inform the governments to which they were 
accredited in advance about the decision (not more than about 24 hours in 
advance), the U.K. still realised that there could be a last-minute hitch. [103] 
Indeed, this hitch almost took place when the U.K. decided to sell Israel some 
submarines and there were some negative developments in the Sudan 
regarding the Mahdi’s call for re-negotiation over the water agreement. [104]
2 — Ambassadors
The resumption of diplomatic relations between the U.A.R. and the U.K. was 
thought to be the final resolution of the conflict that had started in the mid-50s
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and had even preceded the Suez crisis, a conflict that was perhaps inevitable 
considering the attitudes of both states and their leadership, as well as their 
conflicting foreign policy objectives. Predominant in both capitals was the 
general assumption that the exchange of ambassadors was to be take place 
within a couple of months, as mentioned by Heikal to Colin Crowe in October
1959.
Indeed British expectations and intentions were exactly that, for the letter of 
credentials Crowe submitted to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry named him as 
Charge d’Affaires “ad interim”, i.e. that it was a temporary post which meant 
that ambassadors were to be appointed. Indeed, the “ad interim” in Crowe’s 
letter of credentials threatened to delay the Egyptian acceptance of it. Initially, 
the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to accept the letter because 
the term “ad interim” exceeded the terms of the joint communique. [105] 
Nevertheless, Crowe submitted his letter of credentials, thanks to the 
intervention of Heikal who persuaded the Foreign Ministry to accept it after he 
had talked to Nasser. [106]
Egypt’s acceptance of Colin Crowe’s letter of credentials despite the term “ad 
interim” is significant because it shows that Nasser was also expecting an early 
exchange of ambassadors at that stage. This was further confirmed when 
Crowe, in his first meeting with Murad Ghalib, the Deputy Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, on December 21, 1959, discussed the subject of the names of the 
future ambassadors of the two countries. Egypt at the time was considering 
Mahmud Riad as the first Egyptian Ambassador in London, [107] a fact that 
was mentioned by Heikal in his talks with Crowe in October of that year. [108]
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Nevertheless, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry refused to grant the U.K. mission 
in Egypt the title of “embassy” because the U.K. had no ambassador, thus the 
mission was to be entitled a “diplomatic mission”, a fact that the U.K. had to 
accept since the point was valid. [109] However, despite the title of the 
mission, expectations were quite positive regarding the future of the relations 
between the two states. The favourable reception to the resumption of the 
relations in both the U.A.R. and the U.K. appeared from the positive reaction 
to that decision in the U.K. Parliament to its announcement by the Secretary of 
State on December 1 as well as the positive response in the newspapers of both 
countries. [110] Other positive changes included the formation of an all-party 
parliamentary group interested in Egypt and Syria and in increasing the 
relations of the U.K. with these two countries. [ I l l ]
The first problem that arose after the resumption of relations occurred even 
before Crowe submitted his credentials. The Port Said local council decided to 
erect a museum to celebrate the anniversary of the killing of British servicemen 
during the Suez War. This resulted in vehement attacks on Egypt in the British 
press. This incident, despite its potential damage to bilateral relations, passed 
without either side making an issue out of it. [112] Relations between both 
states were improving, despite whatever frictions appeared. There were U.K. 
complaints about Egypt’s slow execution of the financial agreement, mainly in 
the areas of desequestration. However, the tardiness of the Egyptian 
government in desequestrating British properties was judged by the U.K. 
Charge d’Affaires in Cairo as resulting mainly from the failures of the Egyptian 
bureaucracy and not the will of the Egyptian government. Crowe argued that 
“our complaints are peripheral to the agreement not to its heart”. Furthermore, 
he advised against the U.K. complaining to Mr. Black of the World Bank;
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advice that was adhered to. Therefore, it appeared that the bilateral agreements 
between both states were being adequately respected and that the U.K. no 
longer felt the need to resort to third party mediation. [113]
At the same time the U.K. Secretary of State issued instructions to the heads of 
the U.K. missions abroad to the effect that the representatives of the U.A.R. 
were “to be treated on a par with representatives of other countries with 
whom H.M.G. are on reasonable terms”. And though the Secretary of State’s 
instructions warned that such a treatment should not be over-friendly to the 
extent of offending Middle Eastern and African countries with which the U.K. 
had special relations, he went on to warn U.K. representatives to be on their 
guard when carrying out the latter instructions as the U.A.R. representatives 
were likely to be over-sensitive. [114]
The goodwill at the time was not limited to the U.K., but was also felt in Egypt, 
as expressed by Egyptian officials publicly and privately. In Crowe’s first 
meeting with Dr. Murad Ghalib, the Egyptian Under-Secretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, on December 19, 1959, the latter expressed Egyptian hopes 
for an increase in the intensity of bilateral ties between the two states, 
especially in the areas of economic, cultural and educational relations. [115] 
However, more important at that stage was the public position of Nasser and 
the Egyptian government. Nasser’s and his government’s approval of the new 
start of the relations with the U.K. was outlined by Nasser himself on December 
23, 1959. In his speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the evacuation of 
the British troops from Port Said, Nasser said that Egypt was ready ”to forget 
the past and start a new era”. [116] There was also an improvement in trade
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relations between the two states. Egypt purchased in 1960 three Comet planes 
and was about to increase its imports from the U.K. At the same time, the U.K. 
wanted to increase its trade with Egypt and for that purpose invited the U.A.R. 
Minister for Industry, Aziz Sidqi, to visit the U.K. and allocated £20 million to 
Egypt in export credits so as to be able to participate in the Egyptian Five Year 
Plan. [117]
However, despite apparent good intentions from both states, relations faced 
yet another period of relapse which affected the speedy upgrading of the 
relationship to the ambassadorial level, which Heikal and Crowe had agreed 
would take place within a few months of the resumption of relations. Instead, 
the exchange of ambassadors took over a year to materialise.
The first reason for this delay was a deterioration in the state of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict at the end of January 1960, caused by a border incident, the Al- 
Tawafiq incident, on the Syrian-Israeli border. Because both the U.K. and the 
United States positions were negative, as far as Egypt was concerned, this led 
to a deterioration in the relations between Egypt and both the U.S. and the 
U.K. This incident, as well as the Israeli factor, were the main issues responsible 
for the delay in the appointment of ambassadors between the two states in the 
first half of 1960. [118]
Indeed, the British position and policy towards Israel was the main factor that 
not only delayed the appointment of ambassadors but also soured the 
atmosphere of the newly reconstructed relations between the two states. The 
Israeli issue was of paramount importance and gravity to the national security 
of Egypt, as perceived by Nasser and the entire Egyptian government
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machinery. The military assistance given by the U.K. to Israel, at a time when 
Israel was adopting an aggressive policy — violating Egyptian airspace by 
military flights over Sinai, threatening the northern province of the U.A.R. by 
getting into border clashes on the Syrian-Israeli border — was an issue that 
transcended a mere clash in foreign policy. It was an issue which threatened 
Egypt’s national security and could not be ignored or underestimated. The 
U.K.’s military assistance to an aggressive Israel fuelled Egypt’s anxiety as to a 
military threat which occupied “the traditional heart of national security 
concerns” and was “accorded the highest priority in national security 
concerns”. [119]
Indeed, the impact of that issue on Anglo-Egyptian relations was confirmed 
through the channel that helped reconstruct that relationship initially, i.e. the 
Crowe-Heikal channel of communications. Heikal used that channel yet again 
when the relations between the two states reached a low ebb in March 1960. 
He asked to see Crowe and informed him of Nasser’s disappointment in the 
U.K. because of the growing relations between the U.K. and Israel at the time, 
and also because some U.K. officials had made some statements about Egypt 
that were badly received. These statements were by both Lloyd and Macmillan 
who had responded, in reply to questions in Parliament regarding the 
publication of Anthony Eden’s memoirs, stating that they were proud to have 
supported Eden’s policy in the Suez affair in 1956. These remarks had an even 
worse effect as they coincided with Ben Gurion’s visit to the U.K. [120]
The second issue that led to the delay in the appointment of ambassadors 
between the two states regarded the opening of consulates. Following the 
resumption of relations on December 1, 1959, both states wanted to move to
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the second outstanding issue which was the resumption of consular relation 
and their diplomatic representation in each other’s lands and spheres of 
influence. Egypt wanted to open consulates in the U.K. itself as well as in some 
of the British protectorates. The Egyptian list included London and Liverpool 
as well as nine posts in British protectorates: Nairobi, Kampala, Entebbe, Dar- 
es-Salaam, Sierra Leone, Aden, Hong Kong, Singapore and Kuwait (as far as 
the latter was concerned, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 
they would also approach the ruler of Kuwait directly). The U.K. asked to 
open consulates in Damascus, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez and Aleppo. [121]
The Egyptian government refused to concede any consular posts for the U.K. 
until the U.K. itself accepted the Egyptian demands for consular posts. The 
British government, on the other hand, was deeply suspicious of the Egyptian 
demands to open consular posts in the territories that it controlled because it 
feared that these posts were going to support independence movements in 
these colonies or protectorates and that their main activity would be to try to 
drive the U.K. out of these colonies. Certainly, there were legitimate reasons for 
the U.K. to object to the Egyptian demands, as the Egyptian government itself 
was then supporting most of the independence movements in Africa and the 
Arab world, and decolonisation became a major theme of the Egyptian foreign 
policy of the time. Indeed, this policy of Egypt compelled the British 
representatives (mainly governors) in these posts to object strongly to the 
opening of Egyptian consular posts in their territories. [122]
The question of the consular posts of each state in the territories of (or 
territories controlled by) the other became a major issue which blocked the 
path of the appointment of ambassadors throughout the remainder of 1960.
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Because of the importance the U.K. placed on its relations with Egypt and 
upgrading the relations to the ambassadorial level, the discord which occurred 
in the field of Anglo-Egyptian relations spilled over into the relations between 
the Foreign and Colonial offices in the British government itself. The Foreign 
Office was exasperated by the adamant refusal of the Colonial Office to grant 
any concession and agree to Egypt’s opening almost any consulate in the 
colonies. Indeed that matter had to be decided not just in the Cabinet, but by 
separate meetings chaired by the Prime Minister which included the Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. [123]
This impasse was solved by the occurrence, almost by chance, of the highest- 
level meeting between the leaders of the governments of the U.K. and Egypt. 
This was the summit meeting between Nasser and Macmillan in September- 
October 1960, in New York, while both leaders were attending the U.N. 
General Assembly meetings. The details of the meeting were arranged on 
September 26, 1960 when the foreign ministers of both countries met and 
decided that a summit meeting should take place. [124] The leaders of both 
states wanted that meeting, as the idea was suggested by Macmillan and 
agreed to by Nasser. However, protocol proved an obstacle, because Nasser 
refused to go to meet Macmillan and insisted that Macmillan should come to 
him, since it was Macmillan who had suggested the meeting in the first place. 
Macmillan, on the other hand, felt that Nasser should come to him, since it was 
Egypt that had severed diplomatic relations with the U.K. To bypass this issue, 
it was agreed between Heikal and the Macmillan delegation that two meetings 
should be arranged, the first at the Egyptian mission to the United Nations and 
the second at the hotel where Macmillan was residing in New York. Therefore, 
a chance meeting was engineered while the two leaders were attending the
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General Assembly meetings in New York. After Macmillan introduced himself, 
Nasser invited him for a meeting and two meetings then occurred between 
them. [125] The first meeting took place at the U.A.R. Permanent Mission to 
the United Nations in New York, on September 28, while the second meeting 
took place in the U.K. Prime Minister’s suite at the Waldorf Astoria on October 
3, 1960.
These meetings contributed tremendously to the positive development of 
bilateral relations. Nasser agreed with the Prime Minister’s suggestion as to the 
usefulness of appointing ambassadors between the two states. Indeed, during 
the first meeting, Nasser said that he accepted the appointment of Sir Harold 
Beeley as the U.K. Ambassador to Cairo, when the exchange of ambassadors 
took place. These meetings allowed both leaders to agree on their desire both 
to establish diplomatic relations and to improve the relations between both 
countries especially in the economic area. Although the meeting illustrated the 
differences in the approach and outlook between both states in the areas of 
foreign relations, especially regarding the Soviet Union and King Hussein, it 
still confirmed the unity of purpose of both states in opposing Communism. 
[126]
Furthermore, this meeting resulted in an agreement for another meeting 
between the foreign ministers of both states on October 7, 1960 in New York, 
to discuss bilateral relations. During that meeting, Dr. Fawzi agreed on the 
exchange of ambassadors. However, he also asked for a response regarding 
Egypt’s request for consular posts. Both foreign ministers agreed that the date 
for the exchange of the names of the ambassadors should be November 15,
1960. [127]
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However, the issue of the consular posts was still unresolved, because the U.K. 
refused to grant any of the Egyptian demands with the exception of three 
consular posts — in Singapore, Hong Kong, and either Liverpool or 
Manchester. Therefore the timetable for the exchange of names of the 
ambassadors of both states in the other’s capital kept being delayed. After the 
date was delayed to November 30, then to December, the U.K. decided not to 
fix a date, but to inform the Egyptian government that it was prepared to 
exchange the names of ambassadors whenever the Egyptian government was 
prepared to do so. Meanwhile, the British position regarding granting Egypt 
consular posts was improved by some sweeteners. First it offered Egypt a 
consular post in Sierra Leone, and gave acceptance, in principle, for one in 
Kuwait. At the same time the U.K. gave an oral promise to review its decision 
on the Egyptian requests for consulates in Entebbe, Dar-es-Salaam and 
Zanzibar in one year’s time. Suddenly, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry agreed 
to exchange the names of the ambassadors, and offered the U.K. consular 
positions in Damascus and Alexandria. [128]
A common feature of the Egyptian decisions to grant the U.K. a mission in 
Cairo, to restore diplomatic relations and finally to exchange the names of the 
ambassadors, was the suddenness of these decisions. During the long process 
of negotiations to achieve the above-mentioned results, the U.K. was always 
surprised when it found the impasse blocking an agreement suddenly broken 
when Egypt, out of the blue, accepted the U.K. offer without any prelude. The 
reason was related to the decision-making process in Egypt. Such matters were 
ultimately decided by Nasser himself. Therefore, during the U.K.’s negotiations 
with the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, it would be facing policy decided by
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Nasser some time back. However, whenever Nasser decided to upgrade 
relations with the U.K., he did not consult the officials conducting the 
negotiations with the U.K. but merely informed them of his decision, expecting 
an immediate result.
The names of the ambassadors of both states were exchanged on January 15, 
1961, and the agreement for their appointment was announced on January 22. 
The upgrading of relations was in itself an achievement as it meant the 
effective end of a chapter in the history of bilateral relations between the U.K. 
and Egypt, a chapter that started even before November 1, 1956. The choice of 
ambassadors was indicative of the importance that each state placed on their 
bilateral relations. Sir Harold Beeley was a senior official at the Foreign Office, 
he was the U.K. Ambassador to Jedda, the Assistant Under Secretary of State 
at the Foreign Office as well as the acting head of the U.K. Mission to the 
United Nations in New York. The Egyptian Ambassador to the Court of Saint 
James, Mr. Mohamed Awad al-Kony, was occupying Egypt’s leading 
ambassadorial post, Moscow, at the time of his appointment, and he was 
known as one of Egypt’s leading diplomats. In their choice of ambassadors, 
both countries merely confirmed the importance that they both placed on their 
bilateral relationship.
m  THE ATTITUDE OF BOTH STATES
TO THE RELATIONS
A The U.K.
The way in which relations were finally restored between the two states gives 
rise to a serious and even more important question. In the light of the serious
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differences between the two states, as far as their foreign policies were 
concerned and the regional conflict that ensued between them, whether in the 
Middle East or in Africa, did the reconstruction of relations mean a genuine 
reconciliation with Nasser, or was it merely a reconstruction of the relationship 
between the two states? For if the former was true, i.e. that it was a total 
reconciliation, then how was it that the regional conflict intensified during the 
period in which this relationship was actively being reconstructed?
The answer to that question is that it was indeed a reconstruction of the 
relationship. Such a reconstruction helped reconcile the differences between 
the U.K. and Egypt. Indeed, the first mandate of the new British Ambassador in 
Cairo, Sir Harold Beeley, when he arrived at his post in 1961 was to establish a 
“good and business-like relationship between Her Majesty’s government and 
U.A.R. government”. [129] Nevertheless, the same document which instructed 
Sir Harold Beeley to try and improve the relations between both states was 
also loaded with outlining the differences between the U.K. and Egypt on 
most major international problems, especially de-colonisation and the East- 
West conflict. [130] It is also noteworthy that even while the U.K. was 
generating its maximum efforts to reach a financial agreement and establish 
diplomatic relations with Egypt — in 1958 and 1959 —  it had not in any way 
changed its views on Nasser or his policies. When a Conservative Member of 
Parliament (Nigel Fisher) wrote to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in 
December 1958 expressing his, and other Conservative backbench Members 
of Parliament’s, fear that the U.K. was going to pursue an appeasement policy 
towards Nasser [131] the government response was most emphatic. 
Commander Allan Noble, the Minister of State, wrote to the M.P. explaining 
that the U.K .’s goal was merely to reach a financial settlement vis-a-vis the
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U.K. claims in Egypt and assuring him that “it is quite untrue that the Foreign 
Office has gone pro-Nasser or that we have any thoughts of appeasement”. 
The Minister of State emphasised that the U.K. was merely pursuing the 
financial agreement and for that purpose it wanted a normal relationship with 
the U.A.R. However it also stressed that the U.K. was not “under any illusion 
that the resumption of relations and the settlement of financial problems would 
themselves lead to any dramatic improvement in our relations. Indeed we 
should go very cautiously and with our eyes fully open to the dangers which 
Nasserism presents." [132]
However, that response was in no way an attempt to appease public and 
parliamentary opinion in the U.K. as the events of 1959 unfolded. In February 
1959 — just before the signature of the financial agreement with Egypt, and 
while the U.K. Secretary of State was seeking to establish diplomatic relations 
with Egypt — he was at the same time trying to dissuade the United States 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, from changing U.S. policy towards 
Egypt or giving it any large amount of aid. He also tried to convince Dulles 
that the United States should not participate in the second stage of the High 
Dam project or give Egypt any loan for the Suez Canal development project. 
Furthermore, he even asked the American Foreign Secretary not to encourage 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to give the 
proposed $100 million loan to the Suez Canal development project. [133]
The U.K. did not limit its efforts to trying to deny Egypt Western aid or 
American support at the meeting that took place between Lloyd and Dulles in 
February 1959. In April 1959 the U.K. renewed its contact with the American
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administration to try to convince the latter of the negative aspects of Nasser, 
and especially the ill effects of his influence in the Middle East. The U.K. 
stressed that though Nasser appeared to be against Communism, the result of 
his policies was exactly the opposite; and even more he could change at any 
moment to support Communism. The U.K. message to the U.S. State 
Department was also aimed at trying to persuade the United States that Nasser 
could not be depended on and should not be a recipient of United States aid. 
[134] Once the U.K. realised that the I.B.R.D. loan to the Suez Canal was 
going through, it immediately instructed its ambassador to Washington to make 
representations to the World Bank to the effect that Egypt was not fulfilling 
the terms of the financial agreement — which Mr. Black of the World Bank 
had helped mediate — in an attempt to dissuade the latter from proceeding 
with the loan. [135] Indeed, the U.K. admitted to Mr. Black, when he was 
received in London by the Secretary of State on May 7, 1959, that they were 
holding the American administration back from giving aid to Egypt. [136]
The U.K. Secretary of State continued his attempts to dissuade the World Bank 
from agreeing to the $100 million loan to Egypt’s Suez Canal development 
project when he implied to Mr. Black, when he met him again in July 1959, that 
the U.K. might not support that project when it was submitted to the Board, 
knowing that if Mr. Black felt the project might not be accepted by the Board 
he would not submit it, as the Board had not refused a loan for the previous 11 
years. [137] The same attitude was also taken by the Secretary of State when 
he met Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld in Geneva, less than a week later, where he 
expressed the view that the U.K. would probably object to the Suez loan 
because of Egypt’s refusal to allow Israeli shipping through the Canal. [138] 
The British officials’ negative perception of Egypt and Nasser is also confirmed
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from the internal memoranda between these officials. Thus, even when the 
Foreign Secretary was writing to the Prime Minister recommending a detente 
with Egypt and suggesting that the U.K. should engage the mediation of the 
Canadian government, through the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo, to try to 
convince the Egyptian leadership to resuming relations with the U.K., the 
Foreign Secretary felt obliged to start his memorandum by writing, of Nasser, 
that “I still fundamentally distrust him“ and ending his recommendations by 
asserting that “we do not love him much”. [139]
However the issue which confirmed, even to the Egyptians themselves at the 
time, British suspicions and fear of Egypt was the issue of the exchange of 
consulates. The British response to the Egyptian requests to open consular 
posts in the territories under its sphere of influence is most revealing. The U.K. 
adamantly refused Egyptian requests for consular posts, especially in East 
Africa, Aden and Cyprus. The attitude of the Colonial Office in particular is 
most revealing as it considered granting Egypt’s consular posts in its territories 
as opening the door to trouble and Communism fermented by Egypt. Indeed, 
the Colonial Office was so adamant that it resisted the pleading of the Foreign 
Office and, to a great extent, the intervention of the Prime Minister. [140]
The issue of Communism, as that period shows, was responsible for a great part 
of the misunderstandings between the two states and their antipathy towards 
each other. The U.K., on the one hand, believed that Egypt was supporting 
encouraging communist insurgencies in Africa and the Middle East. Egypt, on 
the other hand, believed that the U.K. was supporting Qasim in Iraq, which 
Nasser considered to be a communist regime. Some U.K. officials, especially in 
the Colonial Office, considered Nasser’s regime to be pro-Communist. They
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based that belief on several features of Nasser’s rule, such as his close 
relationship with the Soviet Union, his support of revolutionary and 
independence movements in the Third World, together with his declared anti­
imperialist stance and slogans and his declared ideology of national-socialism. 
The fact that this period was one which witnessed the escalation of the cold 
war influenced their interpretation of Nasser’s relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Nasser feared a different kind of Communism, mainly the activities of 
communist parties and movements in Egypt and the Arab world, which he 
considered a threat to him and to the policy that he began to represent, Arab 
nationalism. He saw the U.K.’s support of Qasim as an attempt to try to build 
up what he considered as a communist regime to replace Nasser and his 
ideology of Arab nationalism. And though the views of both states regarding 
relations between Communism and the other state had severe limitations, 
nevertheless, the importance of these views was their influence on the 
perceptions of both states and thus their direct and ultimate effect on their 
policies towards each other.
B Egypt
It was not only the U.K. which did not want a total and genuine reconciliation. 
Egypt itself was quite hesitant in accepting to reconstruct the bilateral 
relations, as its reluctance to resume diplomatic relations in the first place as 
well as to upgrade the official relations to ambassadorial status demonstrated. 
In addition to the reasons outlined earlier for Egypt’s refusal to resume bilateral 
relations with the U.K., there were other reasons also which contributed to 
Egypt’s delay in approving an exchange of ambassadors.
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According to Colin Crowe, who spent the period from 1958 until 1961 trying 
to reconstruct the relationship, as a member of the U.K. delegation to the 
financial negotiations in Rome, Geneva and Cairo, later, as head of the British 
Property Commission, and then as Charge d ’Affaires in Cairo from 1959 to 
1961, there were other reasons as well. The first was the Egyptian belief that 
there was a direct conflict of interest between the two countries in respect to 
Egypt’s policy of Arab nationalism and the U.K.’s traditional interests in that 
area. This basic belief made the Egyptian leaders more suspicious of the U.K. 
and prone to believe fallacious arguments about it, the most flagrant of which 
was that the U.K. was supporting the communists in Iraq. The second reason, 
according to Crowe, was the existence of Israel and the continuing state of 
belligerence between it and the Arab states. The Egyptian leaders blamed the 
West for the existence of Israel, and especially the U.K. for the Balfour 
Declaration. The Suez War confirmed that belief for the new Egyptian regime; 
the U.K. policy of assisting Israel politically and through the sale of arms kept 
that belief alive.
Another major reason for the reluctance of Egypt to accept a British 
ambassador in Cairo was due mainly to the history and pattern of the Anglo- 
Egyptian relations prior to the 1952 coup. Crowe referred to the triangle of 
power that had existed prior to the demise of the monarchy, where the role of 
the U.K. Ambassador or High Commissioner had been paramount in deciding 
the outcome of political decisions in Egypt. The 1942 incident, when the U.K. 
Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson had forced the king to appoint the Nahas 
government with the use of British troops, was an incident of major relevance 
for President Nasser and his comrades in the new Egyptian regime that came to 
power in 1952. Nasser frequently referred to it in his speeches, saying that
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Egypt was now an independent country in which the British Ambassador 
could not dictate to Egyptian ministers. The fact that Egypt, for a while at least, 
did not even allow the presence of a British ambassador in Cairo was the best 
support for Nasser’s arguments about his country’s independence. Indeed, 
that point prompted Crowe to remark that it would have been better for the 
future of Anglo-Egyptian relations if Egypt had been made a U.K. colony, 
where the lines of authority were clear. As a result of the history of the 
relationship the Egyptians were more than reasonably suspicious of the role of 
the U.K. representative in Egypt. Finally, there were the feelings of anti- 
Westernism in Egypt which naturally affected the prospects of the U.K. and 
U.A.R. relationship. [141]
IV A GOOD START FOR THE RELATIONS
The appointment of ambassadors between the two states, after a great deal of 
difficulty and aggravation over issues relating to Israel or regarding the 
exchange of consular posts, marked the start of a new stage in the relations 
between the U.K. and Egypt. The upgrading of relations between the two 
states to ambassadorial level was a result of the positive improvement of the 
atmosphere of the relations between the two states. The years of animosity 
resulting from the clashes in the foreign policies of the two states had led to the 
rise of problems in the sphere of bilateral relations between them. These 
problems forced both countries to realise the importance of restoring and 
maintaining the official links between them. Furthermore, the importance of 
both countries in the region that witnessed their rivalries and competition, the 
Middle East, convinced them both of the need for links between them to 
maintain consultation and to avoid misunderstandings which in turn could
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have increased the tensions in that volatile area. At the same time, the restoring 
of diplomatic relations between the states and the appointment of ambassadors 
contributed to the improvement in bilateral relations, as it meant increasing the 
intensity and level of consultation between officials of both states.
Accordingly, this new stage marked an improvement in relations in the bilateral 
field as well as a decrease in the regional conflict between the two states. The 
decrease in the regional conflict was mainly the result of the changes that 
occurred in the situation in the Middle East, but the existence of bilateral 
relations and bilateral contacts between the U.K. and Egypt allowed for the 
existence of a larger degree of harmony between them.
A Decrease in Regional Conflict: Kuwait
Despite the fact that the main reason for the regional conflict between the U.K. 
and Egypt was their different perceptions of (and thus policy towards) Qasim’s 
Iraq, it was exactly the politics of that country (Iraq) which allowed for the 
decrease in the regional conflict between them. This occurred thanks to 
Qasim’s policy towards Kuwait. On April 30,1961, President Qasim, in a speech 
to the Reserve Military Academy in Iraq, attacked the U.K.’s policy towards 
Kuwait and laid claim to the territories of that country, anticipating that the 
U.K. might grant independence to it. Qasim’s rhetoric increased in vehemence 
when he officially laid claim to the state of Kuwait. The U.K. believed that 
Qasim might indeed use force to occupy Kuwait or try to engineer a coup of 
some sort to use as a pretext for occupying it.
As a result of this incident, the U.K. guaranteed the defence of Kuwait under
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an exchange of notes between the two countries on June 19, 1961. This was 
followed by a message from the U.K. government to the Emir of Kuwait 
confirming the U.K.’s obligation to defend his territory. Moreover, the U.K. 
dispatched British troops to Kuwait to ensure its defence. [142] The presence 
of these troops, even though it was in defence of Kuwait, posed serious 
problems for the U.K. Apart from the risk of the escalation of the crisis to the 
stage of military action, their presence in Kuwait was jeopardising the 
admittance of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations. The Soviet Union 
indicated that it would veto Kuwait’s application if it was submitted while 
there were British troops on its soil. [143] At the same time, the presence of 
U.K. troops in Kuwait gave Qasim a propaganda advantage, which the British 
Political Resident in Kuwait feared might give him the support he lacked from 
the rest of the Arab states — for Qasim was isolated in the Arab world at that 
time. The U.K. representative in Kuwait believed that the U.K. would only 
achieve victory over Iraq in that dispute if the Iraqi threat was averted by Arab 
diplomatic action. [144]
The U.K. wanted to withdraw its troops from Kuwait, while maintaining the 
security of that State to the satisfaction of the Emir of Kuwait, since the U.K. 
was legally bound to ensure that by Article D of the Exchange of Notes of 
June 19, 1961, The U.K.’s dilemma was compounded by its lack of any kind of 
support from the United States, which declared that the defence of Kuwait was 
a matter between the U.K. and Kuwait. [145] This led the U.K. to seek a 
solution that it would have adamantly refused and fought against just a couple 
of years back.
That solution was to resort to the Arab League, which was based in Cairo; its
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Secretary General, Abd al-Khaliq Hassuna, was also Egyptian and Egypt 
enjoyed considerable influence in the League. The Arab League accepted 
Kuwait’s membership and undertook to support the Emir of Kuwait in the 
defence of his state against the threat of Iraqi aggression. The solution that the 
Arab League proposed was the creation of an Arab League Force to go to 
Kuwait and take over its defence from the British troops there, who would 
then withdraw.
The details of that particular issue are not of direct concern to this research. 
However, what is directly relevant is the fact that the U.K. not only did not 
object to that solution, but did its utmost to support it. Only a year earlier, the 
U.K. had refused a mere consular post for Egypt in Kuwait. During the current 
crisis, however, the U.K. actively persuaded the reluctant Emir of Kuwait to 
accept the presence of these troops and lobbied for the point that such a force 
be of sufficient strength to deter an Iraqi aggression, and therefore argued for 
the participation of Egyptian troops in it (initially Egypt’s proposal to the Arab 
League about the sending of Arab League troops to Kuwait had stipulated 
that countries bordering Israel would be excluded from contributing to the 
force).
Moreover, the U.K. even agreed to the Egyptian stipulation that when the 
Arab League Force arrived in Kuwait the U.K. troops would have to leave. 
[146] Thus, the situation had arisen where the U.K. was actively trying to bring 
military troops — which included Egyptian troops — to Kuwait to substitute 
for British troops there. This was exceptional, considering the importance of 
Kuwait in terms of oil supplies to the U.K., since it meant that after years of the 
U.K. basing its policy in the Middle East on the alliance with Iraq against
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Nasser’s Egypt, it was now willing to let Egyptian troops replace its own 
troops to counter Iraqi threat.
B Improvement in Bilateral Ties
The first sign of the improvement that occurred in bilateral ties between Egypt 
and the U.K. after the restoration of official relations and the subsequent, 
though much delayed, agreement about the appointment of ambassadors, was 
the removal of the outstanding problems between the two states. Indeed, the 
existence of these problems was the catalyst that had forced the two countries 
to meet to discuss them and then to negotiate an agreement to resolve these 
issues, and had forced them to see the importance of having official 
representation in each other capitals to ensure the execution of that agreement. 
Nevertheless, it was essential to resolve these problems, otherwise their 
continued presence would have contributed to souring the newly restored 
relationship.
The first of these problems to be resolved were the release of the Egyptian 
blocked balances in the U.K., the Number One account, and the gradual release 
of the balances in the Number Two account which was to be governed by the 
agreement of the two countries in the exchange of notes on November 10, 
1952 and August 30, 1955 [147] and the removal of the restrictions that Egypt 
imposed on U.K. nationals in Egypt under Presidential Proclamation No. 5 of 
November 1, 1956. The gradual desequestration of British properties in Egypt 
was also started in 1959, and was only subject to the administrative capabilities 
of the Egyptian Sequestrator General’s organisation. These matters, as well as 
the matter of compensation for British employees dismissed from the service of
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the Egyptian government, were all successfully negotiated by the financial 
agreement signed in February 1959.
However, there were other outstanding issues that remained to be settled 
between the two states. The most important of these concerned the two British 
subjects imprisoned in Egypt on charges of espionage. The prisoners, Mr. 
Swindon and Mr. Zarb, had been arrested in Egypt in August 1956, in the 
period between the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the Suez War. After 
their trial (concluded on June 22, 1957), the U.K. government had protested in 
July 1957 — through the Swiss government — about the sentences, which 
also included the acquittal of some five other British subjects who had also 
been arrested in connection with the espionage case. [148] The protest had 
been refused by the Egyptian government and the matter promised to be 
settled only within the framework of settlement between the two countries. 
Indeed, the only glimmer of hope in that regard had appeared when Colonel 
Hatim visited the U.K. in September of that year, when, as explained earlier, he 
indicated Egypt’s willingness to free the two prisoners in the package deal he 
was then offering. The same undertaking had been given by the Egyptian 
Ambassador to Rome on December 6, 1957, towards the end of the financial 
talks that were conducted there. [149] Certainly, the issue of Zarb and 
Swindon commanded sufficient attention in the U.K. to the extent that it was 
repeatedly discussed in Cabinet meetings, especially in 1958, and it was an 
issue in which the Prime Minister himself took an interest.
The U.K. Cabinet had decided, since January 1958, to make the U.K. 
acceptance of the financial agreement with Egypt conditional on the release of 
the two British prisoners. On September 9, 1958, the British government
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decided that in consideration of Egyptian public opinion their release would 
not be part of the financial agreement. That policy of the U.K., namely linking 
the issues of the two prisoners with that of the financial agreement, rather than 
making the agreement conditional on their release, aimed at securing the 
release of the two prisoners just after the initialling of the agreement and before 
the actual signature and before the release of the Egyptian balances in the U.K. 
Prime Minister Macmillan confirmed that policy on September 9,1958, after the 
Foreign Office proposed it once again on September 2, 1958. [150]
However the U.K. did not stick to this stipulation — that the release of the two 
prisoners should precede the signature of the financial agreement — just as it 
did not stick to its other stipulation that the U.K. should have a diplomatic 
mission in Cairo. This was decided because the British government was keen 
on reaching an agreement with Egypt, and also because it believed that Egypt 
would release the prisoners shortly after the signature of the financial 
agreement [151] When this hope did not materialise, the U.K. continued to try 
to convince the Egyptian government to release the two prisoners, both 
through direct private messages from the Secretary of State Selwyn Lloyd to 
his Egyptian counterpart Dr. Fawzi and the use of the good offices of Black 
and Hammarskjoeld. [152]
All the British efforts to secure the release of Zarb and Swindon were as 
fruitless as their efforts to establish a British diplomatic mission. However, 
thanks to the intervention of Heikal, [153] Egypt suddenly decided to release 
Swindon in September 1959. The U.K. had agreed, earlier that year, to limit the 
press coverage of Swindon’s release, to save the Egyptian government any 
embarrassment if the British Press covered it extensively, and there was but a
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passing mention of the news in The Times in just nine lines under the headline 
"Mr. Swindon To Be Freed Today". [154] Although the U.K. continued and 
increased its efforts to release the other prisoner, Zarb, efforts which included 
attempting to link the resumption of diplomatic relations with his release, as 
well as the mediation of Mr. Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister, and other world 
leaders whose good offices had been previously used, [155] all these attempts 
proved of no avail.
Finally, Heikal informed Crowe on February 3, 1961, just a few days before the 
latter’s departure from Cairo, that the Egyptian government had decided to 
give him a “cheque” as a goodbye present. That “cheque” turned out to be 
the release of Zarb. [156] However, the Egyptian government felt that it 
needed to justify the release of Zarb, and therefore it used the pretext of a 
public argument that had taken place in Montreal between Professor Toynbee 
and the Israeli Ambassador to Canada. Al-Ahram  newspaper allocated front 
page coverage to this heated exchange, as well as to Professor Toynbee’s 
public commentaries, which attacked Israel. [157] When Heikal informed 
Crowe of Zarb’s release he expressed the wish that now the last problem 
between the two states was resolved and that the two states could start their 
relations with a clean slate. [158]
The matter of Zarb was not the only one that ceased to be an obstacle in the 
path of the full normalisation of the relations between the two states. Other 
issues which delayed the exchange of the names of ambassadors between the 
two countries also ceased to be problems. The Egyptian government stopped 
complaining to the U.K. regarding the issuance of visas to Egyptian officials 
wishing to go to the African counties that were still protected by the U.K.
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During the course of 1961, the Egyptian government established a consulate in 
Kuwait and was promised a consulate in Dar-es-Salaam. [159]
As for the remainder of the Egyptian consular demands, there was little cause 
for concern about a possible negative effect of that issue on the future of the 
bilateral ties between the two countries because of the expected independence 
of the African states in question. Moreover, after the U.K. refused to grant 
Egypt consular posts, Nasser embarked on a new policy to spread Egyptian 
influence in Africa through economic and commercial links. This policy was 
executed through establishing branches for an Egyptian company, Al-Nasr, 
which was to concentrate on trade with African states. Indeed, the establishing 
of branches of Al-Nasr was not based on the economic utility of these 
branches but rather on the importance of creating Egyptian centres of 
influence in these countries and waving the Egyptian flag as a substitute for 
diplomatic missions. [160]
Certainly the bilateral relations between the two states appeared to be moving 
in a positive way. There occurred several meetings between the new British 
Ambassador in Cairo and the Egyptian President, as well as the Foreign 
Minister. The U.K. Secretary of State invited his Egyptian counterpart to 
luncheon in his honour when the latter passed through London from New 
York. [161] At the same time, London was once again heavily frequented by 
Egyptian officials, such as Musa Arafa and Aziz Sidqi, to the extent that the 
new Egyptian Ambassador in London felt that he was overwhelmed by the 
frequency of the visitors. [162]
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The nascent relationship between the U.K. and Egypt was able to be resilient 
in the face of the occasional chilly winds that blew over it in 1961. Thus after 
demonstrators in Cairo attacked the American and British embassies in 1961, 
causing some minor damage to the U.K. mission, the Foreign Office instructed 
its embassy in Cairo not to claim for compensation from the Egyptian 
government for the damage, as there was no evidence that there had been any 
failure or negligence from the Egyptian government in protecting the U.K. 
mission. [163]
Relations were further improved when officials of both states were finally able 
to explain their own respective governments’ decisions and policies regarding 
such thorny issues as de-colonisation, as well as Arab politics [164] The 
relationship reached a state where it was possible to describe it as cordial. It 
even allowed the U.K. Secretary of State to make an attempt at mediation 
between Egypt and France when Egypt arrested some members of the French 
Property Commission in Cairo in 1961, on the charge of espionage (France up 
to that point had not been able to re-establish diplomatic relations with Egypt). 
After years of fearing to be linked or identified once again with France, after 
the events of the Tripartite Aggression, the U.K. Secretary of State felt able to 
inform the Egyptian Ambassador in London that it was desirable that Egypt 
should release the arrested French representatives. [165] Even the re­
sequestration measures by the Egyptian government, which were mainly 
directed against Egyptians but also affected some 47 U.K. owners, was a 
matter that was discussed calmly at that meeting without the risk that it could 
be escalated into an issue which could threaten the existence of the bilateral 
ties between the two countries. [166]
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y  CONCLUSION
The conclusion of the financial agreement between Egypt and the U.K. meant 
the resolution of the technical problems which had been created between both 
countries by the Suez crisis. This meant the way was paved for the restoration 
of diplomatic relations. This was eventually achieved because the problems 
created by the Suez affair forced both governments to address and resolve 
them. Moreover, these problems not only had to to be settled by a financial 
agreement, but they needed official contacts between representatives of both 
states to resolve the cases of thousands of British subjects regarding the 
compensation for their property or its desequestration.
As a result, diplomatic relations were resumed between the two states, albeit at 
a slow pace. Restoration of diplomatic relations took a longer period than the 
resolution of the financial agreement due to the generic difference between the 
two issues. Restoring diplomatic relations proved to be more difficult than 
settling technical financial disputes. The issues of the perceptions of the 
decision-makers of both countries — especially Egypt —  towards relations 
with the other and the psychological effects of the historical legacies of the 
past Anglo-Egyptian relationship and the Suez war also affected the decision 
to restore diplomatic ties. Moreover, as the restoration of diplomatic relations 
occurred against a background of heightened regional confrontation between 
the two states, it was influenced by this confrontation. This was the case, 
because diplomatic relations involved power considerations for Nasser inside 
the U.A.R. and in the region as a whole. Nasser feared the consequences of 
allowing an official U.K. presence in Cairo and Damascus which might have 
been used to undermine his power inside the U.A.R.
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After the rupture of Anglo-Egyptian relations in 1956, the problems caused by 
this abrupt rupture persuaded the two governments of the need for official 
contacts to settle these problems. This occurred against the background of the 
increased regional confrontation between them. As far as both Egypt and the 
United Kingdom were concerned, each was too powerful in relation to the 
other, too capable therefore of doing damage to their respective interests to be 
ignored. This realisation by both states forced the issue of the need for 
diplomatic relations.
Diplomatic relations were, therefore, restored largely because the government 
of each country acknowledged that they could harm each other and, in such a 
situation, the lack of formal diplomatic links was too dangerous.
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CONCLUSION
The restoration of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis 
was a slow and difficult process that lasted from 1957 until 1959. Indeed, it 
took two more years before official or diplomatic relations between the two 
states were upgraded to the ambassadorial level.
The history of Anglo-Egyptian relations prior to the break that occurred in 
1956 illustrates the way in which the structural imbalance which existed in that 
relationship — a relationship based on patronage — found expression in 
clashes in the foreign policies of both states and eventually developed into a 
fully-fledged regional conflict in the Middle East. Indeed, the Anglo-Egyptian 
relationship soured from 1954, until it was ultimately severed in 1956, mainly 
because of the above-mentioned regional confrontation and despite the fact 
that all the problems that had previously existed between the two states in the 
bilateral field were effectively resolved by the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian settlement 
over the Sudan and the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement.
The examination of the restoration of relations between the two states 
illustrates that the problems which developed between the United Kingdom 
and Egypt, as a result of the break of 1956, were the main factor which forced 
the two states to meet to discuss ways and means of resolving these problems 
and restoring their official links. This process occurred at a time when the 
regional conflict between the United Kingdom and Egypt reached its climax.
Bilateral relations took precedence for the governments of both states over
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issues related to the regional conflict because of the problems which emerged 
as a result of the abrupt rupture of the relations. After the break of 1956, these 
problems managed to generate such a momentum, and thereby exerted such 
internal pressure on the government of both the United Kingdom and Egypt, 
that the two governments sought to resolve them. Moreover, these internal 
pressures were mainly responsible for the fact that both governments had to 
accept compromises on these issues.
However, this research clearly shows that the restoration of official relations 
proved to be more difficult than the resolution of the technical problems in the 
field of bilateral relations. This was mainly due to the generic differences 
between the issues related to a financial agreement (which resolved most 
outstanding problems in the bilateral field between the two states) and those 
issues related to the restoration of official relations. Restoration of official or 
diplomatic relations involved other issues, such as the perceptions by the 
decision-makers of each state of the policies of the other and the remnants of 
the colonial legacies which continued to haunt the prospects of improving the 
Anglo-Egyptian relations, even after diplomatic ties were restored in 1959.
The issue of the legacies of the past relationship not only served to harm the 
prospects of the restoration of bilateral relations. The intensity of the relations 
between the United Kingdom and Egypt during the period of domination 
created a state of interdependence between the two states. On many levels, 
this degree of interdependence persisted, even after the period of domination 
was over. The abrupt severance of relations meant that certain sectors of the 
populations of both states were negatively affected. These sectors included 
those who had benefited from trade with the other state, as well as parts of the
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populace (British) who had to leave their country of residence (Egypt) 
because of the 1956 crisis. These two groups effectively created interest 
groups which lobbied their government in favour of the restoration of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations.
The case study examined in this thesis not only sheds light on the dynamics of 
the Anglo-Egyptian relationship during the period between 1957 and 1961, 
but provides some useful guides in the study of international relations. It has 
served to validate in some measure some of the basic assumptions of the realist 
and decision-making approaches, such as the importance of national interests, 
of the domestic environment and of the perceptions of the decision-makers as 
prime factors behind states’ actions. More specifically, this research raises some 
of the general issues that are relevant to an analysis of the dynamics of the 
relationship between a major power and its former client state.
This thesis illustrates the importance of taking into account the legacies of the 
relationship that existed between a major power and its former client state 
during the period of patronage, as these legacies will affect the perceptions of 
the decision-makers of both states regarding each other. These legacies may 
also lead to the emergence of certain groups within each state which may 
lobby their government for or against particular courses of action.
Among the legacies of the past relationship between a major power and its 
former client state, may well be a structural imbalance in their relations which 
may outlast the settlement of bilateral issues. This structural imbalance may be 
due to a frustrated paternalism on the part of the major power, which expects 
its former client state to continue to abide by the rules it had hitherto
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established, despite the end of the patronage relationship. This may be 
complicated by a desire on the part of the government of the former client state 
to prove or illustrate, to both its domestic and external environments, its 
independence by adopting a course of action which runs specifically against 
the interests of the major power. Therefore, such a structural imbalance may 
find expression in conflicts between the general foreign policies of the two 
states which may lead to a crisis in their relations.
In addition, the relationship between a major power and its client state, during 
the period of patronage, is bound to create links between not just the 
governments of the two states in question but also between sectors of the 
economies and societies of each of the two states. The sudden rupture of 
relations is therefore likely to cause a number of problems in the bilateral field 
between the two states. The analysis of these problems and their internal 
ramifications on the major power and its former client state under research, may 
provide a guide to the forces at work which lead to an eventual restoration of 
relations, even if the reason for the initial break —  conflict between their 
general foreign policies — is still in existence.
The case study also underlines the importance of the perceptions of the 
decision-makers and the impact that such perceptions may have on the foreign 
policies of their states. The fears, anxieties and past experiences of the 
decision-makers are bound to affect their countries’ foreign policy decisions in 
the sense that they may decide on courses of actions which would be 
inexplicable if the past experience and perceptions of the decision-maker were 
not taken into account.
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The study of international relations since the end of the Second World War has 
been dominated by the study of the superpowers. However, the international 
system has been characterised, since the dawn of history, by the rise and fall of 
powerful states and great powers. These great powers usually have patron- 
client relationships with a number of lesser powers.
These, in turn, are affected in varying ways by the decline of the great powers 
(or even the collapse of these great powers themselves). The decline in the 
strength of great or leading powers will eventually lead to two main results. 
Firstly, the collapse in the strength of the great powers will mean that they lose 
their hegemonic role in the international system and become simply major 
powers rather than great, leading or superpowers. The change in the status of 
several of the leading powers that once dominated the international system, 
such as Great Britain after the decline of the British Empire, or Russia after the 
collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union, illustrates this point. Secondly, 
this may lead to the eventual end of patron-client relationships which had 
existed when the major power was a great or leading power. The period of 
realignment or change in the status of the major power (from being a leading 
power), and the ending of the patron-client relationship, may lead to the 
souring of relations, and even to the severance of relations between the two.
Consequently, a better understanding of the international system might be 
gained if students of international relations were to devote equal attention to 
the study of the processes whereby states adjust to relative changes in status. 
In particular, the question of restoration of relations between major powers and 
their former clients after the rupture of relations raises issues central to our 
understanding of these processes.
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The process of the restoration of relations between the United Kingdom and 
Egypt examined in this research illuminates these processes. It shows that the 
decline in the power of the major power (the British Empire) had also affected 
the pattern of the relationship between itself and one of its client states 
(Egypt). This was manifested in a structural imbalance in the relationship 
which, after the resolution of the outstanding problems in bilateral relations, 
found expression in clashes between the foreign policies of the two states. In 
addition to the positive effects of the problems in the bilateral field between 
the states in question — problems which resulted from the sudden severance 
of the relationship — on the process of the restoration of relations, the case 
study illustrates that the process of normalisation of the relations between the 
two states is a factor, as well as a function of, the readjustment of the major 
power to its new status in world affairs as a major rather a great power. This 
process of readjustment also applies to the former client state, which eventually 
come to realise the importance of conducting its international relations on the 
basis of common and national interests, with the ensuing realisation that 
sometimes politics may necessitate relations with other states where the only 
common feeling between them is fear, mistrust or even animosity.
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